Cédric Dupont
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Cédric Dupont has a total of 4 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Thomas Schultz
Dickson Poon School of Law, King's College London Thomas Schultz, Professor, Faculty of Law, University of Geneva, Geneva, Switzerland.; Professor London, UK
3 shared publications - Merih Angin
Koc University
2 shared publications Astrid Skjold
Geneva Graduate Institute, Geneva, Switzerland 1
1 shared publicationMelanie R. Wahl
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 29 December 2022
- Published by University of California Press in Global Perspectives
- Vol. 3 (1)
Coordination Conundrum in the United Nations Development System: Solutions from Self-Managed Organizations
Many of the problems that international organizations are tasked with solving are interdependent and require concerted efforts. This interdependence is epitomized in the UN’s Sustainable Development Goals. Yet acting in a concerted manner poses significant organizational obstacles. In this paper, we focus on one of the most prominent of those obstacles, coordination within the UN development system—the collection of UN entities working on development issues. We highlight the complexity of coordination within the UN development system and the changes introduced by the latest reform. We argue that those changes are unlikely to improve the situation significantly and turn to theoretical and empirical sources of inspiration for adjusting those changes. We draw on coordination solutions implemented in nonhierarchical organizational settings, in particular self-managed organizations and humanitarian clusters, to recommend a reorientation of the role of the Resident Coordinator system.
- 29 December 2022
- Published by University of California Press in Global Perspectives
- Vol. 3 (1)
Open AccessCoordination Conundrum in the United Nations Development System: Solutions from Self-Managed Organizations
Many of the problems that international organizations are tasked with solving are interdependent and require concerted efforts. This interdependence is epitomized in the UN’s Sustainable Development Goals. Yet acting in a concerted manner poses significant organizational obstacles. In this paper, we focus on one of the most prominent of those obstacles, coordination within the UN development system—the collection of UN entities working on development issues. We highlight the complexity of coordination within the UN development system and the changes introduced by the latest reform. We argue that those changes are unlikely to improve the situation significantly and turn to theoretical and empirical sources of inspiration for adjusting those changes. We draw on coordination solutions implemented in nonhierarchical organizational settings, in particular self-managed organizations and humanitarian clusters, to recommend a reorientation of the role of the Resident Coordinator system.
- 21 January 2016
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in Journal of International Dispute Settlement
- Vol. 7 (1)
Political Risk and Investment Arbitration: An Empirical Study*
Investment arbitrations should not happen too often, because they are costly processes for both parties. Yet they regularly happen. Why? We investigate the hypothesis that investment arbitrations are used as a means of last resort, after dissuasion has failed, and that dissuasion is most likely to fail in situations where significant political risk materializes. Investment arbitration should thus tend to target countries in which high-political risk has materialized. In order to test this hypothesis, we focus in this article on two drivers of political risk: bad governance and economic crises. We test various links between these two drivers of risk and arbitration claims. We use an original dataset that includes investment claims filed under the rules of all arbitration institutions as well as ad hoc arbitrations. We find that bad governance, understood as corruption and lack of rule of law (using the WGI Corruption and WGI Rule of Law indexes), has a statistically significant relation with investment arbitration claims, but economic crises do not.
- 21 January 2016
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in Journal of International Dispute Settlement
- Vol. 7 (1)
Political Risk and Investment Arbitration: An Empirical Study*
Investment arbitrations should not happen too often, because they are costly processes for both parties. Yet they regularly happen. Why? We investigate the hypothesis that investment arbitrations are used as a means of last resort, after dissuasion has failed, and that dissuasion is most likely to fail in situations where significant political risk materializes. Investment arbitration should thus tend to target countries in which high-political risk has materialized. In order to test this hypothesis, we focus in this article on two drivers of political risk: bad governance and economic crises. We test various links between these two drivers of risk and arbitration claims. We use an original dataset that includes investment claims filed under the rules of all arbitration institutions as well as ad hoc arbitrations. We find that bad governance, understood as corruption and lack of rule of law (using the WGI Corruption and WGI Rule of Law indexes), has a statistically significant relation with investment arbitration claims, but economic crises do not.
- 10 July 2015
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in The Journal of World Energy Law & Business
- Vol. 8 (4) , 337-361
Types of political risk leading to investment arbitrations in the oil and gas sector
It is often believed that investment arbitrations are filed because some form of political risk materialized, harming the investor’s interests. This is the hypothesis that the authors examine in this article, focusing on the oil and gas sector. They analyse which types of political risk, present in the host state, eventually lead oil and gas investors to file investment arbitration claims against that state. They find statistical evidence supporting the idea that bad governance and economic nationalism are indeed conducive to arbitration claims in the oil and gas sector. However, it appears that economic hardship does not have the same triggering effect.
- 10 July 2015
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in The Journal of World Energy Law & Business
- Vol. 8 (4) , 337-361
Types of political risk leading to investment arbitrations in the oil and gas sector
It is often believed that investment arbitrations are filed because some form of political risk materialized, harming the investor’s interests. This is the hypothesis that the authors examine in this article, focusing on the oil and gas sector. They analyse which types of political risk, present in the host state, eventually lead oil and gas investors to file investment arbitration claims against that state. They find statistical evidence supporting the idea that bad governance and economic nationalism are indeed conducive to arbitration claims in the oil and gas sector. However, it appears that economic hardship does not have the same triggering effect.
- 1 December 2013
- Published by Wiley in Swiss Political Science Review
- Vol. 19 (4) , 564-569
Do Hard Economic Times Lead to International Legal Disputes? The Case of Investment Arbitration
- 1 December 2013
- Published by Wiley in Swiss Political Science Review
- Vol. 19 (4) , 564-569
Do Hard Economic Times Lead to International Legal Disputes? The Case of Investment Arbitration