LCLizzie Coles-Kemp

Lizzie Coles-Kemp

*This is an algorithmically generated author record based on publicly available information.

Current Organizations / Institutes

The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article

Previous Organizations / Institutes

The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years


Lizzie Coles-Kemp has a total of 24 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:


Latest Publications

  • Open Access

    Friend or Foe? Navigating and Re-configuring “Snipers' Alley“

    by Andrew C Dwyer, Lizzie Coles-Kemp, Claude P R Heath, Clara Crivellaro


  • Open Access

    Co-creating Conditions for Social Justice in Digital Societies: Modes of Resistance in HCI Collaborative Endeavors

    by Clara Crivellaros, Lizzie Coles-Kemp, Alan Dix, Ann Light

    In this article, we report on a 3-year endeavor that fostered 18 collaborations between academic and non-academic organizations to co-create responses to social (in)justice issues in digital societies. The projects and range of individuals and organizations connected to this program offer a snapshot of the state of social justice thinking within the UK digital economy research sector. Our analysis shows how the program’s constellations of actions enacted different modes of resistance attempting to reshape people’s relationship to power dynamics, addressing institutions and exposing systems, and developing and restoring values for social justice. We explore how these efforts invite nuanced understanding of what constitutes resistance in knowledge co-production endeavors and how they helped surface tensions at the intersection of agencies and the distribution of responsibilities. Drawing from our insights and experience, we discuss implications for HCI concerned with the creation of the conditions for social justice in our digital societies.


  • Open Access

    Designing Through The Stack: The Case for a Participatory Digital Security By Design

    by Ian Slesinger, Lizzie Coles-Kemp, Niki Panteli, Rene Rydhof Hansen

    Whilst participatory practice is increasingly adopted in end user studies, there has been far less use of a participatory approach when designing lower down the software stack. As a result, end users are often presented with security controls over which they have no control but for which they retain the responsibility. Conversely, hardware and software engineers struggle to innovate new security control designs that are resilient to new and emerging threats. In a study utilising ethnographic research and stakeholder interviews, we show that there is a siloing of communities of practice between hardware security engineers, software engineers and coders, manufacturers in the technology supply chain and end users. Our findings indicate that this siloing and a lack of participatory practice impedes the development of a more cohesive digital security design that integrates security through the stack from the hardware layer upwards to the OS and application layers. These barriers make difficult the negotiation between what is possible lower down the stack with what is needed and wanted higher up the stack. Our findings suggest that a more holistic and comprehensive participatory design approach is required to negotiate a digital security by design paradigm that more evenly distributes power over and responsibility for security controls throughout the stack. Working with the HCI literature on co-production in design, this paper will suggest that a pathway for breaking through this impasse is to utilise objects in the design process of the hardware secure instruction set architecture as a feedback mechanism to incorporate other sets of designers and users in the design process to create a more workable stack.


  • Open Access

    Accessible and Inclusive Cyber Security: A Nuanced and Complex Challenge

    by Karen Renaud, Lizzie Coles-Kemp

    It has been argued that human-centred security design needs to accommodate the considerations of three dimensions: (1) security, (2) usability and (3) accessibility. The latter has not yet received much attention. Now that governments and health services are increasingly requiring their citizens/patients to use online services, the need for accessible security and privacy has become far more pressing. The reality is that, for many, security measures are often exasperatingly inaccessible. Regardless of the outcome of the debate about the social acceptability of compelling people to access public services online, we still need to design accessibility into these systems, or risk excluding and marginalising swathes of the population who cannot use these systems in the same way as abled users. These users are particularly vulnerable to attack and online deception not only because security and privacy controls are inaccessible but also because they often struggle with depleted resources and capabilities together with less social, economic and political resilience. This conceptual paper contemplates the accessible dimension of human-centred security and its impact on the inclusivity of security technologies. We scope the range of vulnerabilities that can result from a lack of accessibility in security solutions and contemplate the nuances and complex challenges inherent in making security accessible. We conclude by suggesting a number of avenues for future work in this space.


