João Montez
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Research Subjects
Latest Publications
- 22 July 2015
- Published by Wiley in The RAND Journal of Economics
- Vol. 46 (3) , 650-670
Controlling opportunism in vertical contracting when production precedes sales
In a make‐to‐stock vertical contracting setting with private contracts, when retailers do not observe each other's stocks before choosing their prices, an opportunism problem always exist in contract equilibria but public market‐wide Resale Price Maintenance (RPM) can restore monopoly power. However other widely used tools which do not fall under antitrust scrutiny and require only private bilateral contracts, such as buyback contracts, also allow the producer to fully exercise his monopoly power. We conclude that a more lenient policy toward RPM is unlikely to affect the producer's ability to control opportunism.
- 22 July 2015
- Published by Wiley in The RAND Journal of Economics
- Vol. 46 (3) , 650-670
Controlling opportunism in vertical contracting when production precedes sales
In a make‐to‐stock vertical contracting setting with private contracts, when retailers do not observe each other's stocks before choosing their prices, an opportunism problem always exist in contract equilibria but public market‐wide Resale Price Maintenance (RPM) can restore monopoly power. However other widely used tools which do not fall under antitrust scrutiny and require only private bilateral contracts, such as buyback contracts, also allow the producer to fully exercise his monopoly power. We conclude that a more lenient policy toward RPM is unlikely to affect the producer's ability to control opportunism.
- 1 September 2013
- Published by Wiley in The RAND Journal of Economics
- Vol. 44 (3) , 425-437
Inefficient sales delays by a durable‐good monopoly facing a finite number of buyers
- 1 September 2013
- Published by Wiley in The RAND Journal of Economics
- Vol. 44 (3) , 425-437
Inefficient sales delays by a durable‐good monopoly facing a finite number of buyers