NBNikita Borisov

Nikita Borisov

*This is an algorithmically generated author record based on publicly available information.

Current Organizations / Institutes

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Previous Organizations / Institutes

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Nikita Borisov has a total of 39 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:


Latest Publications

  • Open Access

    DiProber: Using Dual Probing to Estimate Tor Relay Capacities in Underloaded Networks

    by Hussein Darir, Nikita Borisov, Geir Dullerud

    Tor is the most popular anonymous communication network. It has millions of daily users seeking privacy while browsing the internet. It has thousands of relays to route and anonymize the source and destinations of the users packets. To create a path, Tor authorities generate a probability distribution over relays based on the estimates of the capacities of the relays. An incoming user will then sample this probability distribution and choose three relays for their paths. The estimates are based on the bandwidths of observation probes the authority assigns to each relay in the network. Thus, in order to achieve better load balancing between users, accurate estimates are necessary. Unfortunately, the currently implemented estimation algorithm generate inaccurate estimates causing the network to be under utilized and its capacities unfairly distributed between the users paths. We propose DiProber, a new relay capacity estimation algorithm. The algorithm proposes a new measurement scheme in Tor consisting of two probes per relay and uses maximum likelihood to estimate their capacities. We show that the new technique works better in the case of under-utilized networks where users tend to have very low demand on the Tor network.

  • Open Access

    Detecting AI Trojans Using Meta Neural Analysis

    by Xiaojun Xu, Qi Wang, Huichen Li, Nikita Borisov, Carl A. Gunter, Bo Li

    In machine learning Trojan attacks, an adversary trains a corrupted model that obtains good performance on normal data but behaves maliciously on data samples with certain trigger patterns. Several approaches have been proposed to detect such attacks, but they make undesirable assumptions about the attack strategies or require direct access to the trained models, which restricts their utility in practice. This paper addresses these challenges by introducing a Meta Neural Trojan Detection (MNTD) pipeline that does not make assumptions on the attack strategies and only needs black-box access to models. The strategy is to train a meta-classifier that predicts whether a given target model is Trojaned. To train the meta-model without knowledge of the attack strategy, we introduce a technique called jumbo learning that samples a set of Trojaned models following a general distribution. We then dynamically optimize a query set together with the meta-classifier to distinguish between Trojaned and benign models. We evaluate MNTD with experiments on vision, speech, tabular data and natural language text datasets, and against different Trojan attacks such as data poisoning attack, model manipulation attack, and latent attack. We show that MNTD achieves 97% detection AUC score and significantly outperforms existing detection approaches. In addition, MNTD generalizes well and achieves high detection performance against unforeseen attacks. We also propose a robust MNTD pipeline which achieves 90% detection AUC even when the attacker aims to evade the detection with full knowledge of the system.

  • Open Access

    Every Move You Make: Exploring Practical Issues in Smartphone Motion Sensor Fingerprinting and Countermeasures

    by Anupam Das, Nikita Borisov, Edward Chou

    The ability to track users’ activities across different websites and visits is a key tool in advertising and surveillance. The HTML5 DeviceMotion interface creates a new opportunity for such tracking via fingerprinting of smartphone motion sensors. We study the feasibility of carrying out such fingerprinting under real-world constraints and on a large scale. In particular, we collect measurements from several hundred users under realistic scenarios and show that the state-of-the-art techniques provide very low accuracy in these settings. We then improve fingerprinting accuracy by changing the classifier as well as incorporating auxiliary information. We also show how to perform fingerprinting in an open-world scenario where one must distinguish between known and previously unseen users.We next consider the problem of developing fingerprinting countermeasures; we evaluate the usability of a previously proposed obfuscation technique and a newly developed quantization technique via a large-scale user study. We find that both techniques are able to drastically reduce fingerprinting accuracy without significantly impacting the utility of the sensors in web applications.


