Piotr Krysta
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Piotr Krysta has a total of 18 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
Jinshan Zhang
Department of Computer Science, University of Liverpool, Liverpool, UK
3 shared publications- Baharak Rastegari
University of Southampton Southampton UK
2 shared publications - David F. Manlove
School of Computing Science, University of Glasgow, Glasgow, UK
2 shared publications - Eleftherios Anastasiadis
Imperial College London
2 shared publications - Xiaotie Deng
Peking University, Beijing, China
2 shared publications - Carmine Ventre
King's College London, London, United Kingdom
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 18 May 2019
- Published by Springer Nature in Algorithmica
- Vol. 81 (9) , 3422-3463
Size Versus Truthfulness in the House Allocation Problem
- 18 May 2019
- Published by Springer Nature in Algorithmica
- Vol. 81 (9) , 3422-3463
Open AccessSize Versus Truthfulness in the House Allocation Problem
- Open Access
Size versus truthfulness in the House Allocation problem
We study the House Allocation problem (also known as the Assignment problem), i.e., the problem of allocating a set of objects among a set of agents, where each agent has ordinal preferences (possibly involving ties) over a subset of the objects. We focus on truthful mechanisms without monetary transfers for finding large Pareto optimal matchings. It is straightforward to show that no deterministic truthful mechanism can approximate a maximum cardinality Pareto optimal matching with ratio better than 2. We thus consider randomised mechanisms. We give a natural and explicit extension of the classical Random Serial Dictatorship Mechanism (RSDM) specifically for the House Allocation problem where preference lists can include ties. We thus obtain a universally truthful randomised mechanism for finding a Pareto optimal matching and show that it achieves an approximation ratio of $\frac{e}{e-1}$. The same bound holds even when agents have priorities (weights) and our goal is to find a maximum weight (as opposed to maximum cardinality) Pareto optimal matching. On the other hand we give a lower bound of $\frac{18}{13}$ on the approximation ratio of any universally truthful Pareto optimal mechanism in settings with strict preferences. In the case that the mechanism must additionally be non-bossy with an additional technical assumption, we show by utilising a result of Bade that an improved lower bound of $\frac{e}{e-1}$ holds. This lower bound is tight since RSDM for strict preference lists is non-bossy. We moreover interpret our problem in terms of the classical secretary problem and prove that our mechanism provides the best randomised strategy of the administrator who interviews the applicants.Open AccessSize versus truthfulness in the House Allocation problem
We study the House Allocation problem (also known as the Assignment problem), i.e., the problem of allocating a set of objects among a set of agents, where each agent has ordinal preferences (possibly involving ties) over a subset of the objects. We focus on truthful mechanisms without monetary transfers for finding large Pareto optimal matchings. It is straightforward to show that no deterministic truthful mechanism can approximate a maximum cardinality Pareto optimal matching with ratio better than 2. We thus consider randomised mechanisms. We give a natural and explicit extension of the classical Random Serial Dictatorship Mechanism (RSDM) specifically for the House Allocation problem where preference lists can include ties. We thus obtain a universally truthful randomised mechanism for finding a Pareto optimal matching and show that it achieves an approximation ratio of $\frac{e}{e-1}$. The same bound holds even when agents have priorities (weights) and our goal is to find a maximum weight (as opposed to maximum cardinality) Pareto optimal matching. On the other hand we give a lower bound of $\frac{18}{13}$ on the approximation ratio of any universally truthful Pareto optimal mechanism in settings with strict preferences. In the case that the mechanism must additionally be non-bossy with an additional technical assumption, we show by utilising a result of Bade that an improved lower bound of $\frac{e}{e-1}$ holds. This lower bound is tight since RSDM for strict preference lists is non-bossy. We moreover interpret our problem in terms of the classical secretary problem and prove that our mechanism provides the best randomised strategy of the administrator who interviews the applicants. - Open Access
- 2 April 2018
- Published by Springer Nature in Algorithmica
- Vol. 81 (1) , 124-166
Network Pollution Games
The problem of pollution control has been mainly studied in the environmental economics literature where the methodology of game theory is applied for the pollution control. To the best of our knowledge this is the first time this problem is studied from the computational point of view. We introduce a new network model for pollution control and present two applications of this model. On a high level, our model comprises a graph whose nodes represent the agents, which can be thought of as the sources of pollution in the network. The edges between agents represent the effect of spread of pollution. The government who is the regulator, is responsible for the maximization of the social welfare and sets bounds on the levels of emitted pollution in both local areas as well as globally in the whole network. We first prove that the above optimization problem is NP-hard even on some special cases of graphs such as trees. We then turn our attention on the classes of trees and planar graphs which model realistic scenarios of the emitted pollution in water and air, respectively. We derive approximation algorithms for these two kinds of networks and provide deterministic truthful and truthful in expectation mechanisms. In some settings of the problem that we study, we achieve the best possible approximation results under standard complexity theoretic assumptions. Our approximation algorithm on planar graphs is obtained by a novel decomposition technique to deal with constraints on vertices. We note that no known planar decomposition techniques can be used here and our technique can be of independent interest. For trees we design a two level dynamic programming approach to obtain an FPTAS. This approach is crucial to deal with the global pollution quota constraint. It uses a special multiple choice, multi-dimensional knapsack problem where coefficients of all constraints except one are bounded by a polynomial of the input size. We furthermore derive truthful in expectation mechanisms on general networks with bounded degree.
