Luca Dedola
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Research Subjects
Research Interests
Luca Dedola has a total of 3 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Giancarlo Corsetti
European University Institute; University of Cambridge; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)
4 shared publications Francesca Viani
1 shared publication- Sylvain Leduc
Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 21 December 2016
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in Journal of the European Economic Association
- Vol. 14 (6) , 1329-1371
THE MYSTERY OF THE PRINTING PRESS: MONETARY POLICY AND SELF-FULFILLING DEBT CRISES
- 21 December 2016
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in Journal of the European Economic Association
- Vol. 14 (6) , 1329-1371
Open AccessTHE MYSTERY OF THE PRINTING PRESS: MONETARY POLICY AND SELF-FULFILLING DEBT CRISES
- 15 January 2014
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in Journal of the European Economic Association
- Vol. 12 (1) , 153-176
THE INTERNATIONAL DIMENSION OF PRODUCTIVITY AND DEMAND SHOCKS IN THE US ECONOMY
- 15 January 2014
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in Journal of the European Economic Association
- Vol. 12 (1) , 153-176
THE INTERNATIONAL DIMENSION OF PRODUCTIVITY AND DEMAND SHOCKS IN THE US ECONOMY
- 1 January 2012
- Published by University of Chicago Press in NBER International Seminar on Macroeconomics
- Vol. 8 (1) , 403-466
Traded and Nontraded Goods Prices, and International Risk Sharing: An Empirical Investigation
- 1 January 2012
- Published by University of Chicago Press in NBER International Seminar on Macroeconomics
- Vol. 8 (1) , 403-466
Traded and Nontraded Goods Prices, and International Risk Sharing: An Empirical Investigation
- Open Access
Macroeconomics of international price discrimination
This paper builds a baseline two-country model of real and monetary transmission under optimal international proce discrimination. Distributing traded goods to consumers reuires nontradables; because of distributive trade, the proce elasticity of export demand depends on the exchange rate. Profit-maximizing monopolistic firms drive a wedge between wholesale and retial proces across countries. This entails possibly large deviations from the law of one price and incomplete pass-through on import prices. Yet, consistent with expenditure-switching effects, a nominal repreciation generally worsens the terms of trade. Moreover, the exchange rate and the terms of trade can be more volatile than fundamentals. For plausible ranges of the distribution margin, there can be multiple steady states, whereas large differences in nominal and real exhange rates across equilibria translate into small differences in consumption, employment and the price level. Finally, we show that with competitive goods markets international policy cooperation is redundant even under financial autarky. JEL Classification: F3, F4
Open AccessMacroeconomics of international price discrimination
This paper builds a baseline two-country model of real and monetary transmission under optimal international proce discrimination. Distributing traded goods to consumers reuires nontradables; because of distributive trade, the proce elasticity of export demand depends on the exchange rate. Profit-maximizing monopolistic firms drive a wedge between wholesale and retial proces across countries. This entails possibly large deviations from the law of one price and incomplete pass-through on import prices. Yet, consistent with expenditure-switching effects, a nominal repreciation generally worsens the terms of trade. Moreover, the exchange rate and the terms of trade can be more volatile than fundamentals. For plausible ranges of the distribution margin, there can be multiple steady states, whereas large differences in nominal and real exhange rates across equilibria translate into small differences in consumption, employment and the price level. Finally, we show that with competitive goods markets international policy cooperation is redundant even under financial autarky. JEL Classification: F3, F4