Daniela Cutas
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Previous Organizations / Institutes
The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years
Research Subjects
Research Interests
Daniela Cutas has a total of 4 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
Anna Smajdor
University of Oslo
2 shared publications- Anna Smajdor
IFIKK, University of Oslo, Oslo, Norway
2 shared publications - Kristien Hens
Department of Philosophy, University of Antwerp, Rodestraat 14, 2000 Antwerp, Belgium
2 shared publications - David Shaw
Institute for Biomedical Ethics, University of Basel, Bernoullistrasse 28, 4056, Basel, Switzerland
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- 15 February 2020
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 171-182
‘Duped Fathers’, ‘Cuckoo Children’, and the Problem of Basing Fatherhood on Biology: A Philosophical Analysis
- 15 February 2020
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 171-182
‘Duped Fathers’, ‘Cuckoo Children’, and the Problem of Basing Fatherhood on Biology: A Philosophical Analysis
- 24 July 2017
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 609-624
Infertility, Ethics, and the Future: An Exploration
- 24 July 2017
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 609-624
Infertility, Ethics, and the Future: An Exploration
- 20 June 2017
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 141-156
Procreative Procrastination: The Ethics of Postponed Parenthood
- 20 June 2017
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 141-156
Procreative Procrastination: The Ethics of Postponed Parenthood
- Open Access
- 9 May 2017
- Published by Norwegian University of Science and Technology (NTNU) Library in Etikk I Praksis - Nordic Journal of Applied Ethics
- Vol. 11 (1) , 5-15
The moral status of the (nuclear) family
The family is commonly regarded as being an important social institution. In several policy areas, evidence can be found that the family is treated as an entity towards which others can have moral obligations; it has needs and interests that require protection; it can be ill and receive treatment. The interests attributed to the family are not reducible to those of its members – and may even come into conflict with them. Using Warren’s criteria for moral status, we show that, although the family is not explicitly described in terms of moral status, the way in which it is treated implies that it has such status.
- 9 May 2017
- Published by Norwegian University of Science and Technology (NTNU) Library in Etikk I Praksis - Nordic Journal of Applied Ethics
- Vol. 11 (1) , 5-15
Open AccessThe moral status of the (nuclear) family
The family is commonly regarded as being an important social institution. In several policy areas, evidence can be found that the family is treated as an entity towards which others can have moral obligations; it has needs and interests that require protection; it can be ill and receive treatment. The interests attributed to the family are not reducible to those of its members – and may even come into conflict with them. Using Warren’s criteria for moral status, we show that, although the family is not explicitly described in terms of moral status, the way in which it is treated implies that it has such status.
- 10 January 2017
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 189-205
Should Parents Take Active Steps to Preserve Their Children’s Fertility?
- 10 January 2017
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 189-205
Should Parents Take Active Steps to Preserve Their Children’s Fertility?
- Open Access
- 11 March 2016
- Published by Springer Nature in Health Care Analysis
- Vol. 25 (4) , 354-369
“I am Your Mother and Your Father!” In Vitro Derived Gametes and the Ethics of Solo Reproduction
In this paper, we will discuss the prospect of human reproduction achieved with gametes originating from only one person. According to statements by a minority of scientists working on the generation of gametes in vitro, it may become possible to create eggs from men’s non-reproductive cells and sperm from women’s. This would enable, at least in principle, the creation of an embryo from cells obtained from only one individual: ‘solo reproduction’. We will consider what might motivate people to reproduce in this way, and the implications that solo reproduction might have for ethics and policy. We suggest that such an innovation is unlikely to revolutionise reproduction and parenting. Indeed, in some respects it is less revolutionary than in vitro fertilisation as a whole. Furthermore, we show that solo reproduction with in vitro created gametes is not necessarily any more ethically problematic than gamete donation—and probably less so. Where appropriate, we draw parallels with the debate surrounding reproductive cloning. We note that solo reproduction may serve to perpetuate reductive geneticised accounts of reproduction, and that this may indeed be ethically questionable. However, in this it is not unique among other technologies of assisted reproduction, many of which focus on genetic transmission. It is for this reason that a ban on solo reproduction might be inconsistent with continuing to permit other kinds of reproduction that also bear the potential to strengthen attachment to a geneticised account of reproduction. Our claim is that there are at least as good reasons to pursue research towards enabling solo reproduction, and eventually to introduce solo reproduction as an option for fertility treatment, as there are to do so for other infertility related purposes.
