Rory Truex
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Research Subjects
Rory Truex has a total of 4 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Kevin Arceneaux
Center for Political Research (CEVIPOF) Sciences Po Paris France
2 shared publications - Qiuqing Tai
Ph.D. candidate, Yale University, Department of Political Science
1 shared publication - Sheena Chestnut Greitens
Department of political science, University of Missouri.
1 shared publication - Xiaoxiao Shen
Princeton University, Princeton, NJ, USA
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 24 November 2023
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in PS: Political Science & Politics
- Vol. 57 (1) , 146-148
Researching China in Hard Times
In the spring of 2018, Sheena Greitens and I conducted the China Scholar Research Experience Survey, a survey of 562 China scholars in the social sciences.1 The goal of the survey was to understand the incidence rate of different repressive experiences in the conduct of research. We found that at the time, such incidents were a “rare but real” phenomenon. Approximately 9% of respondents stated that they had been “invited to tea” by authorities within the past 10 years; 26% of scholars who conduct archival research reported having had issues with access; and 5% of researchers cited some difficulty obtaining a visa (Greitens and Truex 2020).
- 24 November 2023
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in PS: Political Science & Politics
- Vol. 57 (1) , 146-148
Open AccessResearching China in Hard Times
In the spring of 2018, Sheena Greitens and I conducted the China Scholar Research Experience Survey, a survey of 562 China scholars in the social sciences.1 The goal of the survey was to understand the incidence rate of different repressive experiences in the conduct of research. We found that at the time, such incidents were a “rare but real” phenomenon. Approximately 9% of respondents stated that they had been “invited to tea” by authorities within the past 10 years; 26% of scholars who conduct archival research reported having had issues with access; and 5% of researchers cited some difficulty obtaining a visa (Greitens and Truex 2020).
- 22 June 2022
- Published by Springer Nature in Journal of Chinese Political Science
- Vol. 27 (4) , 795-796
Suzanne E. Scoggins, Policing China: Street-Level Cops in the Shadow of Protest
- 22 June 2022
- Published by Springer Nature in Journal of Chinese Political Science
- Vol. 27 (4) , 795-796
Suzanne E. Scoggins, Policing China: Street-Level Cops in the Shadow of Protest
- Top Cited PapersOpen Access
- 29 March 2022
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Perspectives on Politics
- Vol. 21 (3) , 863-879
Donald Trump and the Lie
The legitimacy of democratically elected governments rests in part on widespread acceptance of the outcome of elections, especially among those who lost. This “losers’ consent” allows the winners to govern, and when the incumbent is the losing party, it allows for a peaceful transition of power. What happens in a democratic system when one side not only refuses to concede but also actively perpetuates lies about the outcome? This article studies the evolution of public opinion about Donald Trump’s “big lie” using a rolling cross-sectional daily tracking survey, yielding 40 days of polls and more than 20,000 responses from US voters from October 27, 2020, through January 29, 2021. We find that the lie is pervasive and sticky: the number of Republicans and independents saying that they believe the election was fraudulent is substantial, and this proportion did not change appreciably over time or shift after important political developments. Belief in the lie may have buoyed some of Trump supporters’ self-esteem. In reaction to the lie and the threat it brought to the transition of power, there was a significant rise in support for violent political activism among Democrats, which only waned after efforts to overturn the election clearly failed. Even if these findings merely reflect partisan cheerleading, we nonetheless find significant and potentially long-term consequences of the lie. A conjoint experiment shows that Republican voters reward politicians who perpetuate the lie, giving Republican candidates an incentive to continue to do so in the next electoral cycle. These findings raise concerns about the fragility of American democracy.
- 29 March 2022
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Perspectives on Politics
- Vol. 21 (3) , 863-879
Top Cited PapersOpen AccessDonald Trump and the Lie
The legitimacy of democratically elected governments rests in part on widespread acceptance of the outcome of elections, especially among those who lost. This “losers’ consent” allows the winners to govern, and when the incumbent is the losing party, it allows for a peaceful transition of power. What happens in a democratic system when one side not only refuses to concede but also actively perpetuates lies about the outcome? This article studies the evolution of public opinion about Donald Trump’s “big lie” using a rolling cross-sectional daily tracking survey, yielding 40 days of polls and more than 20,000 responses from US voters from October 27, 2020, through January 29, 2021. We find that the lie is pervasive and sticky: the number of Republicans and independents saying that they believe the election was fraudulent is substantial, and this proportion did not change appreciably over time or shift after important political developments. Belief in the lie may have buoyed some of Trump supporters’ self-esteem. In reaction to the lie and the threat it brought to the transition of power, there was a significant rise in support for violent political activism among Democrats, which only waned after efforts to overturn the election clearly failed. Even if these findings merely reflect partisan cheerleading, we nonetheless find significant and potentially long-term consequences of the lie. A conjoint experiment shows that Republican voters reward politicians who perpetuate the lie, giving Republican candidates an incentive to continue to do so in the next electoral cycle. These findings raise concerns about the fragility of American democracy.
