Huatao Peng
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Research Subjects
Huatao Peng has a total of 3 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Bert Manfred Sadowski
Eindhoven University of Technology
1 shared publication - Geert Duysters
Tilburg School of Economics and Management, Tilburg University, Tilburg, The Netherlands
1 shared publication Yuan Xu
Department of Human Resource, School of Management, Wuhan University of Technology, P.O. Box 51, Wuhan, 205 LuoShi Road, Hubei, 430070, P.R.China
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- 29 July 2009
- Published by American Society of Civil Engineers (ASCE)
- p. 1748-1753
Analysis of Deepening Mechanism of Logistic System Based on Social Network
Based on the selection effect, external effect, feedback effect and mutation effect, this paper builds up the cooperative competition evolution game under the condition of resource element complementary, risk profit sharing and collaborative multi-win, imitation copy evolution game under the condition of learning effect, spilling effect and assimilation effect, migration variation evolution model under the condition of function decay, layer transition and structure reorganization of logistic system's social network. By means of these models, this paper gives the network pathway of logistic system's social network extension, calculates the logistic system's social network capacity under the condition of limited bearing, designs the joint mediated degree to mark relationship strength and position strength. This paper tries to comprehensively prescribe the deepening pathway of logistic system based on social network, prove the deepening mode of logistic system based on social network, bring forth the deepening measure of logistic system based on social network.
- 29 July 2009
- Published by American Society of Civil Engineers (ASCE)
- p. 1748-1753
Analysis of Deepening Mechanism of Logistic System Based on Social Network
Based on the selection effect, external effect, feedback effect and mutation effect, this paper builds up the cooperative competition evolution game under the condition of resource element complementary, risk profit sharing and collaborative multi-win, imitation copy evolution game under the condition of learning effect, spilling effect and assimilation effect, migration variation evolution model under the condition of function decay, layer transition and structure reorganization of logistic system's social network. By means of these models, this paper gives the network pathway of logistic system's social network extension, calculates the logistic system's social network capacity under the condition of limited bearing, designs the joint mediated degree to mark relationship strength and position strength. This paper tries to comprehensively prescribe the deepening pathway of logistic system based on social network, prove the deepening mode of logistic system based on social network, bring forth the deepening measure of logistic system based on social network.
- 9 July 2007
- Published by American Society of Civil Engineers (ASCE)
- p. 3542-3547
Analysis of the Bayesian Game between Up-Stream Enterprise's Service Aware and Down-Stream Enterprise's Service Supply in Supply Chain
By analyzing the game between up-stream enterprise's service aware and down-stream enterprise's service supply in supply chain under the condition of asymmetric information, this paper tries to build Bayesian game model between up-stream enterprise's service aware based on cost payment and down-stream enterprise's service supply based on value seeking, which is as similar as the game model between bargaining and auction. The paper also discusses the optimal cost payment decision of up-stream enterprise and the optimal value seeking decision of down-stream enterprise, so as to provide the condition tinder which up-stream enterprise's service aware and down-stream enterprise's service supply are both efficient, the condition under which down-stream enterprise can satisfy up-stream enterprise's service aware but it doesn't exceed expectant service value and doesn't get profit, and the condition under which the lowest service supply of down-stream enterprise can also satisfy up-stream enterprise's service aware. The paper proves that down-stream enterprise's service standard must be appropriately advanced, otherwise it will lead to sunk cost of service supply and more serious service competition, and that certain service aware cost of up-stream enterprise is necessary, but up-stream enterprise must consciously reduce try-and-error cost by means of externality effect, diffusion effect and spilling off effect of service in supply chain.
- 9 July 2007
- Published by American Society of Civil Engineers (ASCE)
- p. 3542-3547
Analysis of the Bayesian Game between Up-Stream Enterprise's Service Aware and Down-Stream Enterprise's Service Supply in Supply Chain
By analyzing the game between up-stream enterprise's service aware and down-stream enterprise's service supply in supply chain under the condition of asymmetric information, this paper tries to build Bayesian game model between up-stream enterprise's service aware based on cost payment and down-stream enterprise's service supply based on value seeking, which is as similar as the game model between bargaining and auction. The paper also discusses the optimal cost payment decision of up-stream enterprise and the optimal value seeking decision of down-stream enterprise, so as to provide the condition tinder which up-stream enterprise's service aware and down-stream enterprise's service supply are both efficient, the condition under which down-stream enterprise can satisfy up-stream enterprise's service aware but it doesn't exceed expectant service value and doesn't get profit, and the condition under which the lowest service supply of down-stream enterprise can also satisfy up-stream enterprise's service aware. The paper proves that down-stream enterprise's service standard must be appropriately advanced, otherwise it will lead to sunk cost of service supply and more serious service competition, and that certain service aware cost of up-stream enterprise is necessary, but up-stream enterprise must consciously reduce try-and-error cost by means of externality effect, diffusion effect and spilling off effect of service in supply chain.