Juan Espindola
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Previous Organizations / Institutes
The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years
Juan Espindola has a total of 7 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Moisés Vaca
Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México, Instituto de Investigaciones Filosóficas
3 shared publications - Mónica Jacobo-Suárez
Centro de Investigación y Docencia Económicas
2 shared publications - Blanca Heredia
Investigadora independiente
1 shared publication - Jorge Omar Rodríguez Ramírez
Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México (UNAM)
1 shared publication - Marisol Vazquez
Centro de Investigación y Docencia Económicas
1 shared publication Moises Vaca
National Autonomous University of México
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 24 October 2026
- Published by Universidad Nacional Autonoma de Mexico in Diánoia
- Vol. 71 (97) , e2269
enseñanza de la historia y la lucha contra el fascismo
Algunas de las justificaciones más comunes para defender que el Estado debe promover una historia crítica (que incluya las injusticias históricas relevantes de la sociedad en cuestión) se concentran, por un lado, en la importancia del respeto a las víctimas y, por el otro, en que los perpetradores no permanezcan impunes. Aquí buscamos robustecer la comprensión de otra justificación común: la importancia de la no repetición. En particular, analizamos cómo los estudios sobre el fascismo y el neofascismo muestran que éstos utilizan la distorsión histórica deliberada como una de sus herramientas más poderosas. Defendemos que el objetivo de esa distorsión es romper la razonabilidad democrática (las emociones, compromisos y virtudes cívicas y epistémicas que todas y todos los ciudadanos deben manifestar). Así, argumentamos que el fomento de una historia crítica es necesario para defender a los regímenes democráticos de la amenaza fascista actual.
- 24 October 2026
- Published by Universidad Nacional Autonoma de Mexico in Diánoia
- Vol. 71 (97) , e2269
Open Accessenseñanza de la historia y la lucha contra el fascismo
Algunas de las justificaciones más comunes para defender que el Estado debe promover una historia crítica (que incluya las injusticias históricas relevantes de la sociedad en cuestión) se concentran, por un lado, en la importancia del respeto a las víctimas y, por el otro, en que los perpetradores no permanezcan impunes. Aquí buscamos robustecer la comprensión de otra justificación común: la importancia de la no repetición. En particular, analizamos cómo los estudios sobre el fascismo y el neofascismo muestran que éstos utilizan la distorsión histórica deliberada como una de sus herramientas más poderosas. Defendemos que el objetivo de esa distorsión es romper la razonabilidad democrática (las emociones, compromisos y virtudes cívicas y epistémicas que todas y todos los ciudadanos deben manifestar). Así, argumentamos que el fomento de una historia crítica es necesario para defender a los regímenes democráticos de la amenaza fascista actual.
- Open Access
- 24 October 2026
- Published by Universidad Nacional Autonoma de Mexico in Diánoia
- Vol. 71 (97) , e2328
Dosier: Injusticia histórica
Introducción a los artículos del Dossier sobre injusticia histórica.
- 24 October 2026
- Published by Universidad Nacional Autonoma de Mexico in Diánoia
- Vol. 71 (97) , e2328
Open AccessDosier: Injusticia histórica
Introducción a los artículos del Dossier sobre injusticia histórica.
- 1 January 2026
- Published by Springer Nature
Historical Injustice in Rawlsian Theory
- Open Access
- 11 June 2025
- Published by Wiley in Journal of Applied Philosophy
- Vol. 42 (4) , 1285-1300
Against Human Content Moderation: Algorithms without Trauma
This paper explores the morality of human content moderation. It focuses on content moderation of Child Sexual Abuse Material (CSAM) as it takes place in commercial digital platforms, broadly understood. I select CSAM for examination because there is a widespread and uncontroversial consensus around the need to remove it, which furnishes the strongest possible argument for human content moderation. The paper makes the case that, even if we grant that social media platforms or chatbots are a valuable—or inevitable— force in current societies, and even if moderation plays an important role in protecting users and society more generally from the detrimental effects of these digital tools, it is far from clear that tasking humans to conduct such moderation is permissible without constraints, given the psychic toll of the practice on moderators. While a blanket prohibition of human moderation would be objectionable, given the benefits of the practice, it behooves us to identify the fundamental interests affected by the harms of human moderation, the obligations that platforms acquire to protect such interests, and the conditions under which their realization is in fact possible. I argue that the failure to comply with certain standards renders human moderation impermissible.
