MRMark Ryan

Mark Ryan

*This is an algorithmically generated author record based on publicly available information.

Current Organizations / Institutes

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Previous Organizations / Institutes

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Mark Ryan has a total of 58 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:


Latest Publications

  • Open Access

    Evasion Under Blockchain Sanctions

    by Endong Liu, Mark Ryan, Liyi Zhou, Pascal Berrang


  • Open Access

    Temporally-limited blind-regroup of anonymous credentials

    by Liqun Chen, Chin Hei Ho, Mark Ryan, Christopher Williamson


  • Open Access

    Using Vibration for Secure Pairing With Implantable Medical Devices: Development and Usability Study

    by Mo Zhang, Chaofan Wang, Weiwei Jiang, David Oswald, Toby Murray, Eduard Marin, Jing Wei, Mark Ryan, Vassilis Kostakos

    Background: Implantable medical devices (IMDs), such as pacemakers, increasingly communicate wirelessly with external devices. To secure this wireless communication channel, a pairing process is needed to bootstrap a secret key between the devices. Previous work has proposed pairing approaches that often adopt a “seamless” design and render the pairing process imperceptible to patients. This lack of user perception can significantly compromise security and pose threats to patients. Objective: The study aimed to explore the use of highly perceptible vibrations for pairing with IMDs and aim to propose a novel technique that leverages the natural randomness in human motor behavior as a shared source of entropy for pairing, potentially deployable to current IMD products. Methods: A proof of concept was developed to demonstrate the proposed technique. A wearable prototype was built to simulate an individual acting as an IMD patient (real patients were not involved to avoid potential risks), and signal processing algorithms were devised to use accelerometer readings for facilitating secure pairing with an IMD. The technique was thoroughly evaluated in terms of accuracy, security, and usability through a lab study involving 24 participants. Results: Our proposed pairing technique achieves high pairing accuracy, with a zero false acceptance rate (indicating low risks from adversaries) and a false rejection rate of only 0.6% (1/192; suggesting that legitimate users will likely experience very few failures). Our approach also offers robust security, which passes the National Institute of Standards and Technology statistical tests (with all P values >.01). Moreover, our technique has high usability, evidenced by an average System Usability Scale questionnaire score of 73.6 (surpassing the standard benchmark of 68 for “good usability”) and insights gathered from the interviews. Furthermore, the entire pairing process can be efficiently completed within 5 seconds. Conclusions: Vibration can be used to realize secure, usable, and deployable pairing in the context of IMDs. Our method also exhibits advantages over previous approaches, for example, lenient requirements on the sensing capabilities of IMDs and the synchronization between the IMD and the external device.


  • Open Access

    OOBKey: Key Exchange with Implantable Medical Devices Using Out-Of-Band Channels

    by Mo Zhang, Eduard Marin, Mark Ryan, Vassilis Kostakos, Toby Murray, Benjamin Tag, David Oswald

    Implantable Medical Devices (IMDs) are widely deployed today and often use wireless communication. Establishing a secure communication channel to these devices is challenging in practice. To address this issue, researchers have proposed IMD key exchange protocols, particularly ones that leverage an Out-Of-Band (OOB) channel such as audio, vibration and physiological signals. While these solutions have advantages over traditional key exchange, they are often proposed in an ad-hoc manner and lack a systematic evaluation of their security, usability and deployability properties. In this paper, we provide an in-depth analysis of existing OOB-based solutions for IMDs and, based on our findings, propose a novel IMD key exchange protocol that includes a new class of OOB channel based on human bodily motions. We implement prototypes and validate our designs through a user study (N = 24). The results demonstrate the feasibility of our approach and its unique features, establishing a new direction in the context of IMD security.


  • Open Access

    Remote Registration of Multiple Authenticators

    by Yongqi Wang, Thalia Laing, José Moreira, Mark D. Ryan

    User authentication with discrete authenticators, such as YubiKeys, is becoming increasingly popular. The authenticators can be external or on-device. They work using challenge-response protocols and public key cryptography. Multiple accounts can be associated with each authenticator. Compared with other forms of authentication, this approach has advantages in security and usability. There are, however, significant limitations which persist. In particular, if users possess only one authenticator, they lack resilience to loss and malfunction. On the other hand, if they possess multiple authenticators, they lack practical solutions to keep authenticators synchronised. In this paper, we present three solutions which combine the usability of a single authenticator with the resilience of multiple authenticators. We also present two key derivation functions which are used in our solutions. All three solutions maintain core security and privacy properties found in existing systems. Meanwhile, each solution provides additional value in different use cases. The security of our solutions is analysed using ProVerif.

