Kai Kang
Kai Kang has a total of 34 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
Mengyu He
3 shared publicationsYanfang Ma
Hebei university of Technology
3 shared publications- Yanfang Ma
School of Economics and Management, Hebei University of Technology, Tianjin 300401, China
3 shared publications Fang Yan
Chongqing Jiaotong University
2 shared publications- Guitao Xu
School of Economics and Management, Hebei University of Technology, Tianjin, China
2 shared publications - Jing Zhang
School of Economics and Management, Hebei University of Technology, Tianjin 300401, China
2 shared publications
Latest Publications
- 1 January 2024
- Published by American Institute of Mathematical Sciences (AIMS) in Journal of Industrial and Management Optimization
- Vol. 20 (10) , 3165-3194
Additional contract selection and parameter design under supplier credit guarantee financing
The essence of credit guarantee financing (CGF) is the risk sharing between the guarantor and financial institution. Inspired by the case of the CGF of Evergrowing Bank, this study aims to explore the risk compensation strategies and guarantee decisions for guarantors under CGF and provide decision support for the efficient operation of the supply chain CGF. Considering three kinds of risk compensation contracts, namely cost-sharing, revenue-sharing, and quantity-flexibility, the Stackelberg game method is used to construct the supplier CGF model under the retailer's financial constraints. The results show that additional contract parameters, interest rate, debtor's initial capital, and implicit bankruptcy cost are the main factors affecting the credit guarantee coefficient decision. Besides, we find optimal additional contract parameters that can optimize the profits of supply chain members and complete the contract parameter design. The quantity-flexibility contract is the most effective strategy for the supplier to compensate for guarantee risk. However, the retailer's choice of additional contract depends on the initial capital or implicit bankruptcy cost. The main innovation of this study is that it endogenizes the credit guarantee decision and explores the details of the risk compensation contract. Further, the impact of implicit bankruptcy cost on CGF decision is also mentioned for the first time in supply chain finance. Our findings lead to recommendations for the optimal credit guarantee scheme and contract design of compensation for guarantee risk in the supply chain.
- 1 January 2024
- Published by American Institute of Mathematical Sciences (AIMS) in Journal of Industrial and Management Optimization
- Vol. 20 (10) , 3165-3194
Additional contract selection and parameter design under supplier credit guarantee financing
The essence of credit guarantee financing (CGF) is the risk sharing between the guarantor and financial institution. Inspired by the case of the CGF of Evergrowing Bank, this study aims to explore the risk compensation strategies and guarantee decisions for guarantors under CGF and provide decision support for the efficient operation of the supply chain CGF. Considering three kinds of risk compensation contracts, namely cost-sharing, revenue-sharing, and quantity-flexibility, the Stackelberg game method is used to construct the supplier CGF model under the retailer's financial constraints. The results show that additional contract parameters, interest rate, debtor's initial capital, and implicit bankruptcy cost are the main factors affecting the credit guarantee coefficient decision. Besides, we find optimal additional contract parameters that can optimize the profits of supply chain members and complete the contract parameter design. The quantity-flexibility contract is the most effective strategy for the supplier to compensate for guarantee risk. However, the retailer's choice of additional contract depends on the initial capital or implicit bankruptcy cost. The main innovation of this study is that it endogenizes the credit guarantee decision and explores the details of the risk compensation contract. Further, the impact of implicit bankruptcy cost on CGF decision is also mentioned for the first time in supply chain finance. Our findings lead to recommendations for the optimal credit guarantee scheme and contract design of compensation for guarantee risk in the supply chain.
