Benjamin Edwards
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Previous Organizations / Institutes
The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years
Research Subjects
Research Interests
Benjamin Edwards has a total of 7 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- George Stelle
University of New Mexico
4 shared publications - Stephanie Forrest
Arizona State University, Tempe, AZ, USA
4 shared publications - Steven Hofmeyr
Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory, Berkeley, CA, USA
4 shared publications - Tyler Moore
Harvard University
2 shared publications Stephanie Forrest
Department of Computer Science, University of New Mexico, 1 University of New Mexico Albuquerque, NM 87131, United States; Computer Languages & Systems Software, Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory, 1 Cyclotron Road, Berkeley, CA, United States; Santa Fe Institute 1399 Hyde Park Road Santa Fe, NM 87501, United States
1 shared publicationSteven Hofmeyr
Department of Computer Science, University of New Mexico, 1 University of New Mexico Albuquerque, NM 87131, United States; Computer Languages & Systems Software, Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory, 1 Cyclotron Road, Berkeley, CA, United States; Santa Fe Institute 1399 Hyde Park Road Santa Fe, NM 87501, United States
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- Top Cited PapersOpen Access
- 1 December 2016
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in Journal of Cybersecurity
- Vol. 2 (1) , 3-14
Hype and heavy tails: A closer look at data breaches
Recent widely publicized data breaches have exposed the personal information of hundreds of millions of people. Some reports point to alarming increases in both the size and frequency of data breaches, spurring institutions around the world to address what appears to be a worsening situation. But, is the problem actually growing worse? In this article, we study a popular public dataset and develop Bayesian Generalized Linear Models to investigate trends in data breaches. Analysis of the model shows that neither size nor frequency of data breaches has increased over the past decade. We find that the increases that have attracted attention can be explained by the heavy-tailed statistical distributions underlying the dataset. Specifically, we find that the size of data breaches is well modeled by the log-normal family of distributions and that the daily frequency of breaches is described by a negative binomial distribution. These distributions may provide clues to the generative mechanisms that are responsible for the breaches. Additionally, our model predicts the likelihood of breaches of a particular size in the future. For example, we find that between 15 September 2015 and 16 September 2016 there is only a 53.6% chance of a breach of 10 million records or more in the USA. Regardless of any trend, data breaches are costly, and we combine the model with two different cost models to project that in the next 3 years breaches could cost up to $179 billion.
- 1 December 2016
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in Journal of Cybersecurity
- Vol. 2 (1) , 3-14
Top Cited PapersOpen AccessHype and heavy tails: A closer look at data breaches
Recent widely publicized data breaches have exposed the personal information of hundreds of millions of people. Some reports point to alarming increases in both the size and frequency of data breaches, spurring institutions around the world to address what appears to be a worsening situation. But, is the problem actually growing worse? In this article, we study a popular public dataset and develop Bayesian Generalized Linear Models to investigate trends in data breaches. Analysis of the model shows that neither size nor frequency of data breaches has increased over the past decade. We find that the increases that have attracted attention can be explained by the heavy-tailed statistical distributions underlying the dataset. Specifically, we find that the size of data breaches is well modeled by the log-normal family of distributions and that the daily frequency of breaches is described by a negative binomial distribution. These distributions may provide clues to the generative mechanisms that are responsible for the breaches. Additionally, our model predicts the likelihood of breaches of a particular size in the future. For example, we find that between 15 September 2015 and 16 September 2016 there is only a 53.6% chance of a breach of 10 million records or more in the USA. Regardless of any trend, data breaches are costly, and we combine the model with two different cost models to project that in the next 3 years breaches could cost up to $179 billion.
- 27 July 2012
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 149-170
Modeling Internet-Scale Policies for Cleaning up Malware
- 27 July 2012
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 149-170
Modeling Internet-Scale Policies for Cleaning up Malware
- Open Access
Modeling Internet-Scale Policies for Cleaning up Malware
An emerging consensus among policy makers is that interventions undertaken by Internet Service Providers are the best way to counter the rising incidence of malware. However, assessing the suitability of countermeasures at this scale is hard. In this paper, we use an agent-based model, called ASIM, to investigate the impact of policy interventions at the Autonomous System level of the Internet. For instance, we find that coordinated intervention by the 0.2%-biggest ASes is more effective than uncoordinated efforts adopted by 30% of all ASes. Furthermore, countermeasures that block malicious transit traffic appear more effective than ones that block outgoing traffic. The model allows us to quantify and compare positive externalities created by different countermeasures. Our results give an initial indication of the types and levels of intervention that are most cost-effective at large scale.
