Atul Prakash
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Research Subjects
Research Interests
Atul Prakash has a total of 121 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
Kevin Borders
8 shared publicationsEarlence Fernandes
6 shared publicationsAmir Rahmati
Stony Brook University Stony Brook NY USA
5 shared publications- Haizhong Zheng
University of Michigan Ann Arbor
4 shared publications - Huey-Ming Tzeng
School of Nursing, The University of Texas Medical Branch, Galveston, TX 77555, USA
3 shared publications Jaeyeon Jung
3 shared publications
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 4 June 2026
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 788-804
Taming Data Challenges in ML-based Security Tasks Using Generative AI
- 4 June 2026
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 788-804
Open AccessTaming Data Challenges in ML-based Security Tasks Using Generative AI
- Open Access
- 22 April 2025
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 990-1003
Harmful Terms and Where to Find Them: Measuring and Modeling Unfavorable Financial Terms and Conditions in Shopping Websites at Scale
- 22 April 2025
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 990-1003
Open AccessHarmful Terms and Where to Find Them: Measuring and Modeling Unfavorable Financial Terms and Conditions in Shopping Websites at Scale
- 3 November 2024
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 166-182
Leveraging Hierarchical Feature Sharing for Efficient Dataset Condensation
- 3 November 2024
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 166-182
Leveraging Hierarchical Feature Sharing for Efficient Dataset Condensation
- Open Access
- 15 November 2023
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 786-800
Stateful Defenses for Machine Learning Models Are Not Yet Secure Against Black-box Attacks
Recent work has proposed stateful defense models (SDMs) as a compelling strategy to defend against a black-box attacker who only has query access to the model, as is common for online machine learning platforms. Such stateful defenses aim to defend against black-box attacks by tracking the query history and detecting and rejecting queries that are "similar" and thus preventing black-box attacks from finding useful gradients and making progress towards finding adversarial attacks within a reasonable query budget. Recent SDMs (e.g., Blacklight and PIHA) have shown remarkable success in defending against state-of-the-art black-box attacks. In this paper, we show that SDMs are highly vulnerable to a new class of adaptive black-box attacks. We propose a novel adaptive black-box attack strategy called Oracle-guided Adaptive Rejection Sampling (OARS) that involves two stages: (1) use initial query patterns to infer key properties about an SDM's defense; and, (2) leverage those extracted properties to design subsequent query patterns to evade the SDM's defense while making progress towards finding adversarial inputs. OARS is broadly applicable as an enhancement to existing black-box attacks - we show how to apply the strategy to enhance six common black-box attacks to be more effective against current class of SDMs. For example, OARS-enhanced versions of black-box attacks improved attack success rate against recent stateful defenses from almost 0% to to almost 100% for multiple datasets within reasonable query budgets.
- 15 November 2023
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 786-800
Open AccessStateful Defenses for Machine Learning Models Are Not Yet Secure Against Black-box Attacks
Recent work has proposed stateful defense models (SDMs) as a compelling strategy to defend against a black-box attacker who only has query access to the model, as is common for online machine learning platforms. Such stateful defenses aim to defend against black-box attacks by tracking the query history and detecting and rejecting queries that are "similar" and thus preventing black-box attacks from finding useful gradients and making progress towards finding adversarial attacks within a reasonable query budget. Recent SDMs (e.g., Blacklight and PIHA) have shown remarkable success in defending against state-of-the-art black-box attacks. In this paper, we show that SDMs are highly vulnerable to a new class of adaptive black-box attacks. We propose a novel adaptive black-box attack strategy called Oracle-guided Adaptive Rejection Sampling (OARS) that involves two stages: (1) use initial query patterns to infer key properties about an SDM's defense; and, (2) leverage those extracted properties to design subsequent query patterns to evade the SDM's defense while making progress towards finding adversarial inputs. OARS is broadly applicable as an enhancement to existing black-box attacks - we show how to apply the strategy to enhance six common black-box attacks to be more effective against current class of SDMs. For example, OARS-enhanced versions of black-box attacks improved attack success rate against recent stateful defenses from almost 0% to to almost 100% for multiple datasets within reasonable query budgets.