- 11 March 2016
- Published by Springer Nature in Health Care Analysis
- Vol. 25 (4) , 354-369
Open Access“I am Your Mother and Your Father!” In Vitro Derived Gametes and the Ethics of Solo Reproduction
In this paper, we will discuss the prospect of human reproduction achieved with gametes originating from only one person. According to statements by a minority of scientists working on the generation of gametes in vitro, it may become possible to create eggs from men’s non-reproductive cells and sperm from women’s. This would enable, at least in principle, the creation of an embryo from cells obtained from only one individual: ‘solo reproduction’. We will consider what might motivate people to reproduce in this way, and the implications that solo reproduction might have for ethics and policy. We suggest that such an innovation is unlikely to revolutionise reproduction and parenting. Indeed, in some respects it is less revolutionary than in vitro fertilisation as a whole. Furthermore, we show that solo reproduction with in vitro created gametes is not necessarily any more ethically problematic than gamete donation—and probably less so. Where appropriate, we draw parallels with the debate surrounding reproductive cloning. We note that solo reproduction may serve to perpetuate reductive geneticised accounts of reproduction, and that this may indeed be ethically questionable. However, in this it is not unique among other technologies of assisted reproduction, many of which focus on genetic transmission. It is for this reason that a ban on solo reproduction might be inconsistent with continuing to permit other kinds of reproduction that also bear the potential to strengthen attachment to a geneticised account of reproduction. Our claim is that there are at least as good reasons to pursue research towards enabling solo reproduction, and eventually to introduce solo reproduction as an option for fertility treatment, as there are to do so for other infertility related purposes.
- 28 October 2014
- Published by Springer Nature in Science and Engineering Ethics
- Vol. 21 (5) , 1315-1329
Writers Blocked: On the Wrongs of Research Co-authorship and Some Possible Strategies for Improvement
The various problems associated with co-authorship of research articles have attracted much attention in recent years. We believe that this (hopefully) growing awareness is a very welcome development. However, we will argue that the particular and increasing importance of authorship and the harmful implications of current practices of research authorship for junior researchers have not been emphasised enough. We will use the case of our own research area (bioethics) to illustrate some of the pitfalls of current publishing practices—in particular, the impact on the evaluation of one’s work in the area of employment or funding. Even where there are explicit guidelines, they are often disregarded. This disregard, which is often exemplified through the inflation of co-authorship in some research areas, may seem benign to some of us; but it is not. Attribution of co-authorship for reasons other than merit in relation to the publication misrepresents the work towards that publication, and generates unfair competition. We make a case for increasing awareness, for transparency and for more explicit guidelines and regulation of research co-authorship within and across research areas. We examine some of the most sensitive areas of concern and their implications for researchers, particularly junior ones, and we suggest several strategies for future action.
- 28 October 2014
- Published by Springer Nature in Science and Engineering Ethics
- Vol. 21 (5) , 1315-1329
Writers Blocked: On the Wrongs of Research Co-authorship and Some Possible Strategies for Improvement
The various problems associated with co-authorship of research articles have attracted much attention in recent years. We believe that this (hopefully) growing awareness is a very welcome development. However, we will argue that the particular and increasing importance of authorship and the harmful implications of current practices of research authorship for junior researchers have not been emphasised enough. We will use the case of our own research area (bioethics) to illustrate some of the pitfalls of current publishing practices—in particular, the impact on the evaluation of one’s work in the area of employment or funding. Even where there are explicit guidelines, they are often disregarded. This disregard, which is often exemplified through the inflation of co-authorship in some research areas, may seem benign to some of us; but it is not. Attribution of co-authorship for reasons other than merit in relation to the publication misrepresents the work towards that publication, and generates unfair competition. We make a case for increasing awareness, for transparency and for more explicit guidelines and regulation of research co-authorship within and across research areas. We examine some of the most sensitive areas of concern and their implications for researchers, particularly junior ones, and we suggest several strategies for future action.
- 5 September 2014
- Published by Springer Nature in Medicine, Health Care and Philosophy
- Vol. 18 (2) , 253-260
Preserving children’s fertility: two tales about children’s right to an open future and the margins of parental obligations
The sources, extent and margins of parental obligations in taking decisions regarding their children’s medical care are subjects of ongoing debates. Balancing children’s immediate welfare with keeping their future open is a delicate task. In this paper, we briefly present two examples of situations in which parents may be confronted with the choice of whether to authorise or demand non-therapeutic interventions on their children for the purpose of fertility preservation. The first example is that of children facing cancer treatment, and the second of children with Klinefelter syndrome. We argue that, whereas decisions of whether to preserve fertility may be prima facie within the limits of parental discretion, the right to an open future does not straightforwardly put parents under an obligation to take actions that would detect or relieve future infertility in their children—and indeed in some cases taking such actions is problematic.
- 5 September 2014
- Published by Springer Nature in Medicine, Health Care and Philosophy
- Vol. 18 (2) , 253-260
Preserving children’s fertility: two tales about children’s right to an open future and the margins of parental obligations
The sources, extent and margins of parental obligations in taking decisions regarding their children’s medical care are subjects of ongoing debates. Balancing children’s immediate welfare with keeping their future open is a delicate task. In this paper, we briefly present two examples of situations in which parents may be confronted with the choice of whether to authorise or demand non-therapeutic interventions on their children for the purpose of fertility preservation. The first example is that of children facing cancer treatment, and the second of children with Klinefelter syndrome. We argue that, whereas decisions of whether to preserve fertility may be prima facie within the limits of parental discretion, the right to an open future does not straightforwardly put parents under an obligation to take actions that would detect or relieve future infertility in their children—and indeed in some cases taking such actions is problematic.