Christian Zenger
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Christian Zenger has a total of 19 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Christof Paar
Max Planck Institute for Security and Privacy, Bochum, Germany
3 shared publications - Aiqun Hu
Southeast University
2 shared publications - Guyue Li
School of Cyber Science and Engineering, Southeast University, Nanjing, China
2 shared publications - Harald Elders-Boll
Max Planck Institute for Security and Privacy TH Köln ICCT Cologne Germany
2 shared publications - Abhijit Ambekar
University of Kaiserslautern
1 shared publication - Christof Paar
Max Planck Institute for Security and Privacy, Bochum, Germany
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- Open Access
Anti-Tamper Radio meets Reconfigurable Intelligent Surface for System-Level Tamper Detection
Many computing systems need to be protected against physical attacks using active tamper detection based on sensors. One technical solution is to employ an ATR (Anti-Tamper Radio) approach, analyzing the radio wave propagation effects within a protected device to detect unauthorized physical alterations. However, ATR systems face key challenges in terms of susceptibility to signal manipulation attacks, limited reliability due to environmental noise, and regulatory constraints from wide bandwidth usage. In this work, we propose and experimentally evaluate an ATR system complemented by an RIS to dynamically reconfigure the wireless propagation environment. We show that this approach can enhance resistance against signal manipulation attacks, reduce bandwidth requirements from several~GHz down to as low as 20 MHz, and improve robustness to environmental disturbances such as internal fan movements. Our work demonstrates that RIS integration can strengthen the ATR performance to enhance security, sensitivity, and robustness, recognizing the potential of smart radio environments for ATR-based tamper detection
Open AccessAnti-Tamper Radio meets Reconfigurable Intelligent Surface for System-Level Tamper Detection
Many computing systems need to be protected against physical attacks using active tamper detection based on sensors. One technical solution is to employ an ATR (Anti-Tamper Radio) approach, analyzing the radio wave propagation effects within a protected device to detect unauthorized physical alterations. However, ATR systems face key challenges in terms of susceptibility to signal manipulation attacks, limited reliability due to environmental noise, and regulatory constraints from wide bandwidth usage. In this work, we propose and experimentally evaluate an ATR system complemented by an RIS to dynamically reconfigure the wireless propagation environment. We show that this approach can enhance resistance against signal manipulation attacks, reduce bandwidth requirements from several~GHz down to as low as 20 MHz, and improve robustness to environmental disturbances such as internal fan movements. Our work demonstrates that RIS integration can strengthen the ATR performance to enhance security, sensitivity, and robustness, recognizing the potential of smart radio environments for ATR-based tamper detection
- Open Access
RIS-Jamming: Breaking Key Consistency in Channel Reciprocity-based Key Generation
Channel Reciprocity-based Key Generation (CRKG) exploits reciprocal channel randomness to establish shared secret keys between wireless terminals. This new security technique is expected to complement existing cryptographic techniques for secret key distribution of future wireless networks. In this paper, we present a new attack, reconfigurable intelligent surface (RIS) jamming, and show that an attacker can prevent legitimate users from agreeing on the same key by deploying a malicious RIS to break channel reciprocity. Specifically, we elaborate on three examples to implement the RIS jamming attack: Using active nonreciprocal circuits, performing time-varying controls, and reducing the signal-to-noise ratio. The attack effect is then studied by formulating the secret key rate with a relationship to the deployment of RIS. To resist such RIS jamming attacks, we propose a countermeasure that exploits wideband signals for multipath separation. The malicious RIS path is distinguished from all separated channel paths, and thus the countermeasure is referred to as contaminated path removal-based CRKG(CRP-CRKG). We present simulation results, showing that legitimate users under RIS jamming are still able to generate secret keys from the remaining paths. We also experimentally demonstrate the RIS jamming attack by using commodity Wi-Fi devices in conjunction with a fabricated RIS prototype. In our experiments, we were able to increase the average bit disagreement ratio (BDR) of raw secret keys by 20%. Further, we successfully demonstrate the proposed CRP-CRKG countermeasure to tackle RIS jamming in wideband systems as long as the source of randomness and the RIS propagation paths are separable.
