Jerónimo Pérez Alemán
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Jerónimo Pérez Alemán has a total of 8 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
Carolina Bona Sánchez
Universidad de Las Palmas de Gran Canaria
2 shared publicationsCarolina Bonasanchez
1 shared publicationCarolina Bona‐Sánchez
University of Las Palmas de Gran Canaria
1 shared publicationDomingo J. Santana Martín
Universidad de Las Palmas de Gran Canaria
1 shared publicationDomingo J. Santana‐Martín
University of Las Palmas de Gran Canaria
1 shared publicationDomingo Javier Santana Martín
Universidad de las Palmas de Gran Canaria- F. CC Económicas y Empresariales
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- 14 March 2014
- Published by Wiley in Corporate Governance: An International Review
- Vol. 22 (4) , 330-346
Politically Connected Firms and Earnings Informativeness in the Controlling versus Minority Shareholders Context:European Evidence
Manuscript Type: EmpiricalResearch Question/Issue: Focusing on an environment where ownership concentration is prevalent and where the presence of politically connected directors on the board is the natural form of political connection, we analyze the effect of political connections on earnings informativeness. We also examine a question that has not been considered in previous research, namely, the impact of the level of divergence between the dominant owner's voting and cash flow rights on earnings informativeness for politically connected firms.Research Findings/Insights: We find that the presence of politicians on the board negatively affects earnings informativeness. We also find a positive impact of the divergence between the dominant owner's voting and cash flow rights on the informativeness of accounting earnings in politically connected firms.Theoretical/Academic Implications: We show that the relationship between political ties and earnings informativeness is explained by an information effect, whereby politicians and shareholders are interested in providing as little information to the market as possible in order to protect political ties from public scrutiny and prevent the leakage of competitive advantages to competitors. Additionally, we show that the positive effect of divergence between the dominant owner's voting and cash flow rights on earnings informativeness in firms that belong to a pyramid is explained both by an alignment effect, whereby political connections promote transparency, as well as by a stewardship effect, whereby the ultimate owner of the pyramid, acting as a steward, places politicians on the board to increase the firm's reputation and reports earnings in good faith.Practitioner/Policy Implications: The results of our study may be useful to regulators interested in increasing transparency in order to promote a more efficient allocation of resources. In particular, the results suggest that in countries where recent reforms aim to improve investor protection and market confidence, regulators should encourage the disclosure of firm political ties. The results of our study may also be useful to investors, financial analysts and auditors, as they highlight the importance of considering specific features of the corporate governance system when assessing the credibility of accounting information.
- 14 March 2014
- Published by Wiley in Corporate Governance: An International Review
- Vol. 22 (4) , 330-346
Politically Connected Firms and Earnings Informativeness in the Controlling versus Minority Shareholders Context:European Evidence
Manuscript Type: EmpiricalResearch Question/Issue: Focusing on an environment where ownership concentration is prevalent and where the presence of politically connected directors on the board is the natural form of political connection, we analyze the effect of political connections on earnings informativeness. We also examine a question that has not been considered in previous research, namely, the impact of the level of divergence between the dominant owner's voting and cash flow rights on earnings informativeness for politically connected firms.Research Findings/Insights: We find that the presence of politicians on the board negatively affects earnings informativeness. We also find a positive impact of the divergence between the dominant owner's voting and cash flow rights on the informativeness of accounting earnings in politically connected firms.Theoretical/Academic Implications: We show that the relationship between political ties and earnings informativeness is explained by an information effect, whereby politicians and shareholders are interested in providing as little information to the market as possible in order to protect political ties from public scrutiny and prevent the leakage of competitive advantages to competitors. Additionally, we show that the positive effect of divergence between the dominant owner's voting and cash flow rights on earnings informativeness in firms that belong to a pyramid is explained both by an alignment effect, whereby political connections promote transparency, as well as by a stewardship effect, whereby the ultimate owner of the pyramid, acting as a steward, places politicians on the board to increase the firm's reputation and reports earnings in good faith.Practitioner/Policy Implications: The results of our study may be useful to regulators interested in increasing transparency in order to promote a more efficient allocation of resources. In particular, the results suggest that in countries where recent reforms aim to improve investor protection and market confidence, regulators should encourage the disclosure of firm political ties. The results of our study may also be useful to investors, financial analysts and auditors, as they highlight the importance of considering specific features of the corporate governance system when assessing the credibility of accounting information.
