Hemanta K. Maji
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Previous Organizations / Institutes
The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years
Hemanta K. Maji has a total of 14 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Amit Sahai
UCLA
1 shared publication Craig Gentry
IBM Research
1 shared publication- Divya Gupta
University of California
1 shared publication - Eric Miles
UCLA
1 shared publication - Jean-Sébastien Coron
University of Luxembourg, Esch-Sur-Alzette, Luxembourg
1 shared publication - Manoj M. Prabhakaran
University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- 1 August 2015
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 538-557
Explicit Non-malleable Codes Against Bit-Wise Tampering and Permutations
- 1 August 2015
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 538-557
Explicit Non-malleable Codes Against Bit-Wise Tampering and Permutations
- Open Access
- 1 August 2015
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 247-266
Zeroizing Without Low-Level Zeroes: New MMAP Attacks and their Limitations
- 1 August 2015
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 247-266
Open AccessZeroizing Without Low-Level Zeroes: New MMAP Attacks and their Limitations
- Open Access
Limits of Random Oracles in Secure Computation
The seminal result of Impagliazzo and Rudich (STOC 1989) gave a black-box separation between one-way functions and public-key encryption: informally, a public-key encryption scheme cannot be constructed using one-way functions as the sole source of computational hardness. In addition, this implied a black-box separation between one-way functions and protocols for certain Secure Function Evaluation (SFE) functionalities (in particular, Oblivious Transfer). Surprisingly, however, {\em since then there has been no further progress in separating one-way functions and SFE functionalities} (though several other black-box separation results were shown). In this work, we present the complete picture for deterministic 2-party SFE functionalities. We show that one-way functions are black-box separated from {\em all such SFE functionalities}, except the ones which have unconditionally secure protocols (and hence do not rely on any computational hardness), when secure computation against semi-honest adversaries is considered. In the case of security against active adversaries, a black-box one-way function is indeed useful for SFE, but we show that it is useful only as much as access to an ideal commitment functionality is useful. Technically, our main result establishes the limitations of random oracles for secure computation.
Open AccessLimits of Random Oracles in Secure Computation
The seminal result of Impagliazzo and Rudich (STOC 1989) gave a black-box separation between one-way functions and public-key encryption: informally, a public-key encryption scheme cannot be constructed using one-way functions as the sole source of computational hardness. In addition, this implied a black-box separation between one-way functions and protocols for certain Secure Function Evaluation (SFE) functionalities (in particular, Oblivious Transfer). Surprisingly, however, {\em since then there has been no further progress in separating one-way functions and SFE functionalities} (though several other black-box separation results were shown). In this work, we present the complete picture for deterministic 2-party SFE functionalities. We show that one-way functions are black-box separated from {\em all such SFE functionalities}, except the ones which have unconditionally secure protocols (and hence do not rely on any computational hardness), when secure computation against semi-honest adversaries is considered. In the case of security against active adversaries, a black-box one-way function is indeed useful for SFE, but we show that it is useful only as much as access to an ideal commitment functionality is useful. Technically, our main result establishes the limitations of random oracles for secure computation.