Zhendong Ma
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Zhendong Ma has a total of 9 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
Christoph Schmittner
AIT Austrian Institute of Technology
2 shared publications- Bettina Pospisil
University of Continuing Education Krems
1 shared publication Carolina Reyes
TTTech Computertechnik AG
1 shared publication- Florian Skopik
Digital Safety and Security, Austrian Institute of Technology GmbH, Wien, Austria
1 shared publication Oliver Dillinger
TTControl GmbH
1 shared publication- Paul Smith
Lancaster University
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- 27 September 2017
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 427-434
Security and Privacy in the Automotive Domain: A Technical and Social Analysis
- 27 September 2017
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 427-434
Security and Privacy in the Automotive Domain: A Technical and Social Analysis
- 1 September 2016
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 157-170
Using SAE J3061 for Automotive Security Requirement Engineering
- 1 September 2016
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 157-170
Using SAE J3061 for Automotive Security Requirement Engineering
- Open Access
Towards a Layered Architectural View for Security Analysis in SCADA Systems
Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) systems support and control the operation of many critical infrastructures that our society depend on, such as power grids. Since SCADA systems become a target for cyber attacks and the potential impact of a successful attack could lead to disastrous consequences in the physical world, ensuring the security of these systems is of vital importance. A fundamental prerequisite to securing a SCADA system is a clear understanding and a consistent view of its architecture. However, because of the complexity and scale of SCADA systems, this is challenging to acquire. In this paper, we propose a layered architectural view for SCADA systems, which aims at building a common ground among stakeholders and supporting the implementation of security analysis. In order to manage the complexity and scale, we define four interrelated architectural layers, and uses the concept of viewpoints to focus on a subset of the system. We indicate the applicability of our approach in the context of SCADA system security analysis.
Open AccessTowards a Layered Architectural View for Security Analysis in SCADA Systems
Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) systems support and control the operation of many critical infrastructures that our society depend on, such as power grids. Since SCADA systems become a target for cyber attacks and the potential impact of a successful attack could lead to disastrous consequences in the physical world, ensuring the security of these systems is of vital importance. A fundamental prerequisite to securing a SCADA system is a clear understanding and a consistent view of its architecture. However, because of the complexity and scale of SCADA systems, this is challenging to acquire. In this paper, we propose a layered architectural view for SCADA systems, which aims at building a common ground among stakeholders and supporting the implementation of security analysis. In order to manage the complexity and scale, we define four interrelated architectural layers, and uses the concept of viewpoints to focus on a subset of the system. We indicate the applicability of our approach in the context of SCADA system security analysis.