Katalin Evers
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Previous Organizations / Institutes
The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years
Research Subjects
Research Interests
Katalin Evers has a total of 4 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Lutz Bellmann
Friedrich-Alexander-Universität Erlangen-Nürnberg und Institut für Arbeitsmarkt und Berufsforschung der Bundesagentur für Arbeit, Nürnberg
4 shared publications - John T. Addison
Darla Moore School of Business Columbia South Carolina USA
3 shared publications - Paulino Teixeira
University of Coimbra CeBER Faculty of Economics Coimbra Portugal
3 shared publications - Reinhard Hujer
Goethe-Universität Frankfurt/M
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- 6 June 2018
- Published by Springer Nature in The Annals of Regional Science
- Vol. 61 (2) , 319-349
Regional and firm-specific effects on innovations using multi-level methods
- 6 June 2018
- Published by Springer Nature in The Annals of Regional Science
- Vol. 61 (2) , 319-349
Regional and firm-specific effects on innovations using multi-level methods
- 5 December 2016
- Published by Wiley in Industrial Relations: A Journal of Economy and Society
- Vol. 56 (1) , 73-121
Collective Bargaining and Innovation in Germany: A Case of Cooperative Industrial Relations?
At the level of theory, the effect of collective bargaining on innovation is contested. The large proponderance of the U.S. evidence clearly points to adverse effects, but other‐country experience suggests that certain industrial‐relations systems, or the wider regulatory apparatus, might even tip the balance in favor of unions. Our pooled cross‐ section and difference‐in‐differences estimates provide some weak evidence that German collective bargaining inhibits innovation. However, in conjunction with workplace representation, there is the suggestion that it might actually foster innovative activity.
- 5 December 2016
- Published by Wiley in Industrial Relations: A Journal of Economy and Society
- Vol. 56 (1) , 73-121
Collective Bargaining and Innovation in Germany: A Case of Cooperative Industrial Relations?
At the level of theory, the effect of collective bargaining on innovation is contested. The large proponderance of the U.S. evidence clearly points to adverse effects, but other‐country experience suggests that certain industrial‐relations systems, or the wider regulatory apparatus, might even tip the balance in favor of unions. Our pooled cross‐ section and difference‐in‐differences estimates provide some weak evidence that German collective bargaining inhibits innovation. However, in conjunction with workplace representation, there is the suggestion that it might actually foster innovative activity.
- 1 June 2016
- Published by Wiley in Industrial Relations: A Journal of Economy and Society
- Vol. 55 (3) , 415-443
Is the Erosion Thesis Overblown? Alignment from Without in Germany
It is sometimes alleged that collective bargaining coverage in Germany is understated because uncovered firms “orient” themselves toward sectoral agreements. In fact, although orientation has grown as sectoral bargaining has declined, their joint frequency has fallen. Further, where orientation occurs at firms that leave a sectoral agreement, it provides only partial compensation. The small deficits involved, in conjunction with some indirect evidence on joiners, suggest some modest attenuation of the undoubted decline in collective bargaining.
- 1 June 2016
- Published by Wiley in Industrial Relations: A Journal of Economy and Society
- Vol. 55 (3) , 415-443
Is the Erosion Thesis Overblown? Alignment from Without in Germany
It is sometimes alleged that collective bargaining coverage in Germany is understated because uncovered firms “orient” themselves toward sectoral agreements. In fact, although orientation has grown as sectoral bargaining has declined, their joint frequency has fallen. Further, where orientation occurs at firms that leave a sectoral agreement, it provides only partial compensation. The small deficits involved, in conjunction with some indirect evidence on joiners, suggest some modest attenuation of the undoubted decline in collective bargaining.
- 17 December 2013
- Published by Wiley in Industrial Relations: A Journal of Economy and Society
- Vol. 53 (1) , 125-156
Indicative and Updated Estimates of the Collective Bargaining Premium in Germany
This study provides updated evidence on the union contract differential in Germany using establishment‐wide wage data and two estimation strategies. It provides pairwise estimates of the union differential based on separate samples of collective bargaining leavers and joiners vis‐à‐vis the corresponding counterfactual groups. We report that average wages increase by 3 to 3.5 percent after entering into a collective agreement and decrease by 3 to 4 percent after abandoning a collective agreement. Excluding establishments that experience mass layoffs does not significantly influence these net findings, although such establishments record wage losses—statistically insignificant for joiners but up to 10 percent in the case of leavers, as compared with the counterfactuals. The backdrop to these new indicative estimates, which are properly conditioned on establishment size and industry affiliation, inter alia, is one of wage stagnation and continuing union decline.
- 17 December 2013
- Published by Wiley in Industrial Relations: A Journal of Economy and Society
- Vol. 53 (1) , 125-156
Indicative and Updated Estimates of the Collective Bargaining Premium in Germany
This study provides updated evidence on the union contract differential in Germany using establishment‐wide wage data and two estimation strategies. It provides pairwise estimates of the union differential based on separate samples of collective bargaining leavers and joiners vis‐à‐vis the corresponding counterfactual groups. We report that average wages increase by 3 to 3.5 percent after entering into a collective agreement and decrease by 3 to 4 percent after abandoning a collective agreement. Excluding establishments that experience mass layoffs does not significantly influence these net findings, although such establishments record wage losses—statistically insignificant for joiners but up to 10 percent in the case of leavers, as compared with the counterfactuals. The backdrop to these new indicative estimates, which are properly conditioned on establishment size and industry affiliation, inter alia, is one of wage stagnation and continuing union decline.