- Open Access
D4: Detection of Adversarial Diffusion Deepfakes Using Disjoint Ensembles
Detecting diffusion-generated deepfake images remains an open problem. Current detection methods fail against an adversary who adds imperceptible adversarial perturbations to the deepfake to evade detection. In this work, we propose Disjoint Diffusion Deepfake Detection (D4), a deepfake detector designed to improve black-box adversarial robustness beyond de facto solutions such as adversarial training. D4 uses an ensemble of models over disjoint subsets of the frequency spectrum to significantly improve adversarial robustness. Our key insight is to leverage a redundancy in the frequency domain and apply a saliency partitioning technique to disjointly distribute frequency components across multiple models. We formally prove that these disjoint ensembles lead to a reduction in the dimensionality of the input subspace where adversarial deepfakes lie, thereby making adversarial deepfakes harder to find for black-box attacks. We then empirically validate the D4 method against several black-box attacks and find that D4 significantly outperforms existing state-of-the-art defenses applied to diffusion-generated deepfake detection. We also demonstrate that D4 provides robustness against adversarial deepfakes from unseen data distributions as well as unseen generative techniques.
Open AccessD4: Detection of Adversarial Diffusion Deepfakes Using Disjoint Ensembles
Detecting diffusion-generated deepfake images remains an open problem. Current detection methods fail against an adversary who adds imperceptible adversarial perturbations to the deepfake to evade detection. In this work, we propose Disjoint Diffusion Deepfake Detection (D4), a deepfake detector designed to improve black-box adversarial robustness beyond de facto solutions such as adversarial training. D4 uses an ensemble of models over disjoint subsets of the frequency spectrum to significantly improve adversarial robustness. Our key insight is to leverage a redundancy in the frequency domain and apply a saliency partitioning technique to disjointly distribute frequency components across multiple models. We formally prove that these disjoint ensembles lead to a reduction in the dimensionality of the input subspace where adversarial deepfakes lie, thereby making adversarial deepfakes harder to find for black-box attacks. We then empirically validate the D4 method against several black-box attacks and find that D4 significantly outperforms existing state-of-the-art defenses applied to diffusion-generated deepfake detection. We also demonstrate that D4 provides robustness against adversarial deepfakes from unseen data distributions as well as unseen generative techniques.
- Open Access
Coverage-centric Coreset Selection for High Pruning Rates
One-shot coreset selection aims to select a representative subset of the training data, given a pruning rate, that can later be used to train future models while retaining high accuracy. State-of-the-art coreset selection methods pick the highest importance examples based on an importance metric and are found to perform well at low pruning rates. However, at high pruning rates, they suffer from a catastrophic accuracy drop, performing worse than even random sampling. This paper explores the reasons behind this accuracy drop both theoretically and empirically. We first propose a novel metric to measure the coverage of a dataset on a specific distribution by extending the classical geometric set cover problem to a distribution cover problem. This metric helps explain why coresets selected by SOTA methods at high pruning rates perform poorly compared to random sampling because of worse data coverage. We then propose a novel one-shot coreset selection method, Coverage-centric Coreset Selection (CCS), that jointly considers overall data coverage upon a distribution as well as the importance of each example. We evaluate CCS on five datasets and show that, at high pruning rates (e.g., 90%), it achieves significantly better accuracy than previous SOTA methods (e.g., at least 19.56% higher on CIFAR10) as well as random selection (e.g., 7.04% higher on CIFAR10) and comparable accuracy at low pruning rates. We make our code publicly available at https://github.com/haizhongzheng/Coverage-centric-coreset-selection.
Open AccessCoverage-centric Coreset Selection for High Pruning Rates
One-shot coreset selection aims to select a representative subset of the training data, given a pruning rate, that can later be used to train future models while retaining high accuracy. State-of-the-art coreset selection methods pick the highest importance examples based on an importance metric and are found to perform well at low pruning rates. However, at high pruning rates, they suffer from a catastrophic accuracy drop, performing worse than even random sampling. This paper explores the reasons behind this accuracy drop both theoretically and empirically. We first propose a novel metric to measure the coverage of a dataset on a specific distribution by extending the classical geometric set cover problem to a distribution cover problem. This metric helps explain why coresets selected by SOTA methods at high pruning rates perform poorly compared to random sampling because of worse data coverage. We then propose a novel one-shot coreset selection method, Coverage-centric Coreset Selection (CCS), that jointly considers overall data coverage upon a distribution as well as the importance of each example. We evaluate CCS on five datasets and show that, at high pruning rates (e.g., 90%), it achieves significantly better accuracy than previous SOTA methods (e.g., at least 19.56% higher on CIFAR10) as well as random selection (e.g., 7.04% higher on CIFAR10) and comparable accuracy at low pruning rates. We make our code publicly available at https://github.com/haizhongzheng/Coverage-centric-coreset-selection.
