MGMatthew Green

Matthew Green

*This is an algorithmically generated author record based on publicly available information.

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The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article


Matthew Green has a total of 31 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:


Latest Publications

  • Open Access

    zk-Agreements: A Privacy-Preserving Way to Establish Deterministic Trust in Confidential Agreements

    by To-Wen Liu, Matthew Green

    Digital transactions currently exceed trillions of dollars annually, yet traditional paper-based agreements remain a bottleneck for automation, enforceability, and dispute resolution. Natural language contracts introduce ambiguity, require manual processing, and lack computational verifiability, all of which hinder efficient digital commerce. Computable legal contracts, expressed in machine-readable formats, offer a potential solution by enabling automated execution and verification. Blockchain-based smart contracts further strengthen enforceability and accelerate dispute resolution; however, current implementations risk exposing sensitive agreement terms on public ledgers, raising serious privacy and competitive intelligence concerns that limit enterprise adoption. We introduce zk-agreements, a protocol designed to transition from paper-based trust to cryptographic trust while preserving confidentiality. Our design combines zero-knowledge proofs to protect private agreement terms, secure two-party computation to enable private compliance evaluation, and smart contracts to guarantee automated enforcement. Together, these components achieve both privacy preservation and computational enforceability, resolving the fundamental tension between transparency and confidentiality in blockchain-based agreements.

  • Open Access

    SoK: Privacy-Preserving Signatures

    by Alishah Chator, Matthew Green, Pratyush Ranjan Tiwari

    Modern security systems depend fundamentally on the ability of users to authenticate their communications to other parties in a network. Unfortunately, cryptographic authentication can substantially undermine the privacy of users. One possible solution to this problem is to use privacy-preserving cryptographic authentication. These protocols allow users to authenticate their communications without revealing their identity to the verifier. In the non-interactive setting, the most common protocols include blind, ring, and group signatures, each of which has been the subject of enormous research in the security and cryptography literature. These primitives are now being deployed at scale in major applications, including Intel's SGX software attestation framework. The depth of the research literature and the prospect of large-scale deployment motivate us to systematize our understanding of the research in this area. This work provides an overview of these techniques, focusing on applications and efficiency.


  • On the Possibility of a Backdoor in the Micali-Schnorr Generator

    by Hannah Davis, Matthew D. Green, Nadia Heninger, Keegan Ryan, Adam Suhl


  • Open Access

    Time-Deniable Signatures

    by Gabrielle Beck, Arka Rai Choudhuri, Matthew Green, Abhishek Jain, Pratyush Ranjan Tiwari

    In this work we propose time-deniable signatures (TDS), a new primitive that facilitates deniable authentication in protocols such as DKIM-signed email. As with traditional signatures, TDS provide strong authenticity for message content, at least {\em for a sender-chosen period of time}. Once this time period has elapsed, however, time-deniable signatures can be forged by any party who obtains a signature. This forgery property ensures that signatures serve a useful authentication purpose for a bounded time period, while also allowing signers to plausibly disavow the creation of older signed content. Most critically, and unlike many past proposals for deniable authentication, TDS do not require interaction with the receiver or the deployment of any persistent cryptographic infrastructure or services beyond the signing process ( e.g., APIs to publish secrets or author timestamp certificates.) We first investigate the security definitions for time-deniability, demonstrating that past definition attempts are insufficient (and indeed, allow for broken signature schemes.) We then propose an efficient construction of TDS based on well-studied assumptions.


  • Open Access

    McFIL: Model Counting Functionality-Inherent Leakage

    by Maximilian Zinkus, Yinzhi Cao, Matthew Green

    Protecting the confidentiality of private data and using it for useful collaboration have long been at odds. Modern cryptography is bridging this gap through rapid growth in secure protocols such as multi-party computation, fully-homomorphic encryption, and zero-knowledge proofs. However, even with provable indistinguishability or zero-knowledgeness, confidentiality loss from leakage inherent to the functionality may partially or even completely compromise secret values without ever falsifying proofs of security. In this work, we describe McFIL, an algorithmic approach and accompanying software implementation which automatically quantifies intrinsic leakage for a given functionality. Extending and generalizing the Chosen-Ciphertext attack framework of Beck et al. with a practical heuristic, our approach not only quantifies but maximizes functionality-inherent leakage using Maximum Model Counting within a SAT solver. As a result, McFIL automatically derives approximately-optimal adversary inputs that, when used in secure protocols, maximize information leakage of private values.

  • Open Access

    Efficient Proofs of Software Exploitability for Real-world Processors

    by Matthew Green, Mathias Hall-Andersen, Eric Hennenfent, Gabriel Kaptchuk, Benjamin Perez, Gijs Van Laer

    We consider the problem of proving in zero-knowledge the existence of vulnerabilities in executables compiled to run on real-world processors. We demonstrate that it is practical to prove knowledge of real exploits for real-world processor architectures without the need for source code and without limiting our consideration to narrow vulnerability classes. To achieve this, we devise a novel circuit compiler and a toolchain that produces highly optimized, non-interactive zero-knowledge proofs for programs executed on the MSP430, an ISA commonly used in embedded hardware. Our toolchain employs a highly optimized circuit compiler and a number of novel optimizations to construct efficient proofs for program binaries. To demonstrate the capability of our system, we test our toolchain by constructing proofs for challenges in the Microcorruption capture the flag exercises.


  • One-Time Programs from Commodity Hardware

    by Harry Eldridge, Aarushi Goel, Matthew Green, Abhishek Jain, Maximilian Zinkus


  • Stacking Sigmas: A Framework to Compose $\varSigma $-Protocols for Disjunctions

    by Aarushi Goel, Matthew Green, Mathias Hall-Andersen, Gabriel Kaptchuk


  • Open Access

    Efficient Set Membership Proofs using MPC-in-the-Head

    by Aarushi Goel, Matthew Green, Mathias Hall-Andersen, Gabriel Kaptchuk

    Set membership proofs are an invaluable part of privacy preserving systems. These proofs allow a prover to demonstrate knowledge of a witness w corresponding to a secret element x of a public set, such that they jointly satisfy a given NP relation, i.e. ℛ(w, x) = 1 and x is a member of a public set {x 1, . . . , x