- Open Access
- 10 March 2021
- Published by Center for Open Science in PsyArXiv
Donald Trump and the Lie
The legitimacy of democratically elected governments rests in part on widespread acceptance of the outcome of elections, especially among those who lost. This "losers' consent'' allows the winners to govern and, when the incumbent is the losing party, it allows for a peaceful transition of power. What happens in a democratic system when one side not only refuses to concede, but actively perpetuates lies about the outcome? This paper studies the consequences of a Donald Trump's "big lie" using a daily tracking survey, yielding 40-days of polls and over 20,000 responses from American voters. We find that the lie is pervasive and sticky-- the number of Republicans and independents believing that the election was fraudulent is substantial, and this proportion did not change appreciably over time or shift after important political developments. In reaction to the lie, and the threat it brought to the transition of power, there was a significant rise in support for political violence among Democrats, support that only waned after the insurrection of January 6th. We also find there are likely significant, long term consequences to the lie. Republican voters will reward politicians that perpetuate it in the next electoral cycle.
- 10 March 2021
- Published by Center for Open Science in PsyArXiv
Open AccessDonald Trump and the Lie
The legitimacy of democratically elected governments rests in part on widespread acceptance of the outcome of elections, especially among those who lost. This "losers' consent'' allows the winners to govern and, when the incumbent is the losing party, it allows for a peaceful transition of power. What happens in a democratic system when one side not only refuses to concede, but actively perpetuates lies about the outcome? This paper studies the consequences of a Donald Trump's "big lie" using a daily tracking survey, yielding 40-days of polls and over 20,000 responses from American voters. We find that the lie is pervasive and sticky-- the number of Republicans and independents believing that the election was fraudulent is substantial, and this proportion did not change appreciably over time or shift after important political developments. In reaction to the lie, and the threat it brought to the transition of power, there was a significant rise in support for political violence among Democrats, support that only waned after the insurrection of January 6th. We also find there are likely significant, long term consequences to the lie. Republican voters will reward politicians that perpetuate it in the next electoral cycle.
- Top Cited PapersOpen Access
- 16 March 2020
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in British Journal of Political Science
- Vol. 51 (4) , 1672-1684
In Search of Self-Censorship
Item nonresponse rates across regime assessment questions and nonsensitive items are used to create a self-censorship index, which can be compared across countries, over time and across population subgroups. For many authoritarian systems, citizens do not display higher rates of item nonresponse on regime assessment questions than their counterparts in democracies. This result suggests such questions may not be that sensitive in many places, which in turn raises doubts that authoritarian citizens are widely feigning positive attitudes towards regimes they secretly despise. Higher levels of self-censorship are found under regimes without electoral competition for the executive.
- 16 March 2020
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in British Journal of Political Science
- Vol. 51 (4) , 1672-1684
Top Cited PapersOpen AccessIn Search of Self-Censorship
Item nonresponse rates across regime assessment questions and nonsensitive items are used to create a self-censorship index, which can be compared across countries, over time and across population subgroups. For many authoritarian systems, citizens do not display higher rates of item nonresponse on regime assessment questions than their counterparts in democracies. This result suggests such questions may not be that sensitive in many places, which in turn raises doubts that authoritarian citizens are widely feigning positive attitudes towards regimes they secretly despise. Higher levels of self-censorship are found under regimes without electoral competition for the executive.
- Open Access
- 27 May 2019
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in The China Quarterly
- Vol. 242, 349-375
Repressive Experiences among China Scholars: New Evidence from Survey Data
This paper examines the nature of China's current research climate and its effects on foreign scholarship. Drawing on an original survey of over 500 China scholars, we find that repressive research experiences are a rare but real phenomenon and collectively present a barrier to the conduct of research in China. Roughly 9 per cent of China scholars report that they have been “invited to tea” by authorities within the past ten years; 26 per cent of scholars who conduct archival research report being denied access; and 5 per cent of researchers report some difficulty obtaining a visa. The paper provides descriptive information on the nature of these experiences and their determinants. It concludes with a discussion of self-censorship and strategies for conducting research on China.
- 27 May 2019
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in The China Quarterly
- Vol. 242, 349-375
Open AccessRepressive Experiences among China Scholars: New Evidence from Survey Data
This paper examines the nature of China's current research climate and its effects on foreign scholarship. Drawing on an original survey of over 500 China scholars, we find that repressive research experiences are a rare but real phenomenon and collectively present a barrier to the conduct of research in China. Roughly 9 per cent of China scholars report that they have been “invited to tea” by authorities within the past ten years; 26 per cent of scholars who conduct archival research report being denied access; and 5 per cent of researchers report some difficulty obtaining a visa. The paper provides descriptive information on the nature of these experiences and their determinants. It concludes with a discussion of self-censorship and strategies for conducting research on China.