- 23 October 2023
- Published by Elsevier in Computers & Industrial Engineering
- Vol. 186
A tripartite stochastic evolutionary game model of complex technological products in a transnational supply chain
- 23 October 2023
- Published by Elsevier in Computers & Industrial Engineering
- Vol. 186
A tripartite stochastic evolutionary game model of complex technological products in a transnational supply chain
- Open Access
- 13 February 2023
- Published by Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) in IEEE Access
- Vol. 11, 14859-14875
An Omnichannel Retailing Operation for Solving Joint Inventory Replenishment Control and Dynamic Pricing Problems From the Perspective of Customer Experience
Customer experience, a key element in the domain of omnichannel retailing, plays a vital role in attracting consumers. Implementing a new BOPS (buy online, pick up in store) strategy will not only affect the inventory structure and pricing strategy of retail enterprises, but will also impact the original sales channel. In accordance with the consumer experience, a dynamic optimization model of a retailer inventory system was established in this research. Based on the optimal control theory, analyze the optimal control strategies under four sales modes: online, offline, BOPS, and BOPS-PLUS (BOPS and buy offline online-logistics distribution). Through numerical experiments, the inventory control strategies and optimal discounted profits under the four modes are compared and analyzed. The results show that the optimal experience investment and dynamic pricing levels gradually decrease with time, and the inventory state has a vital influence on the discounted profit of the system. The traditional dual-channel retail model is optimal when the channel inventory is not out of stock. In situations where channel inventory is in short supply (both online and offline), a deeply integrated omnichannel retail mode BOPS-PLUS is best. The numerical analysis also reveals that price sensitivity coefficient, experience service coefficient and online return rate also have significant influence on the selection of optimal channel strategy.
- 13 February 2023
- Published by Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) in IEEE Access
- Vol. 11, 14859-14875
Open AccessAn Omnichannel Retailing Operation for Solving Joint Inventory Replenishment Control and Dynamic Pricing Problems From the Perspective of Customer Experience
Customer experience, a key element in the domain of omnichannel retailing, plays a vital role in attracting consumers. Implementing a new BOPS (buy online, pick up in store) strategy will not only affect the inventory structure and pricing strategy of retail enterprises, but will also impact the original sales channel. In accordance with the consumer experience, a dynamic optimization model of a retailer inventory system was established in this research. Based on the optimal control theory, analyze the optimal control strategies under four sales modes: online, offline, BOPS, and BOPS-PLUS (BOPS and buy offline online-logistics distribution). Through numerical experiments, the inventory control strategies and optimal discounted profits under the four modes are compared and analyzed. The results show that the optimal experience investment and dynamic pricing levels gradually decrease with time, and the inventory state has a vital influence on the discounted profit of the system. The traditional dual-channel retail model is optimal when the channel inventory is not out of stock. In situations where channel inventory is in short supply (both online and offline), a deeply integrated omnichannel retail mode BOPS-PLUS is best. The numerical analysis also reveals that price sensitivity coefficient, experience service coefficient and online return rate also have significant influence on the selection of optimal channel strategy.
- Open Access
- 21 December 2022
- Published by Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) in IEEE Access
- Vol. 10, 133219-133231
Optimal Pricing and Customer Experience Investment Strategy in an Omnichannel Supply Chain Under BOPS
This study investigates an omnichannel supply chain comprising a manufacturer with online retailing and a physical retailer that provides a shopping experience to consumers. To enhance this shopping experience, the supply chain also offers buy-online-and-pick-up-in-store (BOPS) services. A model was constructed considering cost-sharing of customer experience investment to improve the performance level of the omnichannel supply chain. The analysis examined the optimal choice of unified pricing or differential pricing for online and offline channels using the Stackelberg game model. The results show that the implementation of a cost-sharing cooperation contract can increase customer experience investment and consumer demand and improve supply chain performance. Specifically, the pricing strategy was associated with channel competition and the customer experience factor. The unified pricing strategy performed better when competition intensity was lower, and the differential pricing strategy performed better when competition intensity was higher. Further, the study’s consideration of customer experience investment level as an endogenous variable has not been done in previous studies, which contributes to its novelty. Therefore, in the omnichannel supply chain, excessive channel competition should be avoided, and cooperative investment in the customer experience among supply chain actors should be encouraged.
