Dilshani Sarathchandra
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Previous Organizations / Institutes
The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years
Research Subjects
Dilshani Sarathchandra has a total of 45 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Kristin Haltinner
Department of Culture, Society and Justice University of Idaho Moscow Idaho USA
22 shared publications - Cedric A. L. Taylor
The School of Politics, Society, Justice, and Public Service, Central Michigan University, Mount Pleasant, USA
3 shared publications - Courtney Cooper
Berry College, Mount Berry, GA, USA
2 shared publications Debbie A. Storrs
University of North Dakota, Grand Forks, ND, USA
2 shared publications- Jeff B. Langman
Department of Earth and Spatial Sciences, University of Idaho, Moscow, ID 83844, USA
2 shared publications Kristin Haltinner
2 shared publications
Latest Publications
- 4 March 2025
- Published by Wiley in Sociology Compass
- Vol. 19 (3)
The Potential for Changing Public Perceptions on Climate Change Through Narratives
- 4 March 2025
- Published by Wiley in Sociology Compass
- Vol. 19 (3)
The Potential for Changing Public Perceptions on Climate Change Through Narratives
- Open Access
White Identity, Conservatism, and Resistance to COVID-19 Mitigation Strategies
Research suggests that opposition to COVID-19 mitigation strategies and mandates has been notable among young adults, especially those who are conservative. The current political climate, through which young adults have developed their political beliefs, has combined conservative values of limited government with pronounced anti-institutional sentiments, thus predisposing today’s younger conservatives to greater skepticism. Young white adults are also experiencing a growing salience in their own racial identities—an experience different from prior generations. No known research has connected these observations by examining the interplay between white identity and conservatism and their impact on support for and adherence to COVID-19 mitigation strategies. Drawing on survey data from a national U.S. sample of white young adults, we examine how two white identity constructs (racial identity and racial identity verification) influence how conservatism impacts resistance to six COVID-19 mitigation outcomes (i.e., vaccination status, masking behavior, support for vaccinations, support for masking, support for vaccination mandates, and support for masking mandates). White racial identity indirectly decreased support for and adherence to all COVID-19 mitigation outcomes by enhancing levels of conservatism. In addition, racial identity verification enhanced the negative effects of conservatism with most of the COVID-19 mitigation outcomes. We discuss these findings within the context of the literature on COVID-19 attitudes and racial identity.
Open AccessWhite Identity, Conservatism, and Resistance to COVID-19 Mitigation Strategies
Research suggests that opposition to COVID-19 mitigation strategies and mandates has been notable among young adults, especially those who are conservative. The current political climate, through which young adults have developed their political beliefs, has combined conservative values of limited government with pronounced anti-institutional sentiments, thus predisposing today’s younger conservatives to greater skepticism. Young white adults are also experiencing a growing salience in their own racial identities—an experience different from prior generations. No known research has connected these observations by examining the interplay between white identity and conservatism and their impact on support for and adherence to COVID-19 mitigation strategies. Drawing on survey data from a national U.S. sample of white young adults, we examine how two white identity constructs (racial identity and racial identity verification) influence how conservatism impacts resistance to six COVID-19 mitigation outcomes (i.e., vaccination status, masking behavior, support for vaccinations, support for masking, support for vaccination mandates, and support for masking mandates). White racial identity indirectly decreased support for and adherence to all COVID-19 mitigation outcomes by enhancing levels of conservatism. In addition, racial identity verification enhanced the negative effects of conservatism with most of the COVID-19 mitigation outcomes. We discuss these findings within the context of the literature on COVID-19 attitudes and racial identity.
- 25 September 2024
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Environmental Sociology
- Vol. 11 (2) , 198-212
Perceived risk, health protective behavior, and trust: a case study of the flint water crisis
- 25 September 2024
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Environmental Sociology
- Vol. 11 (2) , 198-212
Perceived risk, health protective behavior, and trust: a case study of the flint water crisis
- Open Access
How Political Ideology and Media Shaped Vaccination Intention in the Early Stages of the COVID-19 Pandemic in the United States
As a pharmaceutical intervention, vaccines remain a major public health strategy for mitigating the effects of COVID-19. Yet, vaccine intake has been affected by various cognitive and cultural factors. We examine how a selected set of factors (i.e., knowledge, concern, media, peer influence, and demographics) shaped COVID-19 vaccination intention in the early phase of the pandemic (Fall 2020). Using a survey conducted in three US states (Idaho, Texas, and Vermont) just prior to the rollout of the first vaccines against COVID-19, we find that COVID-19 concern was the primary driver of vaccination intention. Concern was shaped mainly by two factors: political ideology and media sources. Yet, ideology and media were much more important in affecting concern for those who leaned politically conservative, as opposed to those who leaned liberal or remained moderate. The results from our structural equation models affirm that the information politically conservative respondents were receiving reinforced the effects of their ideology, leading to a greater reduction in their concern. We discuss the potential implications of these findings for future pandemic preparedness.