- 20 December 2018
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in The China Quarterly
- Vol. 236, 1214-1216
China's Governance Puzzle: Enabling Transparency and Participation in a Single-Party State Jonathan R. Stromseth, Edmund J. Malesky and Dimitar D. Gueorguiev Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 2017 xix + 326 pp. $34.99 ISBN 978-1-107-55332-3
- 20 December 2018
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in The China Quarterly
- Vol. 236, 1214-1216
China's Governance Puzzle: Enabling Transparency and Participation in a Single-Party State Jonathan R. Stromseth, Edmund J. Malesky and Dimitar D. Gueorguiev Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 2017 xix + 326 pp. $34.99 ISBN 978-1-107-55332-3
- 26 April 2018
- Published by SAGE Publications in Comparative Political Studies
- Vol. 53 (9) , 1455-1492
Authoritarian Gridlock? Understanding Delay in the Chinese Legislative System
Legislative gridlock is often viewed as a uniquely democratic phenomenon. The institutional checks and balances that produce gridlock are absent from authoritarian systems, leading many observers to romanticize “authoritarian efficiency” and policy dynamism. A unique data set from the Chinese case demonstrates that authoritarian regimes can have trouble passing laws and changing policies—48% of laws are not passed within the period specified in legislative plans, and about 12% of laws take more than 10 years to pass. This article develops a theory that relates variation in legislative outcomes to the absence of division within the ruling coalition and citizen attention shocks. Qualitative analysis of China’s Food Safety Law, coupled with shadow case studies of two other laws, illustrates the plausibility of the theoretical mechanisms. Division and public opinion play decisive roles in authoritarian legislative processes.
- 26 April 2018
- Published by SAGE Publications in Comparative Political Studies
- Vol. 53 (9) , 1455-1492
Authoritarian Gridlock? Understanding Delay in the Chinese Legislative System
Legislative gridlock is often viewed as a uniquely democratic phenomenon. The institutional checks and balances that produce gridlock are absent from authoritarian systems, leading many observers to romanticize “authoritarian efficiency” and policy dynamism. A unique data set from the Chinese case demonstrates that authoritarian regimes can have trouble passing laws and changing policies—48% of laws are not passed within the period specified in legislative plans, and about 12% of laws take more than 10 years to pass. This article develops a theory that relates variation in legislative outcomes to the absence of division within the ruling coalition and citizen attention shocks. Qualitative analysis of China’s Food Safety Law, coupled with shadow case studies of two other laws, illustrates the plausibility of the theoretical mechanisms. Division and public opinion play decisive roles in authoritarian legislative processes.
- Top Cited Papers
- 24 April 2018
- Published by SAGE Publications in Journal of Conflict Resolution
- Vol. 63 (4) , 1032-1052
Focal Points, Dissident Calendars, and Preemptive Repression
This article explains temporal variation in repression as a function of the “dissident calendar,” the set of events that serve as natural focal points for coordination. The core argument is that regimes can anticipate the events that create these focal points and engage in preemptive repression to survive their passing. This dynamic produces predictable, often cyclical patterns in repression. An analysis of dissident detentions in China from 1998 to 2014 shows that “focal events” alone appear to be responsible for more than 20 percent of dissident detentions over the analysis period. Such detentions tend to be shorter and rely less on formal criminal procedures, suggesting a “catch-and-release” dynamic. Additional analysis of detentions in Tibet shows how the calendar may vary by issue or group.
- 24 April 2018
- Published by SAGE Publications in Journal of Conflict Resolution
- Vol. 63 (4) , 1032-1052
Top Cited PapersFocal Points, Dissident Calendars, and Preemptive Repression
This article explains temporal variation in repression as a function of the “dissident calendar,” the set of events that serve as natural focal points for coordination. The core argument is that regimes can anticipate the events that create these focal points and engage in preemptive repression to survive their passing. This dynamic produces predictable, often cyclical patterns in repression. An analysis of dissident detentions in China from 1998 to 2014 shows that “focal events” alone appear to be responsible for more than 20 percent of dissident detentions over the analysis period. Such detentions tend to be shorter and rely less on formal criminal procedures, suggesting a “catch-and-release” dynamic. Additional analysis of detentions in Tibet shows how the calendar may vary by issue or group.
- 30 September 2016
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP)
- p. 46-74
Does the NPC Matter?
Making Autocracy Work - October 2016
- 30 September 2016
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP)
- p. 46-74
Does the NPC Matter?
Making Autocracy Work - October 2016