Nils Stieglitz
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Research Subjects
Nils Stieglitz has a total of 19 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Thorbjørn Knudsen
Frankfurt School of Finance and Management
4 shared publications Elmar Gerum
1 shared publicationInsa Sjurts
1 shared publication- Jens Schmidt
Aalto University
1 shared publication - Kannan Srikanth
Department of Management and Human Resources, Max M. Fisher College of Business The Ohio State University Columbus Ohio USA
1 shared publication Madan M. Pillutla
London Business Sch, London, England
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- 1 August 2021
- Published by Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS) in Management Science
- Vol. 67 (8) , 5106-5123
How Complementors Benefit from Taking Competition to the System Level
In many industries, multiple independent complementors supply the individual components of a system. In this paper, we develop a formal model to examine the tensions and tradeoffs that result when a firm—either one of the complementors or a de novo entrant—takes competition to the system level by launching an integrated offering that combines the multiple components. A complementor who takes competition to the system level becomes a competitor to itself at the system level. As a consequence, the task of maintaining the competitiveness of the multiple-component system rests on the shoulders of the remaining complementor. We show that this allows the integrator to earn additional profits at the expense of the complementor—that is, it can raise the price of its component and thereby squeeze the margin of its complementor. We find that this squeezing effect can be so strong that offering an integrated system is profitable even if the system itself is unprofitable. Interestingly, when analyzing the possibility of entry by a de novo integrator who does not suffer from self-cannibalization, we show that an incumbent complementor may nevertheless have stronger incentives to launch an integrated offering. This is because the incumbent's ability to benefit from squeezing its complementor and earn additional profits on cannibalized sales leads to an entrant's disadvantage when taking competition to the system level. We also discuss defense strategies for complementors to shield themselves against the consequences of integration by their complementor.This paper was accepted by Joshua Gans, business strategy.
- 1 August 2021
- Published by Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS) in Management Science
- Vol. 67 (8) , 5106-5123
How Complementors Benefit from Taking Competition to the System Level
In many industries, multiple independent complementors supply the individual components of a system. In this paper, we develop a formal model to examine the tensions and tradeoffs that result when a firm—either one of the complementors or a de novo entrant—takes competition to the system level by launching an integrated offering that combines the multiple components. A complementor who takes competition to the system level becomes a competitor to itself at the system level. As a consequence, the task of maintaining the competitiveness of the multiple-component system rests on the shoulders of the remaining complementor. We show that this allows the integrator to earn additional profits at the expense of the complementor—that is, it can raise the price of its component and thereby squeeze the margin of its complementor. We find that this squeezing effect can be so strong that offering an integrated system is profitable even if the system itself is unprofitable. Interestingly, when analyzing the possibility of entry by a de novo integrator who does not suffer from self-cannibalization, we show that an incumbent complementor may nevertheless have stronger incentives to launch an integrated offering. This is because the incumbent's ability to benefit from squeezing its complementor and earn additional profits on cannibalized sales leads to an entrant's disadvantage when taking competition to the system level. We also discuss defense strategies for complementors to shield themselves against the consequences of integration by their complementor.This paper was accepted by Joshua Gans, business strategy.
- 1 August 2020
- Published by Wiley in Strategic Management Journal
- Vol. 42 (2) , 361-385
Exploration and exploitation in complex search tasks: How feedback influences whether and where human agents search
Research Exploration and exploitation in strategic decision‐making entails decisions about whether and where to search for new alternatives to improve the status quo. Prior research has not explored how decisions about whether to continue search (vs. stop search or satisfice) and where to search (near vs. far) are interrelated. We report laboratory experiment results on how individuals decide whether and where to search in a complex, combinatorial task. We find that different feedback variables influence the decision to stop search from decisions regarding how broadly to search. Our results suggest that not accounting for the decision to continue (or stop) searching, separately from breadth of search, can lead to incorrect predictions regarding how feedback influences search behavior. Managerial Managers concerned about the performance of their company face two challenges—they have to find out what potential performance is feasible given their business environment and which organizational policies to implement to realize it. We use a stylized laboratory experiment to better understand how feedback from experimentation informs such a learning process. We find that early‐stage feedback has a lasting impact on performance aspirations and managerial expectations about feasible performance. Superior early feedback thereby motivates more sustained experimentation with organizational policies. In contrast, more recent feedback guides the extent to which managers are willing to engage in more radical policy adjustments, especially in the latter stages of a learning process.
