Lisa Tessman
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Research Subjects
Research Interests
Latest Publications
- 12 August 2023
- Published by Springer Nature in The Journal of Ethics
- Vol. 27 (4) , 495-514
When the Heavens Fall: The Unintelligible and the Unthinkable
- 12 August 2023
- Published by Springer Nature in The Journal of Ethics
- Vol. 27 (4) , 495-514
When the Heavens Fall: The Unintelligible and the Unthinkable
- 1 September 2021
- Published by Springer Nature in The Journal of Value Inquiry
- Vol. 55 (3) , 437-456
The Virtues of Reactive Attitudes
- 1 September 2021
- Published by Springer Nature in The Journal of Value Inquiry
- Vol. 55 (3) , 437-456
The Virtues of Reactive Attitudes
- 7 February 2020
- Published by Springer Nature in Medicine, Health Care and Philosophy
- Vol. 23 (2) , 165-177
Moral distress in health care: when is it fitting?
Nurses and other medical practitioners often experience moral distress: they feel an anguished sense of responsibility for what they take to be their own moral failures, even when those failures were unavoidable. However, in such cases other people do not tend to think it is right to hold them responsible. This is an interesting mismatch of reactions. It might seem that the mismatch should be remedied by assuring the practitioner that they are not responsible, but I argue that this denies something important that the phenomenon of moral distress tells us. In fact, both the practitioners’ tendencies to hold themselves responsible and other people’s reluctance to hold the practitioners responsible get something right. The practitioners may be right that they are responsible in the sense of having failed to meet a binding moral requirement, even when the requirement was impossible to meet. This makes moral distress a fitting response because it correctly represents their own action as a wrongdoing. However, others may meanwhile be right that the practitioners are not responsible in the sense of being culpable and blameworthy. To blame others, or oneself, for certain failures, including those that are unavoidable, would be unfair. My claim depends on distinguishing between the fittingness and the fairness of holding someone (including oneself) responsible for moral failure. Having drawn the distinction, I suggest that moral distress should be addressed in a way that both recognizes it as a fitting response and avoids the unfairness of blame.
- 7 February 2020
- Published by Springer Nature in Medicine, Health Care and Philosophy
- Vol. 23 (2) , 165-177
Moral distress in health care: when is it fitting?
Nurses and other medical practitioners often experience moral distress: they feel an anguished sense of responsibility for what they take to be their own moral failures, even when those failures were unavoidable. However, in such cases other people do not tend to think it is right to hold them responsible. This is an interesting mismatch of reactions. It might seem that the mismatch should be remedied by assuring the practitioner that they are not responsible, but I argue that this denies something important that the phenomenon of moral distress tells us. In fact, both the practitioners’ tendencies to hold themselves responsible and other people’s reluctance to hold the practitioners responsible get something right. The practitioners may be right that they are responsible in the sense of having failed to meet a binding moral requirement, even when the requirement was impossible to meet. This makes moral distress a fitting response because it correctly represents their own action as a wrongdoing. However, others may meanwhile be right that the practitioners are not responsible in the sense of being culpable and blameworthy. To blame others, or oneself, for certain failures, including those that are unavoidable, would be unfair. My claim depends on distinguishing between the fittingness and the fairness of holding someone (including oneself) responsible for moral failure. Having drawn the distinction, I suggest that moral distress should be addressed in a way that both recognizes it as a fitting response and avoids the unfairness of blame.
- 27 May 2018
- Published by Taylor & Francis in International Journal of Philosophical Studies
- Vol. 26 (3) , 376-398
Sacrificing Value
When is sacrifice – and particularly self-sacrifice – called for? This question turns out to be difficult to answer, for it tends to arise when values conflict, and hence the answer to it depends on how conflicts of values are to be resolved. If values are constructed, and if there is no single right way to construct them or prioritize them when they conflict, though there are identifiable ways in which the construction of values can go wrong, we may be left in a position of ambivalence about what should be sacrificed. In cases of conflict in which self-sacrifice is one of the options, ambivalence may be particularly appropriate. In part this is because there may be in such cases special sources of plurality and incommensurability of values, because the conflict is likely to be between something that is valued by a social group, and something that is valued particularly by an individual who has to consider self-sacrificing. And in part it is because individuals may have trouble balancing self-regarding and other-regarding concerns in the process of value construction. This paper elaborates these complications, and presents cases in which we might suspect that someone has self-sacrificed too much or too little.
- 27 May 2018
- Published by Taylor & Francis in International Journal of Philosophical Studies
- Vol. 26 (3) , 376-398
Sacrificing Value
When is sacrifice – and particularly self-sacrifice – called for? This question turns out to be difficult to answer, for it tends to arise when values conflict, and hence the answer to it depends on how conflicts of values are to be resolved. If values are constructed, and if there is no single right way to construct them or prioritize them when they conflict, though there are identifiable ways in which the construction of values can go wrong, we may be left in a position of ambivalence about what should be sacrificed. In cases of conflict in which self-sacrifice is one of the options, ambivalence may be particularly appropriate. In part this is because there may be in such cases special sources of plurality and incommensurability of values, because the conflict is likely to be between something that is valued by a social group, and something that is valued particularly by an individual who has to consider self-sacrificing. And in part it is because individuals may have trouble balancing self-regarding and other-regarding concerns in the process of value construction. This paper elaborates these complications, and presents cases in which we might suspect that someone has self-sacrificed too much or too little.
- 1 December 2014
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP)
- p. 253-256
Conclusion
- 25 July 2009
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 47-58
Feminist Eudaimonism: Eudaimonism as Non-Ideal Theory
- 25 July 2009
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 47-58
Feminist Eudaimonism: Eudaimonism as Non-Ideal Theory
- 1 January 1998
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Hypatia
- Vol. 13 (4) , 18-39
Dangerous Loyalties and Liberatory Politics
While communities engaged in liberatory struggles have valued group loyalty and condemned betrayal, loyalty itself may be problematic, because remaining loyal to a community may require that one refrain from deconstructing the group identity on which the community is based. This essay investigates what loyalty is and whether loyalty is a virtue, and considers why, if loyalty is indeed a virtue, it may be one that is difficult to maintain in a context of oppression.
- 1 January 1998
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Hypatia
- Vol. 13 (4) , 18-39
Dangerous Loyalties and Liberatory Politics
While communities engaged in liberatory struggles have valued group loyalty and condemned betrayal, loyalty itself may be problematic, because remaining loyal to a community may require that one refrain from deconstructing the group identity on which the community is based. This essay investigates what loyalty is and whether loyalty is a virtue, and considers why, if loyalty is indeed a virtue, it may be one that is difficult to maintain in a context of oppression.