Open AccessHow Political Ideology and Media Shaped Vaccination Intention in the Early Stages of the COVID-19 Pandemic in the United States
As a pharmaceutical intervention, vaccines remain a major public health strategy for mitigating the effects of COVID-19. Yet, vaccine intake has been affected by various cognitive and cultural factors. We examine how a selected set of factors (i.e., knowledge, concern, media, peer influence, and demographics) shaped COVID-19 vaccination intention in the early phase of the pandemic (Fall 2020). Using a survey conducted in three US states (Idaho, Texas, and Vermont) just prior to the rollout of the first vaccines against COVID-19, we find that COVID-19 concern was the primary driver of vaccination intention. Concern was shaped mainly by two factors: political ideology and media sources. Yet, ideology and media were much more important in affecting concern for those who leaned politically conservative, as opposed to those who leaned liberal or remained moderate. The results from our structural equation models affirm that the information politically conservative respondents were receiving reinforced the effects of their ideology, leading to a greater reduction in their concern. We discuss the potential implications of these findings for future pandemic preparedness.
- 8 May 2024
- Published by Taylor & Francis
- p. 228-231
How to mobilize public will to resolve the climate crisis
As sociologists with an interest in the environment, the two of us have been collaborating on climate change research for nearly a decade. Our work primarily focuses on climate change skepticism in the United States, but more recently we have begun to investigate what factors contribute to changing people’s minds on the climate crisis. Through doing this work, we have been struck by the shocking absence of meaningful political action on climate change, despite the catastrophic impacts of the crisis globally.
- 8 May 2024
- Published by Taylor & Francis
- p. 228-231
How to mobilize public will to resolve the climate crisis
As sociologists with an interest in the environment, the two of us have been collaborating on climate change research for nearly a decade. Our work primarily focuses on climate change skepticism in the United States, but more recently we have begun to investigate what factors contribute to changing people’s minds on the climate crisis. Through doing this work, we have been struck by the shocking absence of meaningful political action on climate change, despite the catastrophic impacts of the crisis globally.
- 8 May 2024
- Published by Taylor & Francis
- p. 1-8
Engaging social science knowledge to resolve the climate crisis
In 1912, the magazine Popular Mechanics ran a story (picked up by newspapers in New Zealand and Australia) arguing that the release of carbon dioxide through burning coal would lead to a rise in the earth’s temperature in the future (Pester 2021; Sadeghi 2021). By the 1950s, climate change had already risen as a significant concern among climate scientists (Pester 2021). On November 5, 1965, President Lyndon B. Johnson was notified by his science advisory committee that pollution was increasing carbon dioxide levels in the atmosphere with dire impacts on human populations (Nuccitelli 2015). By 1974, climate scientists had demonstrated through climate models that carbon dioxide leads to an increase in the earth’s temperature (Nuccitelli 2015). Starting in the 1980s, climate scientists had unified in their demand for change in order to prevent catastrophic climate change (Pester 2021).
- 8 May 2024
- Published by Taylor & Francis
- p. 1-8
Engaging social science knowledge to resolve the climate crisis
In 1912, the magazine Popular Mechanics ran a story (picked up by newspapers in New Zealand and Australia) arguing that the release of carbon dioxide through burning coal would lead to a rise in the earth’s temperature in the future (Pester 2021; Sadeghi 2021). By the 1950s, climate change had already risen as a significant concern among climate scientists (Pester 2021). On November 5, 1965, President Lyndon B. Johnson was notified by his science advisory committee that pollution was increasing carbon dioxide levels in the atmosphere with dire impacts on human populations (Nuccitelli 2015). By 1974, climate scientists had demonstrated through climate models that carbon dioxide leads to an increase in the earth’s temperature (Nuccitelli 2015). Starting in the 1980s, climate scientists had unified in their demand for change in order to prevent catastrophic climate change (Pester 2021).
- 8 May 2024
- Published by Taylor & Francis
- p. 109-118
Insights from social and behavioral sciences to motivate climate action
While biophysical sciences have provided us with ample evidence for what causes climate change and what needs to happen to mitigate its worst impacts, individuals and societies often lack the motivation to act. This chapter turns to social and behavioral sciences to identify a range of factors that we know can motivate action. These include psychological factors (e.g., affect, emotion, risk perception) that drive our individual decisions as well as group dynamics and cultural forces that shape our behavior (e.g., identity, trust). The chapter provides examples of where and how these insights have been used to communicate climate change or to influence policy.
- 8 May 2024
- Published by Taylor & Francis
- p. 109-118
Insights from social and behavioral sciences to motivate climate action
While biophysical sciences have provided us with ample evidence for what causes climate change and what needs to happen to mitigate its worst impacts, individuals and societies often lack the motivation to act. This chapter turns to social and behavioral sciences to identify a range of factors that we know can motivate action. These include psychological factors (e.g., affect, emotion, risk perception) that drive our individual decisions as well as group dynamics and cultural forces that shape our behavior (e.g., identity, trust). The chapter provides examples of where and how these insights have been used to communicate climate change or to influence policy.