- 21 December 2022
- Published by Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) in IEEE Access
- Vol. 10, 133219-133231
Open AccessOptimal Pricing and Customer Experience Investment Strategy in an Omnichannel Supply Chain Under BOPS
This study investigates an omnichannel supply chain comprising a manufacturer with online retailing and a physical retailer that provides a shopping experience to consumers. To enhance this shopping experience, the supply chain also offers buy-online-and-pick-up-in-store (BOPS) services. A model was constructed considering cost-sharing of customer experience investment to improve the performance level of the omnichannel supply chain. The analysis examined the optimal choice of unified pricing or differential pricing for online and offline channels using the Stackelberg game model. The results show that the implementation of a cost-sharing cooperation contract can increase customer experience investment and consumer demand and improve supply chain performance. Specifically, the pricing strategy was associated with channel competition and the customer experience factor. The unified pricing strategy performed better when competition intensity was lower, and the differential pricing strategy performed better when competition intensity was higher. Further, the study’s consideration of customer experience investment level as an endogenous variable has not been done in previous studies, which contributes to its novelty. Therefore, in the omnichannel supply chain, excessive channel competition should be avoided, and cooperative investment in the customer experience among supply chain actors should be encouraged.
- 7 September 2022
- Published by Taylor & Francis in International Journal of Production Research
- Vol. 62 (20) , 7540-7558
Asset-light operation strategy for car-sharing model with vertical shareholding: financial leasing or instalment factoring
Supply chain finance is an important way of realising the transformation of the asset-heavy operation mode in car-sharing services to an asset-light operation mode, by transforming the ownership cost into a variable cost. This study considers a service supply chain with vertical shareholding comprising a vehicle manufacturer and a car-sharing operator; further, it establishes financing decision-making models under financial leasing (FL) and instalment factoring finance (IFF) and explores the impact of profitability and shareholding ratios on FL and IFF. The results how that service profitability has a fundamental influence on financing decisions. The pooling effect and service satisfaction rate affect ownership costs and rental income, respectively. In turn, these factors jointly affect the choice of financing strategy. Moreover, there is a threshold of financing strategy choice related to the shareholding ratio: a large shareholding ratio means IFF is optimal, while when the ratio is low, FL is optimal. Finally, under certain conditions, a composite contract with revenue sharing and linear transfer payment for the optimal financing strategies can be adopted to improve supply chain performance. This study thus provides effective strategies for realising asset-light operation in car sharing by transforming ownership cost into variable cost.
- 7 September 2022
- Published by Taylor & Francis in International Journal of Production Research
- Vol. 62 (20) , 7540-7558
Asset-light operation strategy for car-sharing model with vertical shareholding: financial leasing or instalment factoring
Supply chain finance is an important way of realising the transformation of the asset-heavy operation mode in car-sharing services to an asset-light operation mode, by transforming the ownership cost into a variable cost. This study considers a service supply chain with vertical shareholding comprising a vehicle manufacturer and a car-sharing operator; further, it establishes financing decision-making models under financial leasing (FL) and instalment factoring finance (IFF) and explores the impact of profitability and shareholding ratios on FL and IFF. The results how that service profitability has a fundamental influence on financing decisions. The pooling effect and service satisfaction rate affect ownership costs and rental income, respectively. In turn, these factors jointly affect the choice of financing strategy. Moreover, there is a threshold of financing strategy choice related to the shareholding ratio: a large shareholding ratio means IFF is optimal, while when the ratio is low, FL is optimal. Finally, under certain conditions, a composite contract with revenue sharing and linear transfer payment for the optimal financing strategies can be adopted to improve supply chain performance. This study thus provides effective strategies for realising asset-light operation in car sharing by transforming ownership cost into variable cost.
- 31 July 2022
- Published by Elsevier in Applied Mathematics and Computation
- Vol. 434
Dual-channel supply chain coordination considering credit sales competition
- 31 July 2022
- Published by Elsevier in Applied Mathematics and Computation
- Vol. 434
Dual-channel supply chain coordination considering credit sales competition
- 1 January 2022
- Published by American Institute of Mathematical Sciences (AIMS) in Journal of Industrial and Management Optimization
- Vol. 18 (3) , 1737-1768
Financing strategy selection and coordination considering risk aversion in a capital-constrained supply chain
By applying Stackelberg game theory, this paper investigates the supply chain with a risk-neutral retailer and a risk-averse supplier, measuring risk-averse behavior by using conditional value-at-risk (CVaR). The equilibrium solutions of the supplier's wholesale price and the retailer's order quantity are obtained under two financing strategies: supplier financing (SF) and supplier investment (SI). It is found that the supplier's risk aversion is a crucial factor affecting both parties' financing decisions, and the supplier should offer different financing strategies to the retailer based on his risk attitude and the profit-sharing coefficient. However, the retailer prefers SF regardless of the supplier's risk aversion. Taking bank credit financing as a basic model, the advantages of SF and SI have been investigated. A Pareto improvement region for the two finance strategies has been identified and some suggestions are provided for the supplier's optimal utility. Then we extend to the situation that both parties are risk-averse and use the financing cost-sharing mechanism to achieve centralized decision-making.