- Open Access
MAZE: Data-Free Model Stealing Attack Using Zeroth-Order Gradient Estimation
Model Stealing (MS) attacks allow an adversary with black-box access to a Machine Learning model to replicate its functionality, compromising the confidentiality of the model. Such attacks train a clone model by using the predictions of the target model for different inputs. The effectiveness of such attacks relies heavily on the availability of data necessary to query the target model. Existing attacks either assume partial access to the dataset of the target model or availability of an alternate dataset with semantic similarities. This paper proposes MAZE -- a data-free model stealing attack using zeroth-order gradient estimation. In contrast to prior works, MAZE does not require any data and instead creates synthetic data using a generative model. Inspired by recent works in data-free Knowledge Distillation (KD), we train the generative model using a disagreement objective to produce inputs that maximize disagreement between the clone and the target model. However, unlike the white-box setting of KD, where the gradient information is available, training a generator for model stealing requires performing black-box optimization, as it involves accessing the target model under attack. MAZE relies on zeroth-order gradient estimation to perform this optimization and enables a highly accurate MS attack. Our evaluation with four datasets shows that MAZE provides a normalized clone accuracy in the range of 0.91x to 0.99x, and outperforms even the recent attacks that rely on partial data (JBDA, clone accuracy 0.13x to 0.69x) and surrogate data (KnockoffNets, clone accuracy 0.52x to 0.97x). We also study an extension of MAZE in the partial-data setting and develop MAZE-PD, which generates synthetic data closer to the target distribution. MAZE-PD further improves the clone accuracy (0.97x to 1.0x) and reduces the query required for the attack by 2x-24x.
Open AccessMAZE: Data-Free Model Stealing Attack Using Zeroth-Order Gradient Estimation
Model Stealing (MS) attacks allow an adversary with black-box access to a Machine Learning model to replicate its functionality, compromising the confidentiality of the model. Such attacks train a clone model by using the predictions of the target model for different inputs. The effectiveness of such attacks relies heavily on the availability of data necessary to query the target model. Existing attacks either assume partial access to the dataset of the target model or availability of an alternate dataset with semantic similarities. This paper proposes MAZE -- a data-free model stealing attack using zeroth-order gradient estimation. In contrast to prior works, MAZE does not require any data and instead creates synthetic data using a generative model. Inspired by recent works in data-free Knowledge Distillation (KD), we train the generative model using a disagreement objective to produce inputs that maximize disagreement between the clone and the target model. However, unlike the white-box setting of KD, where the gradient information is available, training a generator for model stealing requires performing black-box optimization, as it involves accessing the target model under attack. MAZE relies on zeroth-order gradient estimation to perform this optimization and enables a highly accurate MS attack. Our evaluation with four datasets shows that MAZE provides a normalized clone accuracy in the range of 0.91x to 0.99x, and outperforms even the recent attacks that rely on partial data (JBDA, clone accuracy 0.13x to 0.69x) and surrogate data (KnockoffNets, clone accuracy 0.52x to 0.97x). We also study an extension of MAZE in the partial-data setting and develop MAZE-PD, which generates synthetic data closer to the target distribution. MAZE-PD further improves the clone accuracy (0.97x to 1.0x) and reduces the query required for the attack by 2x-24x.
- Open Access
Content-Adaptive Pixel Discretization to Improve Model Robustness
Preprocessing defenses such as pixel discretization are appealing to remove adversarial attacks due to their simplicity. However, they have been shown to be ineffective except on simple datasets like MNIST. We hypothesize that existing discretization approaches failed because using a fixed codebook for the entire dataset limits their ability to balance image representation and codeword separability. We first formally prove that adaptive codebooks can provide stronger robustness guarantees than fixed codebooks as a preprocessing defense on some datasets. Based on that insight, we propose a content-adaptive pixel discretization defense called Essential Features, which discretizes the image to a per-image adaptive codebook to reduce the color space. We then find that Essential Features can be further optimized by applying adaptive blurring before the discretization to push perturbed pixel values back to their original value before determining the codebook. Against adaptive attacks, we show that content-adaptive pixel discretization extends the range of datasets that benefit in terms of both L_2 and L_infinity robustness where previously fixed codebooks were found to have failed. Our findings suggest that content-adaptive pixel discretization should be part of the repertoire for making models robust.
