AGAyman Ghoneim

Ayman Ghoneim

*This is an algorithmically generated author record based on publicly available information.

Current Organizations / Institutes

The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article


Ayman Ghoneim has a total of 3 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:


Latest Publications

  • Characterizing Game Dynamics in Two-Player Strategy Games Using Network Motifs

    by Ayman Ghoneim, Hussein Abbass, Michael Barlow

    Many complex systems, whether biological, sociological, or physical ones, can be represented using networks. In these networks, a node represents an entity, and an arc represents a relationship/constraint between two entities. In discrete dynamics, one can construct a series of networks with each network representing a time snapshot of interaction among the different components in the system. Understanding these networks is a key to understand the dynamics of real and artificial systems. Network motifs are small graphs-usually three to four nodes-representing local structures. They have been widely used in studying complex systems and in characterizing features on the system level by analyzing locally how the substructures are formed. Frequencies of different network motifs have been shown in the literature to vary from one network to another, and conclusions hypothesized that these variations are due to the evolution/dynamics of the system. In this paper, we show for the first time that in strategy games, each game (i.e., type of dynamism) has its own signature of motifs and that this signature is maintained during the evolution of the game. We reveal that deterministic strategy games have unique footprints (motifs' count) that can be used to recognize and classify the game's type and that these footprints are consistent along the evolutionary path of the game. The findings of this paper have significance for a wide range of fields in cybernetics.


  • Information Sharing in the Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma Game

    by Ayman Ghoneim, Hussein Abbass, Michael Barlow

    In the iterated prisoner's dilemma (IPD) game, players normally have access to their own history, without being able to communicate global information. In this paper, we introduce information sharing among players of the IPD game. During the co-evolutionary process, players obtain access, through information sharing, to the common strategy adopted by the majority of the population in the previous generation. An extra bit is added to the history portion in the strategy chromosome. This extra bit holds a value of 0 if the decisions to cooperate were greater than the decisions to defect in the last generation and 1 if otherwise. We show that information sharing alters the dynamics of the IPD game