- 1 August 2020
- Published by Wiley in Strategic Management Journal
- Vol. 42 (2) , 361-385
Exploration and exploitation in complex search tasks: How feedback influences whether and where human agents search
Research Exploration and exploitation in strategic decision‐making entails decisions about whether and where to search for new alternatives to improve the status quo. Prior research has not explored how decisions about whether to continue search (vs. stop search or satisfice) and where to search (near vs. far) are interrelated. We report laboratory experiment results on how individuals decide whether and where to search in a complex, combinatorial task. We find that different feedback variables influence the decision to stop search from decisions regarding how broadly to search. Our results suggest that not accounting for the decision to continue (or stop) searching, separately from breadth of search, can lead to incorrect predictions regarding how feedback influences search behavior. Managerial Managers concerned about the performance of their company face two challenges—they have to find out what potential performance is feasible given their business environment and which organizational policies to implement to realize it. We use a stylized laboratory experiment to better understand how feedback from experimentation informs such a learning process. We find that early‐stage feedback has a lasting impact on performance aspirations and managerial expectations about feasible performance. Superior early feedback thereby motivates more sustained experimentation with organizational policies. In contrast, more recent feedback guides the extent to which managers are willing to engage in more radical policy adjustments, especially in the latter stages of a learning process.
- 2 June 2020
- Published by Wiley in Strategic Management Journal
- Vol. 41 (12) , 2315-2338
Industry competition and firm conduct: Joint determinants of risk–return relations
Research Summary: In this study, we offer a novel approach, establishing how firm conduct and competitive interactions among firms jointly provide microfoundations of risk–return relations. Firms influence each other, and the way they reciprocate these influences to cause mutual adjustments is a core feature of industry dynamics. This core feature fundamentally influences risk–return relations. Based on our approach, we develop models that allow us to trace how, at the microlevel, firm conduct in conjunction with competitive interactions generate risk–return relations, and how these are associated with macrolevel measures of industry concentration. That translates into an approach that affords fine‐grained predictions of risk–return relations based on the nature of competition in an industry—for example, Cournot or Bertrand—and observations of the industry's competitive intensity and concentration. Managerial Summary: The risk‐return trade‐off is of critical importance for strategic management. Yet, the relation between industry conditions and the shape of risk‐return relations is often unclear. We develop a framework that allows managers to understand how industry conditions generate risk‐return relations, and how these can be inferred from macro‐level measures of industry concentration. At the micro‐level, we show that low variation in operational implementation of strategies may, under some conditions, be associated with high variation as well as high means in financial returns. Our primary insight is that the risk‐return trade‐off changes with competitive intensity: Starting from industries with two or three firms, we show that increasing competitive intensity – higher number of firms, higher entry and exit barriers – gives rise to a predictable sequence of risk‐return relations that change over the life‐cycle of industries. Overall, we contribute a framework that allows managers to infer the risk‐return trade‐off for the industry that their business units are located in.
