RMRyan C. McDevitt

Ryan C. McDevitt

*This is an algorithmically generated author record based on publicly available information.

Current Organizations / Institutes

The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article


Ryan C. McDevitt has a total of 38 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:


Latest Publications

  • Open Access

    Projected US Government Expenditures for Dialysis Care: 2030-2040

    by David A. Rosenkranz, Ryan C. McDevitt, Glenn M. Chertow, Mitchell H. Rosner, Samir M. Parikh

    Background: ESKD is one of the fastest-growing and costliest chronic conditions in the United States. We forecasted net spending by the US government through 2040 for persons with prevalent ESKD and Medicare and examined how it could change if person-years treated with hemodialysis were diverted to other treatment modalities, an earlier stage of kidney disease, or no kidney disease. Methods: We conducted a time-series observational analysis of aggregated, secondary data spanning 2002-2022 published by the US Renal Data System (USRDS). The data included all persons with CKD or ESKD with fee-for-service Medicare claims. We examined alternative scenarios in which person-years using hemodialysis are diverted to peritoneal dialysis, a kidney transplant, CKD Stages G4-5, and, in some cases, CKD Stage G3 and no kidney disease. The outcome measure was government spending, which is the sum of Medicare spending and disability benefits, net of federal tax revenue. Results: Based on trends from the last two decades, the model forecasted 9.1 million person-years with ESKD and Medicare coverage during 2030-2040 and government spending for these person-years totaling $783 billion. We found that if person-years treated with hemodialysis were diverted, then government spending could subsequently fall by $13-126 billion over this time depending on the volume of diverted person-years and the extent to which the progression of kidney disease can be slowed. Conclusions: Deliberate, evidence-based investments that shift modalities and slow progression to ESKD could subsequently lower government spending by billions of dollars while improving the lives of people with kidney disease.

  • Open Access

    Three facts about private equity in the US hospital sector

    by Mark Naslund, Sungil Kim, Ambar La Forgia, Riley League, Ryan C McDevitt, Xingzhi Wang, Kelly Kaili Yang

    Introduction: Private equity (PE) ownership of US hospitals has grown over the past 25 years, attracting substantial academic and policy attention. Despite this interest, fragmented and incomplete transaction data have made it difficult to establish basic facts critical to an informed debate about PE's effects on hospitals, patients, and payers. Methods: Using a harmonized, publicly available PE acquisition data set, supplemented with verified exit transactions, we identify PE ownership spells for all short-term acute care hospitals from 2000 to 2024. Results: We identify 3 key facts: (1) PE ownership has never exceeded 7% of short-term acute care hospitals and was below 4% in 2024; (2) most PE firms exit within 5 years, typically through a sale to another PE firm or strategic acquirer, with bankruptcy and closure representing a small share; and (3) most Americans live in hospital referral regions that have no PE-owned hospitals. Conclusion: These findings indicate that PE ownership continues to represent a small share of hospitals.


  • Open Access

    A practitioner's guide to using data on private equity hospital acquisitions

    by Sungil Kim, Mark Naslund, Xingzhi Wang, Abid Hasan, Hongbin Huang, Hyong-Gu Hwang, Ambar La Forgia, Riley League, Ryan C McDevitt, Kelly Kaili Yang

    Introduction: Private equity (PE) investment in US hospitals has attracted substantial policy and research attention, but empirical work has been limited by fragmented and inconsistent transaction data. We aimed to construct a more comprehensive and validated dataset of PE ownership of US hospitals and to provide a practical guide for using these data in research. Methods: We integrated 6 major commercial deal databases to identify PE investments in US hospitals from 2000 to 2024. We filtered transactions to PE-related hospital deals, matched targets to American Hospital Association (AHA) and the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) hospital identifiers, manually verified uncertain matches, reconciled duplicate transactions across sources, expanded system-level deals to constituent hospitals, and verified deal and exit dates. Results: We identified 141 unique PE deals involving 555 unique short-term acute care hospitals, corresponding to 721 hospital-deal observations. The 6 databases differed substantially in deal coverage, deal type, and whether transactions were reported at the hospital or system level. Reliance on a single source would therefore omit many valid deals and could produce biased or incomplete analytic samples. We also found that linking transactions to stable hospital identifiers required substantial manual verification due to system-level transactions, inconsistent reporting, and identifier changes over time. Conclusion: Accurate study of PE ownership in hospitals requires multisource data construction, transparent validation, and careful linkage to stable hospital identifiers. This harmonized dataset and workflow provide infrastructure for more accurate, transparent, and replicable research on PE ownership in the US hospital sector.