- 1 January 2022
- Published by American Institute of Mathematical Sciences (AIMS) in Journal of Industrial and Management Optimization
- Vol. 18 (3) , 1737-1768
Financing strategy selection and coordination considering risk aversion in a capital-constrained supply chain
By applying Stackelberg game theory, this paper investigates the supply chain with a risk-neutral retailer and a risk-averse supplier, measuring risk-averse behavior by using conditional value-at-risk (CVaR). The equilibrium solutions of the supplier's wholesale price and the retailer's order quantity are obtained under two financing strategies: supplier financing (SF) and supplier investment (SI). It is found that the supplier's risk aversion is a crucial factor affecting both parties' financing decisions, and the supplier should offer different financing strategies to the retailer based on his risk attitude and the profit-sharing coefficient. However, the retailer prefers SF regardless of the supplier's risk aversion. Taking bank credit financing as a basic model, the advantages of SF and SI have been investigated. A Pareto improvement region for the two finance strategies has been identified and some suggestions are provided for the supplier's optimal utility. Then we extend to the situation that both parties are risk-averse and use the financing cost-sharing mechanism to achieve centralized decision-making.
- 19 May 2021
- Published by Taylor & Francis in International Journal of Production Research
- Vol. 60 (11) , 3606-3629
Impact of tax difference and asset structure on a capital-constrained vertical equity holding transnational supply chain
Capital and taxes play vital roles in transnational supply chain financing and operations. We use the Stackelberg game method to explore the financing strategy selection and contract clauses setting for a capital-constrained transnational supply chain with vertical equity holding. The results prove that asset structure, tax difference, and shareholding ratio are essential in selecting the financing strategy and additional clause. First, a higher supplier's asset structure can increase the profits of supply chain members. Second, a threshold for contract choice connected to tax difference is discovered. Early payment with a discount clause is optimal when tax difference is significant. When the tax difference is slight, buyer financing without additional clauses is optimal. Further, there exists an optimal shareholding ratio related to tax, which can avoid double marginalisation under buyer financing and reduce supply chain losses under bank financing. Tax subsidies due to deficit make supply chain performance outstrip centralised decision-making when the shareholding ratio is more excellent than a threshold. Last, the choice of strategy under buyer financing is related to the ex-ante or ex-post signing of the purchase contract and the limited deduction of interest payment within the tax law. Our findings guide transnational supply chain financing and operations.
- 19 May 2021
- Published by Taylor & Francis in International Journal of Production Research
- Vol. 60 (11) , 3606-3629
Impact of tax difference and asset structure on a capital-constrained vertical equity holding transnational supply chain
Capital and taxes play vital roles in transnational supply chain financing and operations. We use the Stackelberg game method to explore the financing strategy selection and contract clauses setting for a capital-constrained transnational supply chain with vertical equity holding. The results prove that asset structure, tax difference, and shareholding ratio are essential in selecting the financing strategy and additional clause. First, a higher supplier's asset structure can increase the profits of supply chain members. Second, a threshold for contract choice connected to tax difference is discovered. Early payment with a discount clause is optimal when tax difference is significant. When the tax difference is slight, buyer financing without additional clauses is optimal. Further, there exists an optimal shareholding ratio related to tax, which can avoid double marginalisation under buyer financing and reduce supply chain losses under bank financing. Tax subsidies due to deficit make supply chain performance outstrip centralised decision-making when the shareholding ratio is more excellent than a threshold. Last, the choice of strategy under buyer financing is related to the ex-ante or ex-post signing of the purchase contract and the limited deduction of interest payment within the tax law. Our findings guide transnational supply chain financing and operations.