Open AccessRIS-Jamming: Breaking Key Consistency in Channel Reciprocity-based Key Generation
Channel Reciprocity-based Key Generation (CRKG) exploits reciprocal channel randomness to establish shared secret keys between wireless terminals. This new security technique is expected to complement existing cryptographic techniques for secret key distribution of future wireless networks. In this paper, we present a new attack, reconfigurable intelligent surface (RIS) jamming, and show that an attacker can prevent legitimate users from agreeing on the same key by deploying a malicious RIS to break channel reciprocity. Specifically, we elaborate on three examples to implement the RIS jamming attack: Using active nonreciprocal circuits, performing time-varying controls, and reducing the signal-to-noise ratio. The attack effect is then studied by formulating the secret key rate with a relationship to the deployment of RIS. To resist such RIS jamming attacks, we propose a countermeasure that exploits wideband signals for multipath separation. The malicious RIS path is distinguished from all separated channel paths, and thus the countermeasure is referred to as contaminated path removal-based CRKG(CRP-CRKG). We present simulation results, showing that legitimate users under RIS jamming are still able to generate secret keys from the remaining paths. We also experimentally demonstrate the RIS jamming attack by using commodity Wi-Fi devices in conjunction with a fabricated RIS prototype. In our experiments, we were able to increase the average bit disagreement ratio (BDR) of raw secret keys by 20%. Further, we successfully demonstrate the proposed CRP-CRKG countermeasure to tackle RIS jamming in wideband systems as long as the source of randomness and the RIS propagation paths are separable.
- Open Access
Reconfigurable Intelligent Surface for Physical Layer Key Generation: Constructive or Destructive?
Physical layer key generation (PKG) is a promising means to provide on-the-fly shared secret keys by exploiting the intrinsic randomness of the radio channel. However, the performance of PKG is highly dependent on the propagation environments. Due to its feature of controlling the wireless environment, reconfigurable intelligent surface~(RIS) is appealing to be applied in PKG. In this paper, in contrast to the existing literature, we investigate both the constructive and destructive effects of RIS on the PKG scheme. For the constructive aspect, we have identified static and wave-blockage environments as two RIS-empowered-PKG applications in future wireless systems. In particular, our experimental results in a static environment showed that RIS can enhance the entropy of the secret key, achieving a key generation rate (KGR) of 97.39 bit/s with a bit disagreement rate (BDR) of 0.083. In multi-user systems where some remote users are in worse channel conditions, the proposed RIS-assisted PKG algorithm improves the sum secret key rate by more than 2 dB, compared to the literature. Furthermore, we point out that RIS could be utilized by an attacker to perform new jamming and leakage attacks and give countermeasures, respectively. Finally, we outline future research directions for PKG systems in light of the RIS.
Open AccessReconfigurable Intelligent Surface for Physical Layer Key Generation: Constructive or Destructive?
Physical layer key generation (PKG) is a promising means to provide on-the-fly shared secret keys by exploiting the intrinsic randomness of the radio channel. However, the performance of PKG is highly dependent on the propagation environments. Due to its feature of controlling the wireless environment, reconfigurable intelligent surface~(RIS) is appealing to be applied in PKG. In this paper, in contrast to the existing literature, we investigate both the constructive and destructive effects of RIS on the PKG scheme. For the constructive aspect, we have identified static and wave-blockage environments as two RIS-empowered-PKG applications in future wireless systems. In particular, our experimental results in a static environment showed that RIS can enhance the entropy of the secret key, achieving a key generation rate (KGR) of 97.39 bit/s with a bit disagreement rate (BDR) of 0.083. In multi-user systems where some remote users are in worse channel conditions, the proposed RIS-assisted PKG algorithm improves the sum secret key rate by more than 2 dB, compared to the literature. Furthermore, we point out that RIS could be utilized by an attacker to perform new jamming and leakage attacks and give countermeasures, respectively. Finally, we outline future research directions for PKG systems in light of the RIS.
- 16 July 2015
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 103-120
Preventing Scaling of Successful Attacks: A Cross-Layer Security Architecture for Resource-Constrained Platforms
- 16 July 2015
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 103-120
Preventing Scaling of Successful Attacks: A Cross-Layer Security Architecture for Resource-Constrained Platforms