- 2 April 2018
- Published by Springer Nature in Algorithmica
- Vol. 81 (1) , 124-166
Open AccessNetwork Pollution Games
The problem of pollution control has been mainly studied in the environmental economics literature where the methodology of game theory is applied for the pollution control. To the best of our knowledge this is the first time this problem is studied from the computational point of view. We introduce a new network model for pollution control and present two applications of this model. On a high level, our model comprises a graph whose nodes represent the agents, which can be thought of as the sources of pollution in the network. The edges between agents represent the effect of spread of pollution. The government who is the regulator, is responsible for the maximization of the social welfare and sets bounds on the levels of emitted pollution in both local areas as well as globally in the whole network. We first prove that the above optimization problem is NP-hard even on some special cases of graphs such as trees. We then turn our attention on the classes of trees and planar graphs which model realistic scenarios of the emitted pollution in water and air, respectively. We derive approximation algorithms for these two kinds of networks and provide deterministic truthful and truthful in expectation mechanisms. In some settings of the problem that we study, we achieve the best possible approximation results under standard complexity theoretic assumptions. Our approximation algorithm on planar graphs is obtained by a novel decomposition technique to deal with constraints on vertices. We note that no known planar decomposition techniques can be used here and our technique can be of independent interest. For trees we design a two level dynamic programming approach to obtain an FPTAS. This approach is crucial to deal with the global pollution quota constraint. It uses a special multiple choice, multi-dimensional knapsack problem where coefficients of all constraints except one are bounded by a polynomial of the input size. We furthermore derive truthful in expectation mechanisms on general networks with bounded degree.
- Open Access
Learning Powers of Poisson Binomial Distributions
We introduce the problem of simultaneously learning all powers of a Poisson Binomial Distribution (PBD). A PBD of order $n$ is the distribution of a sum of $n$ mutually independent Bernoulli random variables $X_i$, where $\mathbb{E}[X_i] = p_i$. The $k$'th power of this distribution, for $k$ in a range $[m]$, is the distribution of $P_k = \sum_{i=1}^n X_i^{(k)}$, where each Bernoulli random variable $X_i^{(k)}$ has $\mathbb{E}[X_i^{(k)}] = (p_i)^k$. The learning algorithm can query any power $P_k$ several times and succeeds in learning all powers in the range, if with probability at least $1- \delta$: given any $k \in [m]$, it returns a probability distribution $Q_k$ with total variation distance from $P_k$ at most $\epsilon$. We provide almost matching lower and upper bounds on query complexity for this problem. We first show a lower bound on the query complexity on PBD powers instances with many distinct parameters $p_i$ which are separated, and we almost match this lower bound by examining the query complexity of simultaneously learning all the powers of a special class of PBD's resembling the PBD's of our lower bound. We study the fundamental setting of a Binomial distribution, and provide an optimal algorithm which uses $O(1/\epsilon^2)$ samples. Diakonikolas, Kane and Stewart [COLT'16] showed a lower bound of $\Omega(2^{1/\epsilon})$ samples to learn the $p_i$'s within error $\epsilon$. The question whether sampling from powers of PBDs can reduce this sampling complexity, has a negative answer since we show that the exponential number of samples is inevitable. Having sampling access to the powers of a PBD we then give a nearly optimal algorithm that learns its $p_i$'s. To prove our two last lower bounds we extend the classical minimax risk definition from statistics to estimating functions of sequences of distributions.Open AccessLearning Powers of Poisson Binomial Distributions
We introduce the problem of simultaneously learning all powers of a Poisson Binomial Distribution (PBD). A PBD of order $n$ is the distribution of a sum of $n$ mutually independent Bernoulli random variables $X_i$, where $\mathbb{E}[X_i] = p_i$. The $k$'th power of this distribution, for $k$ in a range $[m]$, is the distribution of $P_k = \sum_{i=1}^n X_i^{(k)}$, where each Bernoulli random variable $X_i^{(k)}$ has $\mathbb{E}[X_i^{(k)}] = (p_i)^k$. The learning algorithm can query any power $P_k$ several times and succeeds in learning all powers in the range, if with probability at least $1- \delta$: given any $k \in [m]$, it returns a probability distribution $Q_k$ with total variation distance from $P_k$ at most $\epsilon$. We provide almost matching lower and upper bounds on query complexity for this problem. We first show a lower bound on the query complexity