Igor Fischer
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Research Subjects
Igor Fischer has a total of 1 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Thorsten Herfet
Saarland University
2 shared publications
Latest Publications
- 1 July 2007
- Published by International Academy Publishing (IAP) in Journal of Computers
- Vol. 2 (5) , 44-53
Watermarks and Text Transformations in Visual Document Authentication
Integrity of digital documents is a very important issue if they are to be legally binding. Common solutions, like digital signatures or message authentication codes, are based on cryptography and require computers or similar hardware to be produced. They can be trusted only as long as the employed hardware can be trusted. We present a complementary scheme for document authentication in untrusted environment. The scheme combines visual authentication, human- recognizable watermarks, and image transformations, and is suitable also for larger text document. Because it relies on visual cryptography, it requires practically no computational power on the receiver side. To prevent potential attackers from obtaining signatures without author’s knowledge, we propose using a simple challenge-response protocol.
- 1 July 2007
- Published by International Academy Publishing (IAP) in Journal of Computers
- Vol. 2 (5) , 44-53
Watermarks and Text Transformations in Visual Document Authentication
Integrity of digital documents is a very important issue if they are to be legally binding. Common solutions, like digital signatures or message authentication codes, are based on cryptography and require computers or similar hardware to be produced. They can be trusted only as long as the employed hardware can be trusted. We present a complementary scheme for document authentication in untrusted environment. The scheme combines visual authentication, human- recognizable watermarks, and image transformations, and is suitable also for larger text document. Because it relies on visual cryptography, it requires practically no computational power on the receiver side. To prevent potential attackers from obtaining signatures without author’s knowledge, we propose using a simple challenge-response protocol.
- 1 October 2006
- Published by Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE)
- p. 471-474
Visual CAPTCHAs for Document Authentication
Visual CAPCTCHAs, like gimpy images, are commonly used to screen human users from automated computer scripts. We propose using them for direct, visual authentication of digital documents. The basic assumption is that if it is hard or impossible for the computer to recognize a document, then it cannot manipulate it. If such a document is still recognizable by a human, he or she can be confident that it is authentic, or at least that no automated process has manipulated it. Such authentication is highly desirable in the context of digital signatures, which, due to the computational complexity, have to be produced by a computer. It can be a specialized, trusted cryptographic computer, e.g. a smartcard, but the path to it is generally not secure. Visual CAPTCHAs can be used for securing the path without the need for additional hardware
- 1 October 2006
- Published by Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE)
- p. 471-474
Visual CAPTCHAs for Document Authentication
Visual CAPCTCHAs, like gimpy images, are commonly used to screen human users from automated computer scripts. We propose using them for direct, visual authentication of digital documents. The basic assumption is that if it is hard or impossible for the computer to recognize a document, then it cannot manipulate it. If such a document is still recognizable by a human, he or she can be confident that it is authentic, or at least that no automated process has manipulated it. Such authentication is highly desirable in the context of digital signatures, which, due to the computational complexity, have to be produced by a computer. It can be a specialized, trusted cryptographic computer, e.g. a smartcard, but the path to it is generally not secure. Visual CAPTCHAs can be used for securing the path without the need for additional hardware