- 2 June 2020
- Published by Wiley in Strategic Management Journal
- Vol. 41 (12) , 2315-2338
Industry competition and firm conduct: Joint determinants of risk–return relations
Research Summary: In this study, we offer a novel approach, establishing how firm conduct and competitive interactions among firms jointly provide microfoundations of risk–return relations. Firms influence each other, and the way they reciprocate these influences to cause mutual adjustments is a core feature of industry dynamics. This core feature fundamentally influences risk–return relations. Based on our approach, we develop models that allow us to trace how, at the microlevel, firm conduct in conjunction with competitive interactions generate risk–return relations, and how these are associated with macrolevel measures of industry concentration. That translates into an approach that affords fine‐grained predictions of risk–return relations based on the nature of competition in an industry—for example, Cournot or Bertrand—and observations of the industry's competitive intensity and concentration. Managerial Summary: The risk‐return trade‐off is of critical importance for strategic management. Yet, the relation between industry conditions and the shape of risk‐return relations is often unclear. We develop a framework that allows managers to understand how industry conditions generate risk‐return relations, and how these can be inferred from macro‐level measures of industry concentration. At the micro‐level, we show that low variation in operational implementation of strategies may, under some conditions, be associated with high variation as well as high means in financial returns. Our primary insight is that the risk‐return trade‐off changes with competitive intensity: Starting from industries with two or three firms, we show that increasing competitive intensity – higher number of firms, higher entry and exit barriers – gives rise to a predictable sequence of risk‐return relations that change over the life‐cycle of industries. Overall, we contribute a framework that allows managers to infer the risk‐return trade‐off for the industry that their business units are located in.
- Open Access
- 1 August 2018
- Published by Elsevier in Long Range Planning
- Vol. 51 (4) , 511-525
Organizational persistence in the use of war gaming and scenario planning
- 1 August 2018
- Published by Elsevier in Long Range Planning
- Vol. 51 (4) , 511-525
Open AccessOrganizational persistence in the use of war gaming and scenario planning
- 10 August 2015
- Published by Wiley in Strategic Management Journal
- Vol. 37 (9) , 1854-1864
Adaptation and inertia in dynamic environments
Research summary : We address conflicting claims and mixed empirical findings about adaptation as a response to increased environmental dynamism. We disentangle distinct dimensions of environmental dynamism—the direction, magnitude, and frequency of change—and identify how selection shapes adaptive responses to these dimensions. Our results show how frequent directional changes undermine the value of exploration and decisively shift performance advantages to inert organizations that restrict exploration. In contrast, increased environmental variance rewards exploration. Our results also show that, in dynamic environments, the best‐performing organizations are generally more inert than less successful organizations. Managerial summary : Our research helps managers to understand under what business conditions investments into exploration and strategic flexibility are more likely to pay off. Dynamic business environments characterized by persistent trends and by large, infrequently occurring structural shocks reward strategic pursuit of temporary advantage. Thus, exploration and strategic flexibility are preferred strategies. In contrast, the challenge in frequently changing environments with fleeting opportunities is to identify and to focus on strategic actions whose payoffs on average are high, independent of environmental volatility. Low levels of exploration and long‐term strategic focus are preferred strategies in these circumstances. Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
- 10 August 2015
- Published by Wiley in Strategic Management Journal
- Vol. 37 (9) , 1854-1864
Adaptation and inertia in dynamic environments
Research summary : We address conflicting claims and mixed empirical findings about adaptation as a response to increased environmental dynamism. We disentangle distinct dimensions of environmental dynamism—the direction, magnitude, and frequency of change—and identify how selection shapes adaptive responses to these dimensions. Our results show how frequent directional changes undermine the value of exploration and decisively shift performance advantages to inert organizations that restrict exploration. In contrast, increased environmental variance rewards exploration. Our results also show that, in dynamic environments, the best‐performing organizations are generally more inert than less successful organizations. Managerial summary : Our research helps managers to understand under what business conditions investments into exploration and strategic flexibility are more likely to pay off. Dynamic business environments characterized by persistent trends and by large, infrequently occurring structural shocks reward strategic pursuit of temporary advantage. Thus, exploration and strategic flexibility are preferred strategies. In contrast, the challenge in frequently changing environments with fleeting opportunities is to identify and to focus on strategic actions whose payoffs on average are high, independent of environmental volatility. Low levels of exploration and long‐term strategic focus are preferred strategies in these circumstances. Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
- Open Access
- 1 February 2015
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP)
- p. 104-122
Business Model Innovation
This chapter draws on the complementarity literature in economics and management research to dimensionalize business models innovations. Specifically, such innovation can be dimensionalized in terms of the depth and the breadth of the changes to the company’s business model that they imply. Based on this, the chapter identifies four different types of business model innovations. These different types are associated with different management challenges and require different leadership interventions to become successful. In sum, top management is found to play a crucial role in contributing to the success of business model innovation, given that its involvement matches the type of businesses model innovation chosen.