  • Open Access

    Smartphone Fingerprinting Via Motion Sensors: Analyzing Feasibility at Large-Scale and Studying Real Usage Patterns

    by Anupam Das, Nikita Borisov, Edward Chou, Muhammad Haris Mughees

    Advertisers are increasingly turning to fingerprinting techniques to track users across the web. As web browsing activity shifts to mobile platforms, traditional browser fingerprinting techniques become less effective; however, device fingerprinting using built-in sensors offers a new avenue for attack. We study the feasibility of using motion sensors to perform device fingerprinting at scale, and explore countermeasures that can be used to protect privacy. We perform a large-scale user study to demonstrate that motion sensor fingerprinting is effective with even 500 users. We also develop a model to estimate prediction accuracy for larger user populations; our model provides a conservative estimate of at least 12% classification accuracy with 100000 users. We then investigate the use of motion sensors on the web and find, distressingly, that many sites send motion sensor data to servers for storage and analysis, paving the way to potential fingerprinting. Finally, we consider the problem of developing fingerprinting countermeasures; we evaluate a previously proposed obfuscation technique and a newly developed quantization technique via a user study. We find that both techniques are able to drastically reduce fingerprinting accuracy without significantly impacting the utility of the sensors in web applications.

  • Open Access

    Defending Tor from Network Adversaries: A Case Study of Network Path Prediction

    by Joshua Juen, Aaron Johnson, Anupam Das, Nikita Borisov, Matthew Caesar

    The Tor anonymity network has been shown vulnerable to traffic analysis attacks by autonomous systems and Internet exchanges, which can observe different overlay hops belonging to the same circuit. We aim to determine whether network path prediction techniques provide an accurate picture of the threat from such adversaries, and whether they can be used to avoid this threat. We perform a measurement study by running traceroutes from Tor relays to destinations around the Internet. We use the data to evaluate the accuracy of the autonomous systems and Internet exchanges that are predicted to appear on the path using state-of-the-art path inference techniques; we also consider the impact that prediction errors have on Tor security, and whether it is possible to produce a useful overestimate that does not miss important threats. Finally, we evaluate the possibility of using these predictions to actively avoid AS and IX adversaries and the challenges this creates for the design of Tor.

  • Open Access

    SWEET: Serving the Web by Exploiting Email Tunnels

    by Amir Houmansadr, Wenxuan Zhou, Matthew Caesar, Nikita Borisov

    Open communication over the Internet poses a serious threat to countries with repressive regimes, leading them to develop and deploy censorship mechanisms within their networks. Unfortunately, existing censorship circumvention systems do not provide high availability guarantees to their users, as censors can identify, hence disrupt, the traffic belonging to these systems using today's advanced censorship technologies. In this paper we propose SWEET, a highly available censorship-resistant infrastructure. SWEET works by encapsulating a censored user's traffic to a proxy server inside email messages that are carried over by public email service providers, like Gmail and Yahoo Mail. As the operation of SWEET is not bound to specific email providers we argue that a censor will need to block all email communications in order to disrupt SWEET, which is infeasible as email constitutes an important part of today's Internet. Through experiments with a prototype of our system we find that SWEET's performance is sufficient for web traffic. In particular, regular websites are downloaded within couple of seconds.

  • Open Access

    IP over Voice-over-IP for censorship circumvention

    by Amir Houmansadr, Thomas Riedl, Nikita Borisov, Andrew Singer

    Open communication over the Internet poses a serious threat to countries with repressive regimes, leading them to develop and deploy network-based censorship mechanisms within their networks. Existing censorship circumvention systems face different difficulties in providing unobservable communication with their clients; this limits their availability and poses threats to their users. To provide the required unobservability, several recent circumvention systems suggest modifying Internet routers running outside the censored region to intercept and redirect packets to censored destinations. However, these approaches require modifications to ISP networks, and hence requires cooperation from ISP operators and/or network equipment vendors, presenting a substantial deployment challenge. In this report we propose a deployable and unobservable censorship-resistant infrastructure, called FreeWave. FreeWave works by modulating a client's Internet connections into acoustic signals that are carried over VoIP connections. Such VoIP connections are targeted to a server, FreeWave server, that extracts the tunneled traffic of clients and proxies them to the uncensored Internet. The use of actual VoIP connections, as opposed to traffic morphing, allows FreeWave to relay its VoIP connections through oblivious VoIP nodes, hence keeping itself unblockable from censors that perform IP address blocking. Also, the use of end-to-end encryption prevents censors from identifying FreeWave's VoIP connections using packet content filtering technologies, like deep-packet inspection. We prototype the designed FreeWave system over the popular VoIP system of Skype. We show that FreeWave is able to reliably achieve communication bandwidths that are sufficient for web browsing, even when clients are far distanced from the FreeWave server.

