MSManne Sjöstrand

Manne Sjöstrand

*This is an algorithmically generated author record based on publicly available information.

Current Organizations / Institutes

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Previous Organizations / Institutes

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Manne Sjöstrand has a total of 12 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:


Latest Publications

  • Open Access

    Third-Party Perspective in Medical Research Ethics: A Case Series of Clinical Trials Involving Individuals with Sexual Interest in Children

    by Manne Sjöstrand, Niklas Juth, Elisabeth Karlsson, Christoffer Rahm

    It is a central principle in modern research ethics that the rights, safety, and well-being of research participants are the most important considerations. This should also apply to third-party individuals, that is, individuals who are not research participants but may be affected by the research. Despite this, international research ethics guidelines give limited attention to protecting third parties. This gap became evident when we were involved in the design and conduct of a series of clinical trials involving individuals with sexual interest in children, where children may constitute an identifiable third-party group at risk of harm. In response, we systematically analysed these ethical challenges and developed preventive strategies to safeguard third parties alongside the protection of research participants. We discuss specific risk mitigation measures implemented in our clinical trials and propose that international guidelines be revised to strengthen the protection of third parties at risk of harm in medical trials.

  • The phantasm of zero suicide

    by Manne Sjöstrand, Nir Eyal

    Governments and non-governmental organisations are increasingly adopting a ‘zero-suicide’ goal, but what such a goal precisely involves is unclear. Ostensibly it strongly prioritises the prevention and elimination of all suicide. We argue that, so understood, a societal goal of zero suicide risks contravening several ethical principles. In terms of beneficence and non-maleficence, a ‘zero-suicide’ goal risks being inefficient and may burden or harm many people. Autonomy-wise, a blanket ban on all suicide is excessive. As regards social justice, zero suicide risks focusing on the symptoms of social malaise instead of the structures causing it. With respect to transparency, a ‘zero’ goal that cannot be met makes these authorities look detached and risks frustration, distrust and, worse, stigmatisation of suicide and of mental health conditions. Instead, we propose a middle path for suicide prevention, founded on harm reduction, ‘soft group paternalism’ and efforts directed at increased quality of life for disadvantaged groups. Although soft group paternalism respects autonomy, this approach permits coercive interferences in certain circumstances. We hope that the justificatory framework tying together these largely familiar elements is novel and sensible.


  • Open Access

    Skepticism towards the Swedish vision zero for suicide: interviews with 12 psychiatrists

    by Petter Karlsson, Gert Helgesson, David Titelman, Manne Sjöstrand, Niklas Juth

    The main causes of suicide and how suicide could and should be prevented are ongoing controversies in the scientific literature as well as in public media. In the bill on public health from 2008 (Prop 2007/08:110), the Swedish Parliament adopted an overarching “Vision Zero for Suicide” (VZ) and nine strategies for suicide prevention. However, how the VZ should be interpreted in healthcare is unclear. The VZ has been criticized both from a philosophical perspective and against the background of clinical experience and alleged empirical claims regarding the consequences of regulating suicide prevention. This study is part of a larger research project in medical ethics with the overarching aim to explore whether the VZ is ethically justifiable. The aim is to enrich the normative discussion by investigating empirically how the VZ is perceived in healthcare. Interviews based on a semi-structured interview guide were performed with 12 Swedish psychiatrists. The interviews were analysed with descriptive qualitative content analysis aiming for identifying perceptions of the Vision Zero for Suicide as well as arguments for and against it. Though most of the participants mentioned at least some potential benefit of the Vision Zero for Suicide, the overall impression was a predominant skepticism. Some participants focused on why they consider the VZ to be unachievable, while others focused more on its potential consequences and normative implications. The VZ was perceived to be impossible to realize, nonconstructive or potentially counterproductive, and undesirable because of potential conflicts with other values and interests of patients as well as the general public. There were also important notions of the VZ having negative consequences for the working conditions of psychiatrists in Sweden, in increasing their work-related anxiety and thwarting the patient-physician relationship.


  • Open Access

    Ethical deliberations about involuntary treatment: interviews with Swedish psychiatrists

    by Manne Sjöstrand, Lars Sandman, Petter Karlsson, Gert Helgesson, Stefan Eriksson, Niklas Juth

    Involuntary treatment is a key issue in healthcare ethics. In this study, ethical issues relating to involuntary psychiatric treatment are investigated through interviews with Swedish psychiatrists. In-depth interviews were conducted with eight Swedish psychiatrists, focusing on their experiences of and views on compulsory treatment. In relation to this, issues about patient autonomy were also discussed. The interviews were analysed using a descriptive qualitative approach. The answers focus on two main aspects of compulsory treatment. Firstly, deliberations about when and why it was justifiable to make a decision on involuntary treatment in a specific case. Here the cons and pros of ordering compulsory treatment were discussed, with particular emphasis on the consequences of providing treatment vs. refraining from ordering treatment. Secondly, a number of issues relating to background factors affecting decisions for or against involuntary treatment were also discussed. These included issues about the Swedish Mental Care Act, healthcare organisation and the care environment. Involuntary treatment was generally seen as an unwanted exception to standard care. The respondents’ judgments about involuntary treatment were typically in line with Swedish law on the subject. However, it was also argued that the law leaves room for individual judgments when making decisions about involuntary treatment. Much of the reasoning focused on the consequences of ordering involuntary treatment, where risk of harm to the therapeutic alliance was weighed against the assumed good consequences of ensuring that patients received needed treatment. Cases concerning suicidal patients and psychotic patients who did not realise their need for care were typically held as paradigmatic examples of justified involuntary care. However, there was an ambivalence regarding the issue of suicide as it was also argued that risk of suicide in itself might not be sufficient for justified involuntary care. It was moreover argued that organisational factors sometimes led to decisions about compulsory treatment that could have been avoided, given a more patient-oriented healthcare organisation.


