Jared Holsopple
Jared Holsopple has a total of 11 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
Shanchieh Jay Yang
Research Scientist, CUBRC Buffalo, NY, USA
2 shared publications- Adam Stotz
CUBRC
1 shared publication Daniel Liu
Rochester Institute of Technology (United States)
1 shared publicationEric Bohannon
1 shared publicationJason Kistner
1 shared publicationMichael Holender
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- 1 October 2009
- Published by Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE)
- No. 21557578,p. 1-7
Designing a data fusion system using a top-down approach
While there are multiple reference models for data fusion, there are no formal processes in which to design a complete fusion system. Even though high-level fusion, i.e., impact and threat assessment, is included in the various models, the majority of data fusion research has focused on low-level data fusion such as sensing and correlation. More importantly, low-level fusion technologies have been designed without detailed consideration of threat and impact assessment requirements. On the other hand, high-level designs are restricted by the available data from low-level systems. This disconnected practice has presented tremendous challenges for designing an effective overall fusion system that would truly enhance situation awareness. This paper proposes a top-down fusion system design process in which the elements needed for situation awareness will drive the design requirements for environment/terrain models, impact and threat assessment, event correlation and tracking, observable definitions, and sensing. The discussion will be complemented with examples from the cyber security domain.
- 1 October 2009
- Published by Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE)
- No. 21557578,p. 1-7
Designing a data fusion system using a top-down approach
While there are multiple reference models for data fusion, there are no formal processes in which to design a complete fusion system. Even though high-level fusion, i.e., impact and threat assessment, is included in the various models, the majority of data fusion research has focused on low-level data fusion such as sensing and correlation. More importantly, low-level fusion technologies have been designed without detailed consideration of threat and impact assessment requirements. On the other hand, high-level designs are restricted by the available data from low-level systems. This disconnected practice has presented tremendous challenges for designing an effective overall fusion system that would truly enhance situation awareness. This paper proposes a top-down fusion system design process in which the elements needed for situation awareness will drive the design requirements for environment/terrain models, impact and threat assessment, event correlation and tracking, observable definitions, and sensing. The discussion will be complemented with examples from the cyber security domain.
- 1 May 2009
- Published by SPIE-Intl Soc Optical Eng
- Vol. 7352
Elements of impact assessment: a case study with cyber attacks
Extensive discussions have taken place in recent year regarding impact assessment - what is it and how can we do it? It is especially intriguing in this modern era where non-traditional warfare has caused either information overload or limited understanding of adversary doctrines. This work provides a methodical discussion of key elements for the broad definition of impact assessment (IA). The discussion will start with a process flow involving components related to IA. Two key functional components, impact estimation and threat projection, are compared and illustrated in detail. These details include a discussion of when to model red and blue knowledge. Algorithmic approaches will be discussed, augmented with lessons learned from our IA development for cyber situation awareness. This paper aims at providing the community with a systematic understanding of IA and its open issues with specific examples.
- 1 May 2009
- Published by SPIE-Intl Soc Optical Eng
- Vol. 7352
Elements of impact assessment: a case study with cyber attacks
Extensive discussions have taken place in recent year regarding impact assessment - what is it and how can we do it? It is especially intriguing in this modern era where non-traditional warfare has caused either information overload or limited understanding of adversary doctrines. This work provides a methodical discussion of key elements for the broad definition of impact assessment (IA). The discussion will start with a process flow involving components related to IA. Two key functional components, impact estimation and threat projection, are compared and illustrated in detail. These details include a discussion of when to model red and blue knowledge. Algorithmic approaches will be discussed, augmented with lessons learned from our IA development for cyber situation awareness. This paper aims at providing the community with a systematic understanding of IA and its open issues with specific examples.
- 1 November 2005
- Published by Defense Technical Information Center (DTIC)
High Level Fusion in the Cyber Domain
The objective of this report is to summarize the work performed during the summer at AFRL, Rome Research site by a team of researchers from SUNY at Buffalo and Rochester Institute of Technology (RIT). The team began their research with lessons learned from the testing of INFERD v1, and applied research methods to overcome the deficiencies found. These deficiencies and an overview of the old methodology of INFERD are discussed along with the results of this research. Work discussed in the report includes attack identification and tracking techniques, identification of cyber threats and modeling and generation of cyber environments for generation of data sets.
- 1 November 2005
- Published by Defense Technical Information Center (DTIC)
High Level Fusion in the Cyber Domain
The objective of this report is to summarize the work performed during the summer at AFRL, Rome Research site by a team of researchers from SUNY at Buffalo and Rochester Institute of Technology (RIT). The team began their research with lessons learned from the testing of INFERD v1, and applied research methods to overcome the deficiencies found. These deficiencies and an overview of the old methodology of INFERD are discussed along with the results of this research. Work discussed in the report includes attack identification and tracking techniques, identification of cyber threats and modeling and generation of cyber environments for generation of data sets.