Philip Rocco
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Philip Rocco has a total of 4 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Alex Waddan
Department of Politics and International Relations University of Leicester Leicester UK
2 shared publications - Daniel Béland
Department of Political Science, McGill University, Montreal, Quebec, Canada
2 shared publications - Chloe Thurston
Department of Political Science, Johns Hopkins University, USA
1 shared publication - Sara Chatfield
University of Denver
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- 1 May 2014
- Published by Elsevier in Health Policy
- Vol. 116 (1) , 51-60
Implementing health care reform in the United States: Intergovernmental politics and the dilemmas of institutional design
- 1 May 2014
- Published by Elsevier in Health Policy
- Vol. 116 (1) , 51-60
Implementing health care reform in the United States: Intergovernmental politics and the dilemmas of institutional design
- 27 February 2014
- Published by Wiley in Public Administration Review
- Vol. 74 (2) , 142-143
Obamacare, Universal Credit, and the Trilemma of Public Services
- 27 February 2014
- Published by Wiley in Public Administration Review
- Vol. 74 (2) , 142-143
Obamacare, Universal Credit, and the Trilemma of Public Services
- 16 December 2013
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Journal of Public Policy
- Vol. 34 (1) , 35-62
From metaphors to measures: observable indicators of gradual institutional change
Scholarship on social policy has recently emphasised the importance of gradual processes of institutional change. However, conceptual work on the identification of processes such as drift, conversion and layering has not produced clear empirical indicators that distinguish these processes from one another, posing major problems for empirical research. We argue that, in order to improve the validity of its empirical findings, scholarship on gradual change should – and can – pay more attention to issues of measurement and detection. We then contribute to this goal by clearly articulating observable indicators for several mechanisms of gradual institutional change and validating them against extant empirical work on political economy.
- 16 December 2013
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Journal of Public Policy
- Vol. 34 (1) , 35-62
From metaphors to measures: observable indicators of gradual institutional change
Scholarship on social policy has recently emphasised the importance of gradual processes of institutional change. However, conceptual work on the identification of processes such as drift, conversion and layering has not produced clear empirical indicators that distinguish these processes from one another, posing major problems for empirical research. We argue that, in order to improve the validity of its empirical findings, scholarship on gradual change should – and can – pay more attention to issues of measurement and detection. We then contribute to this goal by clearly articulating observable indicators for several mechanisms of gradual institutional change and validating them against extant empirical work on political economy.
- 29 May 2013
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in Publius: The Journal of Federalism
- Vol. 44 (1) , 1-23
Is Federalism a Political Safety Valve? Evidence from Congressional Decision Making, 1960–2005
American federalism is often described as a system that contains “political safety valves,” or institutional mechanisms that ensure that major policy reforms can be created, even during periods of intense political conflict. By granting discretion to the states, for example, scholars claim that Congress can ensure that diverse constituencies receive their preferred policies. In this article, we examine Congress’s pattern of delegating discretion to sub-national institutions in the postwar period, systematically assessing how the political conditions under which a broad sample of landmark legislation passed are related to the delegation of administrative authority to the states. Contrary to the “safety valve” image of federalism, we find very little evidence to suggest that Congress grants more discretion to sub-national governments under periods of intense political conflict.
- 29 May 2013
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in Publius: The Journal of Federalism
- Vol. 44 (1) , 1-23
Is Federalism a Political Safety Valve? Evidence from Congressional Decision Making, 1960–2005
American federalism is often described as a system that contains “political safety valves,” or institutional mechanisms that ensure that major policy reforms can be created, even during periods of intense political conflict. By granting discretion to the states, for example, scholars claim that Congress can ensure that diverse constituencies receive their preferred policies. In this article, we examine Congress’s pattern of delegating discretion to sub-national institutions in the postwar period, systematically assessing how the political conditions under which a broad sample of landmark legislation passed are related to the delegation of administrative authority to the states. Contrary to the “safety valve” image of federalism, we find very little evidence to suggest that Congress grants more discretion to sub-national governments under periods of intense political conflict.