  • Open Access

    Conceptions of decision-making capacity in psychiatry: interviews with Swedish psychiatrists

    by Manne Sjöstrand, Petter Karlsson, Lars Sandman, Gert Helgesson, Stefan Eriksson, Niklas Juth

    Decision-making capacity is a key concept in contemporary healthcare ethics. Previous research has mainly focused on philosophical, conceptual issues or on evaluation of different tools for assessing patients’ capacity. The aim of the present study is to investigate how the concept and its normative role are understood in Swedish psychiatric care. Of special interest for present purposes are the relationships between decisional capacity and psychiatric disorders and between health law and practical ethics. Eight in-depth interviews were conducted with Swedish psychiatrists. The interviews were analysed according to descriptive qualitative content analysis in which categories and sub-categories were distilled from the material. Decision-making capacity was seen as dependent on understanding, insight, evaluation, reasoning, and abilities related to making and communicating a choice. However, also the actual content of the decision was held as relevant. There was an ambivalence regarding the relationship between psychiatric disorders and capacity and a tendency to regard psychiatric patients who made unwise treatment decisions as decisionally incapable. However, in cases relating to patients with somatic illnesses, the assumption was rather that patients who made unwise decisions were imprudent but yet decisionally capable. The respondents’ conceptions of decision-making capacity were mainly in line with standard theories. However, the idea that capacity also includes aspects relating to the content of the decision clearly deviates from the standard view. The tendency to regard imprudent choices by psychiatric patients as betokening lack of decision-making capacity differs from the view taken of such choices in somatic care. This difference merits further investigations.


  • Paternalism in the Name of Autonomy

    by Manne Sjöstrand, Stefan Eriksson, Niklas Juth, Gert Helgesson

    Different ideas of the normative relevance of autonomy can give rise to profoundly different action-guiding principles in healthcare. If autonomy is seen as a value rather than as a right, it can be argued that patients’ decisions should sometimes be overruled in order to protect or promote their own autonomy. We refer to this as paternalism in the name of autonomy. In this paper, we discuss different elements of autonomy (decision-making capacity, efficiency, and authenticity) and arguments in favor of paternalism for the sake of autonomy that have been proposed in the bioethical debate. We argue that if autonomy is valuable, then paternalism for the sake of autonomy may be justified. However, policies allowing paternalism in the name of autonomy may be self-defeating.


  • Authenticity and psychiatric disorder: does autonomy of personal preferences matter?

    by Manne Sjöstrand, Niklas Juth

    In healthcare ethics there is a discussion regarding whether autonomy of personal preferences, what sometimes is referred to as authenticity, is necessary for autonomous decision-making. It has been argued that patients’ decisions that lack sufficient authenticity could be deemed as non-autonomous and be justifiably overruled by healthcare staff. The present paper discusses this issue in relation certain psychiatric disorders. It takes its starting point in recent qualitative studies of the experiences and thoughts of patients’ with anorexia nervosa where issues related to authenticity seem particularly relevant. The paper examines different interpretations of authenticity relevant for autonomy and concludes that the concept, as it has been elaborated in recent debate, is highly problematic to use as a criterion for autonomous decision-making in healthcare.


  • Autonomy-based arguments against physician-assisted suicide and euthanasia: a critique

    by Manne Sjöstrand, Gert Helgesson, Stefan Eriksson, Niklas Juth

    Respect for autonomy is typically considered a key reason for allowing physician assisted suicide and euthanasia. However, several recent papers have claimed this to be grounded in a misconception of the normative relevance of autonomy. It has been argued that autonomy is properly conceived of as a value, and that this makes assisted suicide as well as euthanasia wrong, since they destroy the autonomy of the patient. This paper evaluates this line of reasoning by investigating the conception of valuable autonomy. Starting off from the current debate in end-of-life care, two different interpretations of how autonomy is valuable is discussed. According to one interpretation, autonomy is a personal prudential value, which may provide a reason why euthanasia and assisted suicide might be against a patient’s best interests. According to a second interpretation, inspired by Kantian ethics, being autonomous is unconditionally valuable, which may imply a duty to preserve autonomy. We argue that both lines of reasoning have limitations when it comes to situations relevant for end-of life care. It is concluded that neither way of reasoning can be used to show that assisted suicide or euthanasia always is impermissible.


  • Open Access

    European Association for Palliative Care (EAPC) framework for palliative sedation: an ethical discussion

    by Niklas Juth, Anna Lindblad, Niels Lynöe, Manne Sjöstrand, Gert Helgesson

    The aim of this paper is to critically discuss some of the ethically controversial issues regarding continuous deep palliative sedation at the end of life that are addressed in the EAPC recommended framework for the use of sedation in palliative care.