on PBD powers instances with many distinct parameters $p_i$ which are separated, and we almost match this lower bound by examining the query complexity of simultaneously learning all the powers of a special class of PBD's resembling the PBD's of our lower bound. We study the fundamental setting of a Binomial distribution, and provide an optimal algorithm which uses $O(1/\epsilon^2)$ samples. Diakonikolas, Kane and Stewart [COLT'16] showed a lower bound of $\Omega(2^{1/\epsilon})$ samples to learn the $p_i$'s within error $\epsilon$. The question whether sampling from powers of PBDs can reduce this sampling complexity, has a negative answer since we show that the exponential number of samples is inevitable. Having sampling access to the powers of a PBD we then give a nearly optimal algorithm that learns its $p_i$'s. To prove our two last lower bounds we extend the classical minimax risk definition from statistics to estimating functions of sequences of distributions. - 20 July 2016
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 39-51
New Results for Network Pollution Games
- 17 January 2010
- Published by Society for Industrial & Applied Mathematics (SIAM)
Utilitarian Mechanism Design for Multi-Objective Optimization
- 17 January 2010
- Published by Society for Industrial & Applied Mathematics (SIAM)
Utilitarian Mechanism Design for Multi-Objective Optimization
- Open Access
Stackelberg Network Pricing Games
We study a multi-player one-round game termed Stackelberg Network Pricing Game, in which a leader can set prices for a subset of $m$ priceable edges in a graph. The other edges have a fixed cost. Based on the leader's decision one or more followers optimize a polynomial-time solvable combinatorial minimization problem and choose a minimum cost solution satisfying their requirements based on the fixed costs and the leader's prices. The leader receives as revenue the total amount of prices paid by the followers for priceable edges in their solutions, and the problem is to find revenue maximizing prices. Our model extends several known pricing problems, including single-minded and unit-demand pricing, as well as Stackelberg pricing for certain follower problems like shortest path or minimum spanning tree. Our first main result is a tight analysis of a single-price algorithm for the single follower game, which provides a $(1+\epsilon) \log m$-approximation for any $\epsilon >0$. This can be extended to provide a $(1+\epsilon)(\log k + \log m)$-approximation for the general problem and $k$ followers. The latter result is essentially best possible, as the problem is shown to be hard to approximate within $\mathcal{O(\log^\epsilon k + \log^\epsilon m)$. If followers have demands, the single-price algorithm provides a $(1+\epsilon)m^2$-approximation, and the problem is hard to approximate within $\mathcal{O(m^\epsilon)$ for some $\epsilon >0$. Our second main result is a polynomial time algorithm for revenue maximization in the special case of Stackelberg bipartite vertex cover, which is based on non-trivial max-flow and LP-duality techniques. Our results can be extended to provide constant-factor approximations for any constant number of followers.Open AccessStackelberg Network Pricing Games
We study a multi-player one-round game termed Stackelberg Network Pricing Game, in which a leader can set prices for a subset of $m$ priceable edges in a graph. The other edges have a fixed cost. Based on the leader's decision one or more followers optimize a polynomial-time solvable combinatorial minimization problem and choose a minimum cost solution satisfying their requirements based on the fixed costs and the leader's prices. The leader receives as revenue the total amount of prices paid by the followers for priceable edges in their solutions, and the problem is to find revenue maximizing prices. Our model extends several known pricing problems, including single-minded and unit-demand pricing, as well as Stackelberg pricing for certain follower problems like shortest path or minimum spanning tree. Our first main result is a tight analysis of a single-price algorithm for the single follower game, which provides a $(1+\epsilon) \log m$-approximation for any $\epsilon >0$. This can be extended to provide a $(1+\epsilon)(\log k + \log m)$-approximation for the general problem and $k$ followers. The latter result is essentially best possible, as the problem is shown to be hard to approximate within $\mathcal{O(\log^\epsilon k + \log^\epsilon m)$. If followers have demands, the single-price algorithm provides a $(1+\epsilon)m^2$-approximation, and the problem is hard to approximate within $\mathcal{O(m^\epsilon)$ for some $\epsilon >0$. Our second main result is a polynomial time algorithm for revenue maximization in the special case of Stackelberg bipartite vertex cover, which is based on non-trivial max-flow and LP-duality techniques. Our results can be extended to provide constant-factor approximations for any constant number of followers.