Simon Oya
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Research Subjects
Simon Oya has a total of 4 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Fernando Perez-Gonzalez
Department of Signal Theory and Communications, atlanTTic Research Center, Universidade de Vigo, Vigo, Spain
4 shared publications - Carmela Troncoso
SPRING Lab, EPFL, Lausanne, Switzerland
2 shared publications - Carmela Troncoso
IMDEA Software Institute
1 shared publication - Carmela Troncoso
University of Athens Microsoft Research INRIA École Polytechnique EPFL
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- Open Access
Understanding the Effects of Real-World Behavior in Statistical Disclosure Attacks
High-latency anonymous communication systems prevent passive eavesdroppers from inferring communicating partners with certainty. However, disclosure attacks allow an adversary to recover users' behavioral profiles when communications are persistent. Understanding how the system parameters affect the privacy of the users against such attacks is crucial. Earlier work in the area analyzes the performance of disclosure attacks in controlled scenarios, where a certain model about the users' behavior is assumed. In this paper, we analyze the profiling accuracy of one of the most efficient disclosure attack, the least squares disclosure attack, in realistic scenarios. We generate real traffic observations from datasets of different nature and find that the models considered in previous work do not fit this realistic behavior. We relax previous hypotheses on the behavior of the users and extend previous performance analyses, validating our results with real data and providing new insights into the parameters that affect the protection of the users in the real world.
Open AccessUnderstanding the Effects of Real-World Behavior in Statistical Disclosure Attacks
High-latency anonymous communication systems prevent passive eavesdroppers from inferring communicating partners with certainty. However, disclosure attacks allow an adversary to recover users' behavioral profiles when communications are persistent. Understanding how the system parameters affect the privacy of the users against such attacks is crucial. Earlier work in the area analyzes the performance of disclosure attacks in controlled scenarios, where a certain model about the users' behavior is assumed. In this paper, we analyze the profiling accuracy of one of the most efficient disclosure attack, the least squares disclosure attack, in realistic scenarios. We generate real traffic observations from datasets of different nature and find that the models considered in previous work do not fit this realistic behavior. We relax previous hypotheses on the behavior of the users and extend previous performance analyses, validating our results with real data and providing new insights into the parameters that affect the protection of the users in the real world.
- Open Access
Rethinking Location Privacy for Unknown Mobility Behaviors
Location Privacy-Preserving Mechanisms (LPPMs) in the literature largely consider that users' data available for training wholly characterizes their mobility patterns. Thus, they hardwire this information in their designs and evaluate their privacy properties with these same data. In this paper, we aim to understand the impact of this decision on the level of privacy these LPPMs may offer in real life when the users' mobility data may be different from the data used in the design phase. Our results show that, in many cases, training data does not capture users' behavior accurately and, thus, the level of privacy provided by the LPPM is often overestimated. To address this gap between theory and practice, we propose to use blank-slate models for LPPM design. Contrary to the hardwired approach, that assumes known users' behavior, blank-slate models learn the users' behavior from the queries to the service provider. We leverage this blank-slate approach to develop a new family of LPPMs, that we call Profile Estimation-Based LPPMs. Using real data, we empirically show that our proposal outperforms optimal state-of-the-art mechanisms designed on sporadic hardwired models. On non-sporadic location privacy scenarios, our method is only better if the usage of the location privacy service is not continuous. It is our hope that eliminating the need to bootstrap the mechanisms with training data and ensuring that the mechanisms are lightweight and easy to compute help fostering the integration of location privacy protections in deployed systems.
Open AccessRethinking Location Privacy for Unknown Mobility Behaviors
Location Privacy-Preserving Mechanisms (LPPMs) in the literature largely consider that users' data available for training wholly characterizes their mobility patterns. Thus, they hardwire this information in their designs and evaluate their privacy properties with these same data. In this paper, we aim to understand the impact of this decision on the level of privacy these LPPMs may offer in real life when the users' mobility data may be different from the data used in the design phase. Our results show that, in many cases, training data does not capture users' behavior accurately and, thus, the level of privacy provided by the LPPM is often overestimated. To address this gap between theory and practice, we propose to use blank-slate models for LPPM design. Contrary to the hardwired approach, that assumes known users' behavior, blank-slate models learn the users' behavior from the queries to the service provider. We leverage this blank-slate approach to develop a new family of LPPMs, that we call Profile Estimation-Based LPPMs. Using real data, we empirically show that our proposal outperforms optimal state-of-the-art mechanisms designed on sporadic hardwired models. On non-sporadic location privacy scenarios, our method is only better if the usage of the location privacy service is not continuous. It is our hope that eliminating the need to bootstrap the mechanisms with training data and ensuring that the mechanisms are lightweight and easy to compute help fostering the integration of location privacy protections in deployed systems.
- 13 April 2016
- Published by Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) in IEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking
- Vol. 24 (6) , 3662-3675
Design of Pool Mixes Against Profiling Attacks in Real Conditions
Current implementations of high-latency anonymous communication systems are based on pool mixes. These tools act as routers that apply a random delay to the messages traversing them, making it hard for an eavesdropper to guess the correspondences between incoming and outgoing messages. This hides the identities of communicating partners in the network, but it does not prevent an adversary continuously monitoring the network from unveiling the communication profiles of the users. In this paper, we tackle the problem of designing the delay characteristic of pool mixes so as to maximize the protection of the users against profiling attacks. First, we propose a theoretical model for users' sending behavior which we validate using three real data sets of a different nature. Then, we use this model to perform a privacy analysis of the system and obtain the delay function of the mix, which is optimal in the sense of protecting the users. Since computing the delay characteristic of this optimal pool mix requires information about the users' behavior, we also propose a user-independent but less effective mix design. We evaluate these pool mixes, comparing them with one of the most studied existing designs, the binomial pool mix. Our experiments show that an adversary against our optimal design may need up to 30 times as long to achieve the same level of disclosure as for a binomial pool mix.
- 13 April 2016
- Published by Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) in IEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking
- Vol. 24 (6) , 3662-3675
Design of Pool Mixes Against Profiling Attacks in Real Conditions
Current implementations of high-latency anonymous communication systems are based on pool mixes. These tools act as routers that apply a random delay to the messages traversing them, making it hard for an eavesdropper to guess the correspondences between incoming and outgoing messages. This hides the identities of communicating partners in the network, but it does not prevent an adversary continuously monitoring the network from unveiling the communication profiles of the users. In this paper, we tackle the problem of designing the delay characteristic of pool mixes so as to maximize the protection of the users against profiling attacks. First, we propose a theoretical model for users' sending behavior which we validate using three real data sets of a different nature. Then, we use this model to perform a privacy analysis of the system and obtain the delay function of the mix, which is optimal in the sense of protecting the users. Since computing the delay characteristic of this optimal pool mix requires information about the users' behavior, we also propose a user-independent but less effective mix design. We evaluate these pool mixes, comparing them with one of the most studied existing designs, the binomial pool mix. Our experiments show that an adversary against our optimal design may need up to 30 times as long to achieve the same level of disclosure as for a binomial pool mix.
- 1 January 2014
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 204-223
Do Dummies Pay Off? Limits of Dummy Traffic Protection in Anonymous Communications
- 1 January 2014
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 204-223
Do Dummies Pay Off? Limits of Dummy Traffic Protection in Anonymous Communications