  • Open Access

    Securing Tor Tunnels under the Selective-DoS Attack

    by Anupam Das, Nikita Borisov

    Anonymous communication systems are subject to selective denial-of-service (DoS) attacks. Selective DoS attacks lower anonymity as they force paths to be rebuilt multiple times to ensure delivery which increases the opportunity for more attack. In this paper we present a detection algorithm that filters out compromised communication channels for one of the most widely used anonymity networks, Tor. Our detection algorithm uses two levels of probing to filter out potentially compromised tunnels. We perform probabilistic analysis and extensive simulation to show the robustness of our detection algorithm. We also analyze the overhead of our detection algorithm and show that we can achieve satisfactory security guarantee for reasonable communication overhead (5% of the total available Tor bandwidth in the worst case). Real world experiments reveal that our detection algorithm provides good defense against selective DoS attack.

  • Open Access

    Pisces: Anonymous Communication Using Social Networks

    by Prateek Mittal, Matthew Wright, Nikita Borisov

    The architectures of deployed anonymity systems such as Tor suffer from two key problems that limit user's trust in these systems. First, paths for anonymous communication are built without considering trust relationships between users and relays in the system. Second, the network architecture relies on a set of centralized servers. In this paper, we propose Pisces, a decentralized protocol for anonymous communications that leverages users' social links to build circuits for onion routing. We argue that such an approach greatly improves the system's resilience to attackers. A fundamental challenge in this setting is the design of a secure process to discover peers for use in a user's circuit. All existing solutions for secure peer discovery leverage structured topologies and cannot be applied to unstructured social network topologies. In Pisces, we discover peers by using random walks in the social network graph with a bias away from highly connected nodes to prevent a few nodes from dominating the circuit creation process. To secure the random walks, we leverage the reciprocal neighbor policy: if malicious nodes try to exclude honest nodes during peer discovery so as to improve the chance of being selected, then honest nodes can use a tit-for-tat approach and reciprocally exclude the malicious nodes from their routing tables. We describe a fully decentralized protocol for enforcing this policy, and use it to build the Pisces anonymity system. Using theoretical modeling and experiments on real-world social network topologies, we show that (a) the reciprocal neighbor policy mitigates active attacks that an adversary can perform, (b) our decentralized protocol to enforce this policy is secure and has low overhead, and (c) the overall anonymity provided by our system significantly outperforms existing approaches.

  • Open Access

    PIRATTE: Proxy-based Immediate Revocation of ATTribute-based Encryption

    by Sonia Jahid, Nikita Borisov

    Access control to data in traditional enterprises is typically enforced through reference monitors. However, as more and more enterprise data is outsourced, trusting third party storage servers is getting challenging. As a result, cryptography, specifically Attribute-based encryption (ABE) is getting popular for its expressiveness. The challenge of ABE is revocation. To address this challenge, we propose PIRATTE, an architecture that supports fine-grained access control policies and dynamic group membership. PIRATTE is built using attribute-based encryption; a key and novel feature of our architecture, however, is that it is possible to remove access from a user without issuing new keys to other users or re-encrypting existing ciphertexts. We achieve this by introducing a proxy that participates in the decryption process and enforces revocation constraints. The proxy is minimally trusted and cannot decrypt ciphertexts or provide access to previously revoked users. We describe the PIRATTE construction and provide a security analysis along with performance evaluation.We also describe an architecture for online social network that can use PIRATTE, and prototype application of PIRATTE on Facebook.