  • The Fiscal Impact of the Medicare Secondary Payer Act for ESRD

    by Riley League, Ryan C. McDevitt

    Key Points: The Medicare Secondary Payer Act modestly reduced federal dialysis spending when accounting for the effect on forgone tax revenue. The policy saved money only when private prices were R ) at which the policy breaks even, accounting for the forgone tax revenue associated with tax-deductible private health care spending. We conducted an economic evaluation using published data on spending and utilization for ESRD, private-to-Medicare spending ratios for dialysis, dialysis chain financials, and federal tax parameters. Primary outcomes were expressed per privately insured dialysis patient-year, with a national aggregate calculated from incident ESRD counts. Results: At current tax rates, the break-even spending ratio was R R =2.99, the MSPA reduced federal outlays by $2217 per privately insured dialysis patient-year, or $75 million annually, relative to Medicare being the primary payer for dialysis patients without a coordination period. Ignoring the effect of the MSPA on tax revenue overstated the estimated savings from the MSPA by 4500%. Altering the MSPA so Medicare became the primary payer for dialysis treatments while retaining the coordination period for other services for dialysis patients would have increased federal savings to $29,981 per privately insured dialysis patient-year or $1 billion annually. Conclusions: Under current prices and tax rates, the MSPA modestly reduced federal spending, while counterfactual policy changes would result in larger savings.


  • Evolution of out-of-sequence liver allocation, 2019-2024

    by Jacqueline B. Henson, Xuyang Xia, Ryan McDevitt, Norine W. Chan, Andrew S. Barbas, Lindsay Y. King, Andrew J. Muir, Debra L. Sudan, Stuart J. Knechtle, Lisa M. McElroy


  • The Need for Speed: Demand, Regulation, and Welfare on the Margin of Alternative Financial Services

    by Ryan C. McDevitt, Aaron Sojourner

    We use a nonlinear reduction in a bank’s check-cashing fees and variation in regulated check-clearing times to identify the elasticity of demand for cashing checks rather than depositing them. We find that an extra day of check-clearing time makes account holders 65.5% more likely to cash a check than deposit it, which implies they are willing to pay $11.17 per day for faster access to their funds—an effective annualized discount rate of 11,054% for the average check. We use this elasticity to evaluate recent proposals that mandate faster check-clearing times.

  • Open Access

    Financial Ties, Market Structure, Commercial Prices, and Medical Director Compensation in Dialysis

    by Xuyang Xia, Wanrong Deng, Paul J. Eliason, Riley J. League, Ryan C. McDevitt, James W. Roberts, Heather Wong

    Importance: Growing consolidation in the dialysis industry has raised concerns about market power and the potential need for antitrust enforcement, but a lack of data previously prevented a systematic analysis of these issues. Objective: To document the consolidation of dialysis facilities through chain ownership and vertical integration between dialysis facilities and physicians, as well as study associations between consolidation and commercial prices for outpatient hemodialysis and medical director compensation. Design, Setting, and Participants: This economic evaluation combined data from Freedom of Information Act requests, Medicare claims, cost reports, commercial prices, and physician registries to conduct a retrospective study of market structure, compensation, and prices in the dialysis industry from 2005 to 2019. Those evaluated include dialysis facilities in the US, physicians involved with dialysis for patients enrolled in Medicare, and patients with end-stage renal disease enrolled in Medicare or one of the commercial insurers in claims data provided by the Health Care Cost Institute. Data were analyzed from April 2024 to April 2025. Exposure: Chain ownership, physician ownership, and medical directorship of dialysis facilities in the US from 2005 to 2019. Main Outcomes and Measures: Chain ownership of dialysis facilities, share of population living in markets with different levels of chain ownership, share of facilities with physician owners, levels of medical director compensation, and commercial prices for outpatient hemodialysis in markets with different numbers of chain- and physician-owned facilities. Results: Between 2005 and 2019, the market share of DaVita and Fresenius increased from 59.1% to 77.1%, with 32.5% of the national population living in a hospital service area (HSA) without access to a dialysis facility other than these 2 chains in 2019. The share of facilities with a physician owner increased from 11.4% to 29.1%. Markets with only 1 large chain had $495.08 (95% CI, $371.21-$619.85) higher mean commercial prices for outpatient hemodialysis and $564.56 (95% CI, $429.03-$700.10) higher medical director compensation per patient than markets that did not have large chain facilities. Conclusions and Relevance: In this economic evaluation, market concentration in the US dialysis industry increased from 2005 to 2019 and was associated with higher commercial prices for outpatient hemodialysis. Physician ownership of facilities also increased, and medical directors received higher pay in markets where large chains operate.


  • Open Access

    Provision of transplant education for patients starting dialysis: Disparities persist

    by Vincenzo Villani, Luca Bertuzzi, Gabriel Butler, Paul Eliason, James W. Roberts, Nicole DePasquale, Christine Park, Lisa M. McElroy, Ryan C. McDevitt


  • Specialization and Competition in the Venture Capital Industry

    by Yael V. Hochberg, Michael J. Mazzeo, Ryan C. McDevitt