PLPatrick Loiseau

Patrick Loiseau

*This is an algorithmically generated author record based on publicly available information.

Patrick Loiseau has a total of 10 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:


Latest Publications

  • Open Access

    A Game-Theoretic Analysis of Adversarial Classification

    by Lemonia Dritsoula, Patrick Loiseau, John Musacchio

    Attack detection is usually approached as a classification problem. However, standard classification tools often perform poorly because an adaptive attacker can shape his attacks in response to the algorithm. This has led to the recent interest in developing methods for adversarial classification, but to the best of our knowledge, there have been very few prior studies that take into account the attacker's tradeoff between adapting to the classifier being used against him with his desire to maintain the efficacy of his attack. Including this effect is key to derive solutions that perform well in practice. In this investigation we model the interaction as a game between a defender who chooses a classifier to distinguish between attacks and normal behavior based on a set of observed features and an attacker who chooses his attack features (class 1 data). Normal behavior (class 0 data) is random and exogenous. The attacker's objective balances the benefit from attacks and the cost of being detected while the defender's objective balances the benefit of a correct attack detection and the cost of false alarm. We provide an efficient algorithm to compute all Nash equilibria and a compact characterization of the possible forms of a Nash equilibrium that reveals intuitive messages on how to perform classification in the presence of an attacker. We also explore qualitatively and quantitatively the impact of the non-attacker and underlying parameters on the equilibrium strategies.

  • Open Access

    Dissecting demand response mechanisms: the role of consumption forecasts and personalized offers

    by Alberto Benegiamo, Patrick Loiseau, Giovanni Neglia

    Demand-Response (DR) programs, whereby users of an electricity network are encouraged by economic incentives to rearrange their consumption in order to reduce production costs, are envisioned to be a key feature of the smart grid paradigm. Several recent works proposed DR mechanisms and used analytical models to derive optimal incentives. Most of these works, however, rely on a macroscopic description of the population that does not model individual choices of users. In this paper, we conduct a detailed analysis of those models and we argue that the macroscopic descriptions hide important assumptions that can jeopardize the mechanisms' implementation (such as the ability to make personalized offers and to perfectly estimate the demand that is moved from a timeslot to another). Then, we start from a microscopic description that explicitly models each user's decision. We introduce four DR mechanisms with various assumptions on the provider's capabilities. Contrarily to previous studies, we find that the optimization problems that result from our mechanisms are complex and can be solved numerically only through a heuristic. We present numerical simulations that compare the different mechanisms and their sensitivity to forecast errors. At a high level, our results show that the performance of DR mechanisms under reasonable assumptions on the provider's capabilities are significantly lower than

  • Open Access

    A Game-Theoretic Study on Non-Monetary Incentives in Data Analytics Projects with Privacy Implications

    by Michela Chessa, Jens Grossklags, Patrick Loiseau

    The amount of personal information contributed by individuals to digital repositories such as social network sites has grown substantially. The existence of this data offers unprecedented opportunities for data analytics research in various domains of societal importance including medicine and public policy. The results of these analyses can be considered a public good which benefits data contributors as well as individuals who are not making their data available. At the same time, the release of personal information carries perceived and actual privacy risks to the contributors. Our research addresses this problem area. In our work, we study a game-theoretic model in which individuals take control over participation in data analytics projects in two ways: 1) individuals can contribute data at a self-chosen level of precision, and 2) individuals can decide whether they want to contribute at all (or not). From the analyst's perspective, we investigate to which degree the research analyst has flexibility to set requirements for data precision, so that individuals are still willing to contribute to the project, and the quality of the estimation improves. We study this tradeoff scenario for populations of homogeneous and heterogeneous individuals, and determine Nash equilibria that reflect the optimal level of participation and precision of contributions. We further prove that the analyst can substantially increase the accuracy of the analysis by imposing a lower bound on the precision of the data that users can reveal.

  • Open Access

    Incentive Mechanisms for Internet Congestion Management: Fixed-Budget Rebate versus Time-of-Day Pricing

    by Patrick Loiseau, Galina Schwartz, John Musacchio, Saurabh Amin, S. Shankar Sastry

    Mobile data traffic has been steadily rising in the past years. This has generated a significant interest in the deployment of incentive mechanisms to reduce peak-time congestion. Typically, the design of these mechanisms requires information about user demand and sensitivity to prices. Such information is naturally imperfect. In this paper, we propose a \emph{fixed-budget rebate mechanism} that gives each user a reward proportional to his percentage contribution to the aggregate reduction in peak time demand. For comparison, we also study a time-of-day pricing mechanism that gives each user a fixed reward per unit reduction of his peak-time demand. To evaluate the two mechanisms, we introduce a game-theoretic model that captures the \emph{public good} nature of decongestion. For each mechanism, we demonstrate that the socially optimal level of decongestion is achievable for a specific choice of the mechanism's parameter. We then investigate how imperfect information about user demand affects the mechanisms' effectiveness. From our results, the fixed-budget rebate pricing is more robust when the users' sensitivity to congestion is "sufficiently" convex. This feature of the fixed-budget rebate mechanism is attractive for many situations of interest and is driven by its closed-loop property, i.e., the unit reward decreases as the peak-time demand decreases.

  • Open Access

    Large deviations for the local fluctuations of random walks and new insights into the "randomness" of Pi

    by Julien Barral, Patrick Loiseau

    We establish large deviations properties valid for almost every sample path of a class of stationary mixing processes $(X_1,..., X_n,...)$. These properties are inherited from those of $S_n=\sum_{i=1}^nX_i$ and describe how the local fluctuations of almost every realization of $S_n$ deviate from the almost sure behavior. These results apply to the fluctuations of Brownian motion, Birkhoff averages on hyperbolic dynamics, as well as branching random walks. Also, they lead to new insights into the "randomness" of the digits of expansions in integer bases of Pi. We formulate a new conjecture, supported by numerical experiments, implying the normality of Pi.