Open AccessContent-Adaptive Pixel Discretization to Improve Model Robustness
Preprocessing defenses such as pixel discretization are appealing to remove adversarial attacks due to their simplicity. However, they have been shown to be ineffective except on simple datasets like MNIST. We hypothesize that existing discretization approaches failed because using a fixed codebook for the entire dataset limits their ability to balance image representation and codeword separability. We first formally prove that adaptive codebooks can provide stronger robustness guarantees than fixed codebooks as a preprocessing defense on some datasets. Based on that insight, we propose a content-adaptive pixel discretization defense called Essential Features, which discretizes the image to a per-image adaptive codebook to reduce the color space. We then find that Essential Features can be further optimized by applying adaptive blurring before the discretization to push perturbed pixel values back to their original value before determining the codebook. Against adaptive attacks, we show that content-adaptive pixel discretization extends the range of datasets that benefit in terms of both L_2 and L_infinity robustness where previously fixed codebooks were found to have failed. Our findings suggest that content-adaptive pixel discretization should be part of the repertoire for making models robust.
- Open Access
GRAPHITE: Generating Automatic Physical Examples for Machine-Learning Attacks on Computer Vision Systems
This paper investigates an adversary's ease of attack in generating adversarial examples for real-world scenarios. We address three key requirements for practical attacks for the real-world: 1) automatically constraining the size and shape of the attack so it can be applied with stickers, 2) transform-robustness, i.e., robustness of a attack to environmental physical variations such as viewpoint and lighting changes, and 3) supporting attacks in not only white-box, but also black-box hard-label scenarios, so that the adversary can attack proprietary models. In this work, we propose GRAPHITE, an efficient and general framework for generating attacks that satisfy the above three key requirements. GRAPHITE takes advantage of transform-robustness, a metric based on expectation over transforms (EoT), to automatically generate small masks and optimize with gradient-free optimization. GRAPHITE is also flexible as it can easily trade-off transform-robustness, perturbation size, and query count in black-box settings. On a GTSRB model in a hard-label black-box setting, we are able to find attacks on all possible 1,806 victim-target class pairs with averages of 77.8% transform-robustness, perturbation size of 16.63% of the victim images, and 126K queries per pair. For digital-only attacks where achieving transform-robustness is not a requirement, GRAPHITE is able to find successful small-patch attacks with an average of only 566 queries for 92.2% of victim-target pairs. GRAPHITE is also able to find successful attacks using perturbations that modify small areas of the input image against PatchGuard, a recently proposed defense against patch-based attacks.
Open AccessGRAPHITE: Generating Automatic Physical Examples for Machine-Learning Attacks on Computer Vision Systems
This paper investigates an adversary's ease of attack in generating adversarial examples for real-world scenarios. We address three key requirements for practical attacks for the real-world: 1) automatically constraining the size and shape of the attack so it can be applied with stickers, 2) transform-robustness, i.e., robustness of a attack to environmental physical variations such as viewpoint and lighting changes, and 3) supporting attacks in not only white-box, but also black-box hard-label scenarios, so that the adversary can attack proprietary models. In this work, we propose GRAPHITE, an efficient and general framework for generating attacks that satisfy the above three key requirements. GRAPHITE takes advantage of transform-robustness, a metric based on expectation over transforms (EoT), to automatically generate small masks and optimize with gradient-free optimization. GRAPHITE is also flexible as it can easily trade-off transform-robustness, perturbation size, and query count in black-box settings. On a GTSRB model in a hard-label black-box setting, we are able to find attacks on all possible 1,806 victim-target class pairs with averages of 77.8% transform-robustness, perturbation size of 16.63% of the victim images, and 126K queries per pair. For digital-only attacks where achieving transform-robustness is not a requirement, GRAPHITE is able to find successful small-patch attacks with an average of only 566 queries for 92.2% of victim-target pairs. GRAPHITE is also able to find successful attacks using perturbations that modify small areas of the input image against PatchGuard, a recently proposed defense against patch-based attacks.
- 15 October 2021
- Published by Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) in IEEE Security & Privacy
- Vol. 20 (2) , 61-67
Dispelling Misconceptions and Characterizing the Failings of Deepfake Detection
- 15 October 2021
- Published by Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) in IEEE Security & Privacy
- Vol. 20 (2) , 61-67
Dispelling Misconceptions and Characterizing the Failings of Deepfake Detection