David Bardey
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Previous Organizations / Institutes
The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years
David Bardey has a total of 15 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Jean-Marie Lozachmeur
Toulouse School of Economics, CNRS, France
3 shared publications - Philippe De Donder
University of Toulouse 1 - Toulouse School of Economics (TSE)
3 shared publications - Denis Gromb
JEL Codes PARIS-JOURDAN SCIENCES ECONOMIQUES D82 48 BD JOURDAN -E.N.S. - I11 L13 L15 L51 75014 PARIS
2 shared publications - Giancarlo Buitrago
Universidad Nacional de Colombia, Bogotá, Colombia
2 shared publications - Helmuth Cremer
Toulouse School of Economics, University of Toulouse Capitole, Toulouse, France
2 shared publications Bruno Jullien
Toulouse School of Economics, University of Toulouse 1 Capitole (CNRS), France
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 23 March 2025
- Published by Springer Nature in Discover Health Systems
- Vol. 4 (1) , 1-20
The health technology assessment approach of the economic value of diagnostic tests: a literature review
- 23 March 2025
- Published by Springer Nature in Discover Health Systems
- Vol. 4 (1) , 1-20
Open AccessThe health technology assessment approach of the economic value of diagnostic tests: a literature review
- 7 September 2020
- Published by Wiley in The Journal of Industrial Economics
- Vol. 68 (3) , 409-444
Controlling Sellers Who Provide Advice: Regulation and Competition*
A monopoly seller advising buyers about which of two goods fits their needs may be tempted to recommend the higher margin good. For the seller to collect information about a buyer’s needs and provide truthful advice, the profits from selling both goods must be similar enough, i.e., within an implementability cone. The optimal regulation controls pricing distortions and information‐collection incentives separately via price regulation and fixed rewards respectively. This no longer holds when the seller has private information about costs as both problems interact. We study whether competition and the threat by buyers to switch sellers can substitute for regulation.
- 7 September 2020
- Published by Wiley in The Journal of Industrial Economics
- Vol. 68 (3) , 409-444
Controlling Sellers Who Provide Advice: Regulation and Competition*
A monopoly seller advising buyers about which of two goods fits their needs may be tempted to recommend the higher margin good. For the seller to collect information about a buyer’s needs and provide truthful advice, the profits from selling both goods must be similar enough, i.e., within an implementability cone. The optimal regulation controls pricing distortions and information‐collection incentives separately via price regulation and fixed rewards respectively. This no longer holds when the seller has private information about costs as both problems interact. We study whether competition and the threat by buyers to switch sellers can substitute for regulation.
- 1 December 2019
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Health Economics
- Vol. 68, 102223
How is the trade-off between adverse selection and discrimination risk affected by genetic testing? Theory and experiment
- 1 December 2019
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Health Economics
- Vol. 68, 102223
How is the trade-off between adverse selection and discrimination risk affected by genetic testing? Theory and experiment
- 1 December 2017
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Health Economics
- Vol. 56, 317-329
Supplemental health insurance in the Colombian managed care system: Adverse or advantageous selection?
- 1 December 2017
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Health Economics
- Vol. 56, 317-329
Supplemental health insurance in the Colombian managed care system: Adverse or advantageous selection?
- Open Access
Drugs, Showrooms and Financial Products: Competition and Regulation when Sellers Provide Expert Advice
We consider a market in which sellers can exert an information-gathering effort to advise buyers about which of two goods best fits their needs. Sellers may steer buyers towards the higher margin good. We show that for sellers to collect and reveal information, profits on both goods must be sufficiently close to each other, i.e., lie within an implementability cone, which competition or regulation may ensure. Instruments to do so vary with the context. Controlling market power while improving the quality of advice is more difficult when sellers have private information on the profitability of the goods.