  • Inclusive Security: Digital Security Meets Web Science

    by Lizzie Coles-Kemp

    The rationale for designing, implementing and managing security technologies has a notion of “risk” at its core; the risk of compromise to technology or information weighed up against the cost of protecting against such an incursion. However, such approaches have been focused on the protection of technology and information, with the assumption that if this is protected then people are also protected; an assumption that is much harder to maintain in a more open, networked context such as the one that has been enabled by growth of the World Wide Web. Grounded in the interdisciplinary endeavours that characterise Web Science, this monograph presents the case for a more inclusive form of technological security. Such a security places the security of technology in the context of the security of people operating in a web-enabled and digitally-connected society and results in a digital security that responds to the enmeshed nature of technology and society. This monograph uses a wide analytical lens that encompasses the sociotechnical infrastructures, networks of power and the practices that shape our interactions with and through digital technologies to explore this more expansive form of security.


  • Open Access

    Digital welfare: designing for more nuanced forms of access

    by Lizzie Coles-Kemp, Debi Ashenden, Amelia Morris, Jeremy Yuille

    The aim of many forms of digitalized welfare is to offer a personalized, holistic service that is affordable, sustainable, efficient, encouraging and leaves room for voluntary action. We argue that for these goals to be achieved, consideration has to be given both to the design of the system delivered by the welfare provider and to the ecosystem that further shapes the experience of the system. In such an ecosystem not only should state-provided welfare be considered but so too should community support, as well as alternative methods of accounting for societal contribution. In this paper, we use theoretical perspectives on access and security to ideate sketches that invoke new user experiences of welfare. These sketches reflect the importance of both designing for and understanding the ecosystem in which welfare systems are accessed, in order to articulate a different welfare ethos that can encompass both complementary and conflicting perspectives. Using the ideas of Buchanan ( 1992 , 2001a ) our synthesis of theories related to security with the practical implementation of digital welfare aims to shape the placement (Buchanan 1992 ) of digital welfare by embedding access points of different types further into the welfare ecosystem.


  • Open Access

    Holding on to dissensus: Participatory interactions in security design

    by Claude P.R. Heath, Peter A. Hall, Lizzie Coles-Kemp

    Holding on to dissensus: Participatory interactions in security design


  • Open Access

    Why Should I? Cybersecurity, the Security of the State and the Insecurity of the Citizen

    by Lizzie Coles-Kemp, Debi Ashenden, Kieron O'Hara

    Why Should I? Cybersecurity, the Security of the State and the Insecurity of the Citizen


  • Watching You Watching Me: The Art of Playing the Panopticon

    by Coles-Kemp Lizzie, Zugenmaier Alf, Lewis Makayla

    As governments increasingly deliver services over the Internet, the opportunities for monitoring and surveillance of society increase. In public services to support the vulnerable, such as welfare, monitoring and surveillance functionality is often regarded by system designers as important components in defences against fraud and system misuse. However, the responses from the participants in this study demonstrate the potential difficulty of deploying such approaches when the systems themselves are perceived as working against not with the communities and indicate that supportive social networks are a prerequisite for these the technological systems to be secure. We explored the case of the use of the Internet to deliver parts of the UK welfare system from the perspective of an economically and socially deprived community in the North East of England. The findings show that, in the views of the research participants, reliance on technological security mechanisms makes the underlying administrative processes less rather than more secure. The findings also show that a focus on system security and monitoring rather than benevolence and user empathy is a barrier to the successful delivery of ‘digital by default’ services and can increase the overall feelings of insecurity in everyday life for service users. Our conclusion is that rather than being regarded as a technical system, such a service is better conceptualised as a social system with technological elements embedded within it. We therefore also argue that if such technological systems are to be secure, then the service design must also support the social networks that interact with these systems. We further argue that service providers must work with individual communities to develop and support the social networks in order for the technological security controls to be effective.