- 11 June 2025
- Published by Wiley in Journal of Applied Philosophy
- Vol. 42 (4) , 1285-1300
Open AccessAgainst Human Content Moderation: Algorithms without Trauma
This paper explores the morality of human content moderation. It focuses on content moderation of Child Sexual Abuse Material (CSAM) as it takes place in commercial digital platforms, broadly understood. I select CSAM for examination because there is a widespread and uncontroversial consensus around the need to remove it, which furnishes the strongest possible argument for human content moderation. The paper makes the case that, even if we grant that social media platforms or chatbots are a valuable—or inevitable— force in current societies, and even if moderation plays an important role in protecting users and society more generally from the detrimental effects of these digital tools, it is far from clear that tasking humans to conduct such moderation is permissible without constraints, given the psychic toll of the practice on moderators. While a blanket prohibition of human moderation would be objectionable, given the benefits of the practice, it behooves us to identify the fundamental interests affected by the harms of human moderation, the obligations that platforms acquire to protect such interests, and the conditions under which their realization is in fact possible. I argue that the failure to comply with certain standards renders human moderation impermissible.
- Open Access
- 28 May 2025
- Published by Walter de Gruyter GmbH in Kant-Studien
- Vol. 116 (2) , 149-173
Kant’s Spies
This paper examines and critiques Immanuel Kant’s strong opposition to espionage and related “infernal arts” as expressed in Towards Perpetual Peace and the Metaphysics of Morals. While Kant condemns espionage as a dishonorable stratagem that undermines the trust essential for lasting peace, this stance has received limited scholarly attention. The paper argues that Kant’s rejection of espionage is more nuanced than a mere objection to dishonesty; rather, it is rooted in his political and legal philosophy, particularly his views on just war theory and the need for nations to establish a “rightful condition.” The analysis contrasts Kant’s views with those of Grotius and Hobbes. Critically, the paper challenges Kant’s position, suggesting that it aligns only with a narrow conception of espionage and overlooks its potential to foster international trust. By reassessing Kant’s arguments, the paper highlights their relevance to contemporary debates on the ethical dimensions of espionage and warfare.
- 28 May 2025
- Published by Walter de Gruyter GmbH in Kant-Studien
- Vol. 116 (2) , 149-173
Open AccessKant’s Spies
This paper examines and critiques Immanuel Kant’s strong opposition to espionage and related “infernal arts” as expressed in Towards Perpetual Peace and the Metaphysics of Morals. While Kant condemns espionage as a dishonorable stratagem that undermines the trust essential for lasting peace, this stance has received limited scholarly attention. The paper argues that Kant’s rejection of espionage is more nuanced than a mere objection to dishonesty; rather, it is rooted in his political and legal philosophy, particularly his views on just war theory and the need for nations to establish a “rightful condition.” The analysis contrasts Kant’s views with those of Grotius and Hobbes. Critically, the paper challenges Kant’s position, suggesting that it aligns only with a narrow conception of espionage and overlooks its potential to foster international trust. By reassessing Kant’s arguments, the paper highlights their relevance to contemporary debates on the ethical dimensions of espionage and warfare.
- Open Access
- 22 October 2024
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Perspectives on Politics
- p. 1-15
Attributing Responsibility to Big Tech for Mass Atrocity: Social Media and Transitional Justice
Big Tech companies such as Meta, the owner of Facebook, are increasingly accused of enabling human rights violations. The proliferation of toxic speech in their digital platforms has been in the background of recent episodes of mass atrocity, the most salient of which recently transpired in Myanmar and Ethiopia. The involvement of Big Tech companies in mass atrocity raises multiple normative and conceptual challenges. One is to properly conceptualize Meta’s responsibility for the circulation of toxic speech. On one view, endorsed by the corporation itself, Meta can be absolved from any significant share of responsibility for these atrocities because toxic speech is the speech of some (rogue) users, hosted but neither created nor endorsed by the company; if anything, Meta is responsible for failing to anticipate and swiftly remove that speech. I will argue that this view is misleading, as it misses the underlying forces crafting toxic speech. Meta’s business model relies on what one might call the algorithmic capture of attention, which it achieves by manipulating its users and by creating an environment in which manipulative practices of some users thrive over others. This fact alone turns the company into a co-creator of toxic speech rather than a mere conduit of the toxic speech of others. As a result, it is safe to claim that Meta bears significant causal responsibility and sufficient moral responsibility for the dissemination of toxic speech, such that it justifies its inclusion in transitional justice processes and grounds its moral obligation to act in ways that advance these processes.