Open AccessDrugs, Showrooms and Financial Products: Competition and Regulation when Sellers Provide Expert Advice
We consider a market in which sellers can exert an information-gathering effort to advise buyers about which of two goods best fits their needs. Sellers may steer buyers towards the higher margin good. We show that for sellers to collect and reveal information, profits on both goods must be sufficiently close to each other, i.e., lie within an implementability cone, which competition or regulation may ensure. Instruments to do so vary with the context. Controlling market power while improving the quality of advice is more difficult when sellers have private information on the profitability of the goods.
- Open Access
- 1 July 2016
- Published by Universidad de los Andes in Revista Desarrollo y Sociedad
- No. 77,p. 231-262
Integración vertical en el sector colombiano de la salud
This paper provides a literature review dealing with vertical integration in healthcare systems with a special emphasis in the Colombian health care sector. We start by introducing some general concerns about vertical integration by presenting some of its traditional advantages and disadvantages. Next, we focus on the consequences of vertical integration in the healthcare sector, taking advantage of the US experience. Then, we describe the Colombian healthcare system and some changes of the vertical integration regulation. Finally, the authors provide some public policy recommendations regarding this regulation. In particular, we recommend to switch from a regulatory approach to a supervision model.
- 1 July 2016
- Published by Universidad de los Andes in Revista Desarrollo y Sociedad
- No. 77,p. 231-262
Open AccessIntegración vertical en el sector colombiano de la salud
This paper provides a literature review dealing with vertical integration in healthcare systems with a special emphasis in the Colombian health care sector. We start by introducing some general concerns about vertical integration by presenting some of its traditional advantages and disadvantages. Next, we focus on the consequences of vertical integration in the healthcare sector, taking advantage of the US experience. Then, we describe the Colombian healthcare system and some changes of the vertical integration regulation. Finally, the authors provide some public policy recommendations regarding this regulation. In particular, we recommend to switch from a regulatory approach to a supervision model.
- 1 May 2016
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Public Economics
- Vol. 137, 28-37
The design of insurance coverage for medical products under imperfect competition
- 1 May 2016
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Public Economics
- Vol. 137, 28-37
The design of insurance coverage for medical products under imperfect competition
- 1 May 2016
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Health Economics
- Vol. 47, 50-63
Health insurance and diversity of treatment
- 1 May 2016
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Health Economics
- Vol. 47, 50-63
Health insurance and diversity of treatment
- Open Access
- 25 November 2015
- Published by Springer Nature in Health Economics Review
- Vol. 5 (1) , 1-9
Competition between health maintenance organizations and nonintegrated health insurance companies in health insurance markets
- 25 November 2015
- Published by Springer Nature in Health Economics Review
- Vol. 5 (1) , 1-9
Open AccessCompetition between health maintenance organizations and nonintegrated health insurance companies in health insurance markets
- 17 November 2014
- Published by EDP Sciences in médecine/sciences
- Vol. 30, 41-43
Tests génétiques, prévention et marchés d’assurance santé
Since this special issue of medecine/sciences is devoted to personalized medicine, it seems unnecessary for two economists to summarize or discuss, from a medical perspective, recent advances in genetic research. We rather focus on the consequences of improved genetic testing on the health insurance market, on how this market may be affected and on the degree of coverage offered to consumers according to the regulations implemented. More precisely, we first study the value of the information conveyed by genetic tests and we then decompose this value into several components according to the regulations implemented in various health insurance markets.
- 17 November 2014
- Published by EDP Sciences in médecine/sciences
- Vol. 30, 41-43
Tests génétiques, prévention et marchés d’assurance santé
Since this special issue of medecine/sciences is devoted to personalized medicine, it seems unnecessary for two economists to summarize or discuss, from a medical perspective, recent advances in genetic research. We rather focus on the consequences of improved genetic testing on the health insurance market, on how this market may be affected and on the degree of coverage offered to consumers according to the regulations implemented. More precisely, we first study the value of the information conveyed by genetic tests and we then decompose this value into several components according to the regulations implemented in various health insurance markets.