- 1 February 2015
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP)
- p. 104-122
Open AccessBusiness Model Innovation
This chapter draws on the complementarity literature in economics and management research to dimensionalize business models innovations. Specifically, such innovation can be dimensionalized in terms of the depth and the breadth of the changes to the company’s business model that they imply. Based on this, the chapter identifies four different types of business model innovations. These different types are associated with different management challenges and require different leadership interventions to become successful. In sum, top management is found to play a crucial role in contributing to the success of business model innovation, given that its involvement matches the type of businesses model innovation chosen.
- 1 January 2015
- Published by Academy of Management in Academy of Management Annals
- Vol. 9 (1) , 337-392
Modelling Bounded Rationality in Organizations: Progress and Prospects
- 1 January 2015
- Published by Academy of Management in Academy of Management Annals
- Vol. 9 (1) , 337-392
Modelling Bounded Rationality in Organizations: Progress and Prospects
- 1 February 2013
- Published by Wiley in Strategic Management Journal
- Vol. 35 (3) , 358-375
Rewarding value‐creating ideas in organizations: The power of low‐powered incentives
Ideas from employees are a major source of value creation in firms, yet the merits of rewards for incentivizing the generation of ideas are highly contested. Using a computational model, we show that firms can improve performance by offering low‐powered rewards for the selection and implementation of employee ideas. Low‐powered incentives provide a sufficient stream of good ideas, but few exceptional ones. Higher‐powered incentives, in contrast, do not systematically translate into exceptional ideas either, but generate an excessive number of good ideas. Performance‐based rewards thus appear to be a blunt tool to harness the long tail of innovation. We develop propositions to guide empirical research and discuss their implications for strategy and organizational design . Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
- 1 February 2013
- Published by Wiley in Strategic Management Journal
- Vol. 35 (3) , 358-375
Rewarding value‐creating ideas in organizations: The power of low‐powered incentives
Ideas from employees are a major source of value creation in firms, yet the merits of rewards for incentivizing the generation of ideas are highly contested. Using a computational model, we show that firms can improve performance by offering low‐powered rewards for the selection and implementation of employee ideas. Low‐powered incentives provide a sufficient stream of good ideas, but few exceptional ones. Higher‐powered incentives, in contrast, do not systematically translate into exceptional ideas either, but generate an excessive number of good ideas. Performance‐based rewards thus appear to be a blunt tool to harness the long tail of innovation. We develop propositions to guide empirical research and discuss their implications for strategy and organizational design . Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
- 1 August 2009
- Published by Academy of Management in Academy of Management Proceedings
- Vol. 2009 (1) , 1-6
STRATEGIC FOCUS AND THE QUEST FOR TEMPORARY ADVANTAGE.
The paper addresses the challenge of how firms adapt to a turbulent environment and reap temporary advantages. We contrast strategic flexibility and focus in the sampling of alternatives. Our results suggest that strategic focus reaps temporary advantages in more turbulent environments, while strategic flexibility is viable in less turbulent markets.
- 1 August 2009
- Published by Academy of Management in Academy of Management Proceedings
- Vol. 2009 (1) , 1-6
STRATEGIC FOCUS AND THE QUEST FOR TEMPORARY ADVANTAGE.
The paper addresses the challenge of how firms adapt to a turbulent environment and reap temporary advantages. We contrast strategic flexibility and focus in the sampling of alternatives. Our results suggest that strategic focus reaps temporary advantages in more turbulent environments, while strategic flexibility is viable in less turbulent markets.
- 1 January 2003
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 1-3
Einleitung