- 22 October 2024
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Perspectives on Politics
- p. 1-15
Open AccessAttributing Responsibility to Big Tech for Mass Atrocity: Social Media and Transitional Justice
Big Tech companies such as Meta, the owner of Facebook, are increasingly accused of enabling human rights violations. The proliferation of toxic speech in their digital platforms has been in the background of recent episodes of mass atrocity, the most salient of which recently transpired in Myanmar and Ethiopia. The involvement of Big Tech companies in mass atrocity raises multiple normative and conceptual challenges. One is to properly conceptualize Meta’s responsibility for the circulation of toxic speech. On one view, endorsed by the corporation itself, Meta can be absolved from any significant share of responsibility for these atrocities because toxic speech is the speech of some (rogue) users, hosted but neither created nor endorsed by the company; if anything, Meta is responsible for failing to anticipate and swiftly remove that speech. I will argue that this view is misleading, as it misses the underlying forces crafting toxic speech. Meta’s business model relies on what one might call the algorithmic capture of attention, which it achieves by manipulating its users and by creating an environment in which manipulative practices of some users thrive over others. This fact alone turns the company into a co-creator of toxic speech rather than a mere conduit of the toxic speech of others. As a result, it is safe to claim that Meta bears significant causal responsibility and sufficient moral responsibility for the dissemination of toxic speech, such that it justifies its inclusion in transitional justice processes and grounds its moral obligation to act in ways that advance these processes.
- Open Access
- 30 May 2024
- Published by Wiley in Educational Theory
- Vol. 74 (3) , 312-320
What Comparisons Can Do for Normative Theory
- 30 May 2024
- Published by Wiley in Educational Theory
- Vol. 74 (3) , 312-320
Open AccessWhat Comparisons Can Do for Normative Theory
- Open Access
- 29 August 2023
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Ethics & International Affairs
- Vol. 37 (2) , 113-115
Introduction: Probing the Limits of Ethical Espionage
He downing of a Chinese spy balloon within U.S. territory in early is a graphic and crude reminder that espionage remains part and parcel of international relations. It is striking, therefore, that its academic study continues to be so sparse. The dearth is particularly striking in the philosophical literature. One would think that insofar as international espionage constitutes a paradigmatic breach of basic moral and political principles, such as honesty, loyalty, transparency, and trust, it would attract deep and sustained ethical scrutiny. This has not been the case. Admittedly, one can find remarkable academic analyses on the ethics of intelligence, broadly conceived; on some isolated aspects of international espionage (such as cybersecurity, mass surveillance, and so on); and on the normative criteria that ought to guide spies and spying on the ground. Less common are studies attempting to ground the morality of international espionage on a robust philosophical account of permissible actions and obligatory duties. This is the task of Cécile Fabre's Spying through a Glass Darkly: The Ethics of Espionage and Counter-Intelligence. The book advances the most systematic and rigorous ethical framework to date to examine the subject matter of international espionage. The framework draws and expands on Fabre's prior philosophical work on just war theory, human rights, cosmopolitanism, and economic policy. And while its methodological approach is derived from analytic
- 29 August 2023
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Ethics & International Affairs
- Vol. 37 (2) , 113-115
Open AccessIntroduction: Probing the Limits of Ethical Espionage
He downing of a Chinese spy balloon within U.S. territory in early is a graphic and crude reminder that espionage remains part and parcel of international relations. It is striking, therefore, that its academic study continues to be so sparse. The dearth is particularly striking in the philosophical literature. One would think that insofar as international espionage constitutes a paradigmatic breach of basic moral and political principles, such as honesty, loyalty, transparency, and trust, it would attract deep and sustained ethical scrutiny. This has not been the case. Admittedly, one can find remarkable academic analyses on the ethics of intelligence, broadly conceived; on some isolated aspects of international espionage (such as cybersecurity, mass surveillance, and so on); and on the normative criteria that ought to guide spies and spying on the ground. Less common are studies attempting to ground the morality of international espionage on a robust philosophical account of permissible actions and obligatory duties. This is the task of Cécile Fabre's Spying through a Glass Darkly: The Ethics of Espionage and Counter-Intelligence. The book advances the most systematic and rigorous ethical framework to date to examine the subject matter of international espionage. The framework draws and expands on Fabre's prior philosophical work on just war theory, human rights, cosmopolitanism, and economic policy. And while its methodological approach is derived from analytic