- 15 January 2013
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Spanish Journal of Finance and Accounting / Revista Española de Financiación y Contabilidad
- Vol. 42 (159) , 371-394
Control institucional dominante y capacidad informativa de los resultados constables
En el trabajo analizamos la relación entre el control institucional dominante y la capacidad informativa de los resultados contables en una muestra de empresas no financieras cotizadas españolas en el periodo 1996–2009. Nuestros resultados revelan que a medida que aumenta la propiedad más allá del nivel requerido para el control efectivo en manos del banco dominante, mayor es la credibilidad otorgada por el mercado a la información contable divulgada, mientras que a medida que aumenta la propiedad del fondo de inversión dominante, el mercado espera que la información contable se erija en un instrumento a disposición de dicho accionista para la consecución de mayores primas de control, más que en un reflejo fiel de las operaciones realizadas por la empresa. Estos resultados vienen explicados por las diferencias en objetivos, estabilidad, nivel de escrutinio y visibilidad que caracterizan la actuación de ambos tipos de inversores institucionales cuando detentan el control efectivo de la empresa.
- 15 January 2013
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Spanish Journal of Finance and Accounting / Revista Española de Financiación y Contabilidad
- Vol. 42 (159) , 371-394
Control institucional dominante y capacidad informativa de los resultados constables
En el trabajo analizamos la relación entre el control institucional dominante y la capacidad informativa de los resultados contables en una muestra de empresas no financieras cotizadas españolas en el periodo 1996–2009. Nuestros resultados revelan que a medida que aumenta la propiedad más allá del nivel requerido para el control efectivo en manos del banco dominante, mayor es la credibilidad otorgada por el mercado a la información contable divulgada, mientras que a medida que aumenta la propiedad del fondo de inversión dominante, el mercado espera que la información contable se erija en un instrumento a disposición de dicho accionista para la consecución de mayores primas de control, más que en un reflejo fiel de las operaciones realizadas por la empresa. Estos resultados vienen explicados por las diferencias en objetivos, estabilidad, nivel de escrutinio y visibilidad que caracterizan la actuación de ambos tipos de inversores institucionales cuando detentan el control efectivo de la empresa.
- 7 July 2011
- Published by Wiley in Journal of Business Finance & Accounting
- Vol. 38 (7-8) , 765-793
Defence Measures and Earnings Management in an Owner Dominant Context
- 7 July 2011
- Published by Wiley in Journal of Business Finance & Accounting
- Vol. 38 (7-8) , 765-793
Defence Measures and Earnings Management in an Owner Dominant Context
- Open Access
- 1 January 2009
- Published by Enpresa Institutua - Instituto de Economia Aplicada a la Empresa in Cuadernos de Gestión
- Vol. 9 (2) , 17-30
Informativeness of accounting earnings in family firms
This work examines the relationship between the family control and informativeness of accounting earnings in listed non-financial Spanish companies between 1997 and 2003. The results reveal a negative relationship between the family nature of the controlling shareholder and the credibility of accounting information. Moreover, as the level of voting rights in the hands of the family ultimate owner increases, the informativeness of earnings decreases. Only in family firms where the CEO is hired, the family nature affects positively on the informativeness of accounting earnings.
- 1 January 2009
- Published by Enpresa Institutua - Instituto de Economia Aplicada a la Empresa in Cuadernos de Gestión
- Vol. 9 (2) , 17-30
Open AccessInformativeness of accounting earnings in family firms
This work examines the relationship between the family control and informativeness of accounting earnings in listed non-financial Spanish companies between 1997 and 2003. The results reveal a negative relationship between the family nature of the controlling shareholder and the credibility of accounting information. Moreover, as the level of voting rights in the hands of the family ultimate owner increases, the informativeness of earnings decreases. Only in family firms where the CEO is hired, the family nature affects positively on the informativeness of accounting earnings.