Open AccessModeling Internet-Scale Policies for Cleaning up Malware
An emerging consensus among policy makers is that interventions undertaken by Internet Service Providers are the best way to counter the rising incidence of malware. However, assessing the suitability of countermeasures at this scale is hard. In this paper, we use an agent-based model, called ASIM, to investigate the impact of policy interventions at the Autonomous System level of the Internet. For instance, we find that coordinated intervention by the 0.2%-biggest ASes is more effective than uncoordinated efforts adopted by 30% of all ASes. Furthermore, countermeasures that block malicious transit traffic appear more effective than ones that block outgoing traffic. The model allows us to quantify and compare positive externalities created by different countermeasures. Our results give an initial indication of the types and levels of intervention that are most cost-effective at large scale.
- Open Access
Internet Topology over Time
There are few studies that look closely at how the topology of the Internet evolves over time; most focus on snapshots taken at a particular point in time. In this paper, we investigate the evolution of the topology of the Autonomous Systems graph of the Internet, examining how eight commonly-used topological measures change from January 2002 to January 2010. We find that the distributions of most of the measures remain unchanged, except for average path length and clustering coefficient. The average path length has slowly and steadily increased since 2005 and the average clustering coefficient has steadily declined. We hypothesize that these changes are due to changes in peering policies as the Internet evolves. We also investigate a surprising feature, namely that the maximum degree has changed little, an aspect that cannot be captured without modeling link deletion. Our results suggest that evaluating models of the Internet graph by comparing steady-state generated topologies to snapshots of the real data is reasonable for many measures. However, accurately matching time-variant properties is more difficult, as we demonstrate by evaluating ten well-known models against the 2010 data.
Open AccessInternet Topology over Time
There are few studies that look closely at how the topology of the Internet evolves over time; most focus on snapshots taken at a particular point in time. In this paper, we investigate the evolution of the topology of the Autonomous Systems graph of the Internet, examining how eight commonly-used topological measures change from January 2002 to January 2010. We find that the distributions of most of the measures remain unchanged, except for average path length and clustering coefficient. The average path length has slowly and steadily increased since 2005 and the average clustering coefficient has steadily declined. We hypothesize that these changes are due to changes in peering policies as the Internet evolves. We also investigate a surprising feature, namely that the maximum degree has changed little, an aspect that cannot be captured without modeling link deletion. Our results suggest that evaluating models of the Internet graph by comparing steady-state generated topologies to snapshots of the real data is reasonable for many measures. However, accurately matching time-variant properties is more difficult, as we demonstrate by evaluating ten well-known models against the 2010 data.
- Open Access
Beyond the Blacklist: Modeling Malware Spread and the Effect of Interventions
Malware spread among websites and between websites and clients is an increasing problem. Search engines play an important role in directing users to websites and are a natural control point for intervening, using mechanisms such as blacklisting. The paper presents a simple Markov model of malware spread through large populations of websites and studies the effect of two interventions that might be deployed by a search provider: blacklisting infected web pages by removing them from search results entirely and a generalization of blacklisting, called depreferencing, in which a website's ranking is decreased by a fixed percentage each time period the site remains infected. We analyze and study the trade-offs between infection exposure and traffic loss due to false positives (the cost to a website that is incorrectly blacklisted) for different interventions. As expected, we find that interventions are most effective when websites are slow to remove infections. Surprisingly, we also find that low infection or recovery rates can increase traffic loss due to false positives. Our analysis also shows that heavy-tailed distributions of website popularity, as documented in many studies, leads to high sample variance of all measured outcomes. These result implies that it will be difficult to determine empirically whether certain website interventions are effective, and it suggests that theoretical models such as the one described in this paper have an important role to play in improving web security.
Open AccessBeyond the Blacklist: Modeling Malware Spread and the Effect of Interventions
Malware spread among websites and between websites and clients is an increasing problem. Search engines play an important role in directing users to websites and are a natural control point for intervening, using mechanisms such as blacklisting. The paper presents a simple Markov model of malware spread through large populations of websites and studies the effect of two interventions that might be deployed by a search provider: blacklisting infected web pages by removing them from search results entirely and a generalization of blacklisting, called depreferencing, in which a website's ranking is decreased by a fixed percentage each time period the site remains infected. We analyze and study the trade-offs between infection exposure and traffic loss due to false positives (the cost to a website that is incorrectly blacklisted) for different interventions. As expected, we find that interventions are most effective when websites are slow to remove infections. Surprisingly, we also find that low infection or recovery rates can increase traffic loss due to false positives. Our analysis also shows that heavy-tailed distributions of website popularity, as documented in many studies, leads to high sample variance of all measured outcomes. These result implies that it will be difficult to determine empirically whether certain website interventions are effective, and it suggests that theoretical models such as the one described in this paper have an important role to play in improving web security.