- Open Access
- 29 August 2023
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Ethics & International Affairs
- Vol. 37 (2) , 177-192
Facial Recognition in War Contexts: Mass Surveillance and Mass Atrocity
The use of facial recognition technology (FRT) as a form of intelligence has recently made a prominent public appearance in the theater of war. During the early months of Russia's invasion of Ukraine, Ukrainian authorities relied on FRT as part of the country's defensive activities, harnessing the technology for a variety of purposes, such as unveiling covert Russian agents operating amid the Ukrainian population; revealing the identity of Russian soldiers who committed war crimes; and even identifying dead Russian soldiers. This constellation of uses of FRT—in a war increasingly waged on the digital and information front—warrants ethical examination. The essay discusses some of the most serious concerns with FRT in the context of war, including the infringement of informational privacy; the indiscriminate and disproportionate harms it may inflict, particularly when the technology is coupled with social media intelligence; and the potential abuse of the technology once the fog of war dissipates. Some of these concerns parallel those to be found in nations that are not engulfed in war, but others are unique to war-torn settings.
- 29 August 2023
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Ethics & International Affairs
- Vol. 37 (2) , 177-192
Open AccessFacial Recognition in War Contexts: Mass Surveillance and Mass Atrocity
The use of facial recognition technology (FRT) as a form of intelligence has recently made a prominent public appearance in the theater of war. During the early months of Russia's invasion of Ukraine, Ukrainian authorities relied on FRT as part of the country's defensive activities, harnessing the technology for a variety of purposes, such as unveiling covert Russian agents operating amid the Ukrainian population; revealing the identity of Russian soldiers who committed war crimes; and even identifying dead Russian soldiers. This constellation of uses of FRT—in a war increasingly waged on the digital and information front—warrants ethical examination. The essay discusses some of the most serious concerns with FRT in the context of war, including the infringement of informational privacy; the indiscriminate and disproportionate harms it may inflict, particularly when the technology is coupled with social media intelligence; and the potential abuse of the technology once the fog of war dissipates. Some of these concerns parallel those to be found in nations that are not engulfed in war, but others are unique to war-torn settings.
- Open Access
- 17 January 2022
- Published by SAGE Publications in Theoretical Criminology
- Vol. 27 (1) , 5-22
Bargaining with criminals: The morality of witness collaboration in Mexico's “war on drugs”
Public authorities take considerable and oftentimes controversial steps in their efforts to dismantle criminal organizations involved in drug trafficking and related crimes in Mexico. Among other things, they recruit offenders who abandon their criminal organization and strike a deal with law enforcement agents and prosecutors to share information about their co-perpetrators in exchange for leniency in sentencing as well as of protection from retaliation. This article explores whether the deployment of collaborators is morally permissible in view of the significant risks it exposes them to, most notably retaliatory aggressions. The article examines the underlying philosophical problem regarding the justifiability of deploying collaborators in the social and political circumstances prevailing in the country. The normative framework I advance to explore the Mexican case can be useful in examining the ethical implications of using collaborating witnesses elsewhere.
- 17 January 2022
- Published by SAGE Publications in Theoretical Criminology
- Vol. 27 (1) , 5-22
Open AccessBargaining with criminals: The morality of witness collaboration in Mexico's “war on drugs”
Public authorities take considerable and oftentimes controversial steps in their efforts to dismantle criminal organizations involved in drug trafficking and related crimes in Mexico. Among other things, they recruit offenders who abandon their criminal organization and strike a deal with law enforcement agents and prosecutors to share information about their co-perpetrators in exchange for leniency in sentencing as well as of protection from retaliation. This article explores whether the deployment of collaborators is morally permissible in view of the significant risks it exposes them to, most notably retaliatory aggressions. The article examines the underlying philosophical problem regarding the justifiability of deploying collaborators in the social and political circumstances prevailing in the country. The normative framework I advance to explore the Mexican case can be useful in examining the ethical implications of using collaborating witnesses elsewhere.