  • Open Access

    Using Vibration for Secure Pairing with Implantable Medical Devices: Development and Usability Study (Preprint)

    by Mo Zhang, Chaofan Wang, Weiwei Jiang, David Oswald, Toby Murray, Eduard Marin, Jing Wei, Mark Ryan, Vassilis Kostakos

    BACKGROUND Implantable Medical Devices (IMDs), such as pacemakers, increasingly communicate wirelessly with external devices. To secure this wireless communication channel, a pairing process is needed to bootstrap a secret key between the devices. Previous work has proposed pairing approaches that often adopt a “seamless” design and render the pairing process imperceptible to patients. This lack of user perception can significantly compromise security and pose threats to patients. OBJECTIVE The objective of this work is to explore the use of highly perceptible vibrations for pairing with IMDs. We aim to propose a novel technique that leverages the natural randomness in human motor behavior as a shared source of entropy for pairing, potentially deployable to current IMD products. METHODS We develop a proof-of-concept to demonstrate our proposed technique. We build a wearable prototype designed for individuals to simulate being an IMD patient (we do not test on real patients to avoid potential risks), and devise signal processing algorithms that utilize accelerometer readings to facilitate secure pairing with an IMD. We thoroughly evaluate the accuracy, security, and usability of our technique in a lab study with 24 participants. RESULTS Our proposed pairing technique achieves high pairing accuracy, with a zero false acceptance rate (indicating low risks from adversaries) and a false rejection rate of only 0.6% (suggesting that legitimate users will likely experience very few failures). Our approach also offers robust security, which passes the National Institute of Standards and Technology statistical tests (with all p-values > 0.01). Moreover, our technique has high usability, evidenced by an average System Usability Scale questionnaire score of 73.6 (surpassing the standard benchmark of 68 for "good usability") and insights gathered from the interviews. Furthermore, the entire pairing process can be efficiently completed within five seconds. CONCLUSIONS Vibration can be used to realize secure, usable, and deployable pairing in the context of IMDs. Our method also exhibits advantages over previous approaches, e.g., lenient requirements on the sensing capabilities of IMDs and the synchronization between the IMD and the external device.

  • Open Access

    Using Reed-Muller Codes for Classification with Rejection and Recovery

    by Daniel Fentham, David Parker, Mark Ryan

    When deploying classifiers in the real world, users expect them to respond to inputs appropriately. However, traditional classifiers are not equipped to handle inputs which lie far from the distribution they were trained on. Malicious actors can exploit this defect by making adversarial perturbations designed to cause the classifier to give an incorrect output. Classification-with-rejection methods attempt to solve this problem by allowing networks to refuse to classify an input in which they have low confidence. This works well for strongly adversarial examples, but also leads to the rejection of weakly perturbed images, which intuitively could be correctly classified. To address these issues, we propose Reed-Muller Aggregation Networks (RMAggNet), a classifier inspired by Reed-Muller error-correction codes which can correct and reject inputs. This paper shows that RMAggNet can minimise incorrectness while maintaining good correctness over multiple adversarial attacks at different perturbation budgets by leveraging the ability to correct errors in the classification process. This provides an alternative classification-with-rejection method which can reduce the amount of additional processing in situations where a small number of incorrect classifications are permissible.

  • Open Access

    Automatic verification of transparency protocols

    by Vincent Cheval, José Moreira, Mark Ryan

    Transparency protocols are protocols whose actions can be publicly monitored by observers (such observers may include regulators, rights advocacy groups, or the general public). The observed actions are typically usages of private keys such as decryptions, and signings. Examples of transparency protocols include certificate transparency, cryptocurrency, transparent decryption, and electronic voting. These protocols usually pose a challenge for automatic verification, because they involve sophisticated data types that have strong properties, such as Merkle trees, that allow compact proofs of data presence and tree extension.We address this challenge by introducing new features in ProVerif, and a methodology for using them. With our methodology, it is possible to describe the data type quite abstractly, using ProVerif axioms, and prove the correctness of the protocol using those axioms as assumptions. Then, in separate steps, one can define one or more concrete implementations of the data type, and again use ProVerif to show that the implementations satisfy the assumptions that were coded as axioms. This helps make compositional proofs, splitting the proof burden into several manageable pieces. We illustrate the methodology and features by providing the first formal verification of the transparent decryption and certificate transparency protocols with a precise modelling of the Merkle tree data structure.


  • Open Access

    Automatic verification of transparency protocols (extended version)

    by Vincent Cheval, José Moreira, Mark Ryan

    Transparency protocols are protocols whose actions can be publicly monitored by observers (such observers may include regulators, rights advocacy groups, or the general public). The observed actions are typically usages of private keys such as decryptions, and signings. Examples of transparency protocols include certificate transparency, cryptocurrency, transparent decryption, and electronic voting. These protocols usually pose a challenge for automatic verification, because they involve sophisticated data types that have strong properties, such as Merkle trees, that allow compact proofs of data presence and tree extension. We address this challenge by introducing new features in ProVerif, and a methodology for using them. With our methodology, it is possible to describe the data type quite abstractly, using ProVerif axioms, and prove the correctness of the protocol using those axioms as assumptions. Then, in separate steps, one can define one or more concrete implementations of the data type, and again use ProVerif to show that the implementations satisfy the assumptions that were coded as axioms. This helps make compositional proofs, splitting the proof burden into several manageable pieces. We illustrate the methodology and features by providing the first formal verification of the transparent decryption and certificate transparency protocols with a precise modelling of the Merkle tree data structure.