- 8 May 2024
- Published by Taylor & Francis
Resolving the Climate Crisis
This book brings together a team of renowned social scientists to ask not why climate change is happening, but how we might learn from its human dimensions to raise public and political will to fight against the climate crisis. Despite efforts for mitigation, global emission levels continue to increase annually and the world’s wealthiest nations, including all of the G20 countries, have failed to meet their Paris Climate Goals. In the absence of political will, many have called for individuals to act on climate change by mitigating their own carbon footprint through having fewer children, driving less, using LED lightbulbs, or by becoming vegetarians. While compelling, individual lifestyle changes on this scale are unlikely to prevent climate disaster. Resolving the Climate Crisis presents informed solutions for social change that center human behavior and emotions, political systems, and societal structures. Across a series of concise and accessible chapters, authors explore potential solutions to climate change, addressing topics including Indigenous ecologies, LGBTQ+ community engagement, renewable energy technologies, and climate justice. Their expert engagement with the social and behavioural sciences makes this book not only an essential handbook of climate change solutions but also an innovative model for public-facing social science scholarship. Resolving the Climate Crisis will be an essential resource for students and researchers of climate change, as well as policy makers working to develop meaningful strategies for combatting the climate crisis.
- 8 May 2024
- Published by Taylor & Francis
Resolving the Climate Crisis
This book brings together a team of renowned social scientists to ask not why climate change is happening, but how we might learn from its human dimensions to raise public and political will to fight against the climate crisis. Despite efforts for mitigation, global emission levels continue to increase annually and the world’s wealthiest nations, including all of the G20 countries, have failed to meet their Paris Climate Goals. In the absence of political will, many have called for individuals to act on climate change by mitigating their own carbon footprint through having fewer children, driving less, using LED lightbulbs, or by becoming vegetarians. While compelling, individual lifestyle changes on this scale are unlikely to prevent climate disaster. Resolving the Climate Crisis presents informed solutions for social change that center human behavior and emotions, political systems, and societal structures. Across a series of concise and accessible chapters, authors explore potential solutions to climate change, addressing topics including Indigenous ecologies, LGBTQ+ community engagement, renewable energy technologies, and climate justice. Their expert engagement with the social and behavioural sciences makes this book not only an essential handbook of climate change solutions but also an innovative model for public-facing social science scholarship. Resolving the Climate Crisis will be an essential resource for students and researchers of climate change, as well as policy makers working to develop meaningful strategies for combatting the climate crisis.
- 28 April 2024
- Published by Edward Elgar Publishing
- p. 58-65
Climate change skepticism
This entry addresses climate change skepticism in the context of the United States. While climate scientists overwhelmingly agree that human actions contribute to climate change, roughly one-fifth of the American public remains skeptical about the phenomenon. Public skepticism, both in the form of doubt and denial, presents unique barriers to climate change communication as well as the enactment of effective climate change policy. This entry begins with an examination of how climate change skepticism has been defined and conceptualized by environmental social scientists. It then explores how the phenomenon has originated, how it prevails, and what social identities and ideologies shape and drive skepticism.
- 28 April 2024
- Published by Edward Elgar Publishing
- p. 58-65
Climate change skepticism
This entry addresses climate change skepticism in the context of the United States. While climate scientists overwhelmingly agree that human actions contribute to climate change, roughly one-fifth of the American public remains skeptical about the phenomenon. Public skepticism, both in the form of doubt and denial, presents unique barriers to climate change communication as well as the enactment of effective climate change policy. This entry begins with an examination of how climate change skepticism has been defined and conceptualized by environmental social scientists. It then explores how the phenomenon has originated, how it prevails, and what social identities and ideologies shape and drive skepticism.
- Open Access
- 20 March 2024
- Published by Center for Open Science in OSF Preprints
How Political Ideology and Media Shaped Vaccination Intention in the Early Stages of the COVID-19 Pandemic in the United States
As a pharmaceutical intervention, vaccines remain a major public health strategy for mitigating the effects of COVID-19. Yet, vaccine uptake has been affected by various cognitive and cultural factors. We examine how a selected set of factors (i.e., knowledge, concern, media, peer influence, and demographics) shaped COVID-19 vaccination intention in the early phase of the pandemic (Fall 2020). Using a survey conducted in three US states (Idaho, Texas, and Vermont) just prior to the roll out of the first vaccines against COVID-19, we find that COVID-19 concern was the primary driver of vaccination intention. Concern was shaped mainly by two factors: political ideology and media sources. Yet, ideology and media were much more important in affecting concern for those who leaned politically conservative, as opposed to those who leaned liberal or remained moderate. The results from our Structural Equation Models affirm that the information politically conservative respondents were receiving reinforced the effects of their ideology, leading to a greater reduction in their concern. We discuss the potential implications of these findings for future pandemic preparedness.
- 20 March 2024
- Published by Center for Open Science in OSF Preprints
Open AccessHow Political Ideology and Media Shaped Vaccination Intention in the Early Stages of the COVID-19 Pandemic in the United States
As a pharmaceutical intervention, vaccines remain a major public health strategy for mitigating the effects of COVID-19. Yet, vaccine uptake has been affected by various cognitive and cultural factors. We examine how a selected set of factors (i.e., knowledge, concern, media, peer influence, and demographics) shaped COVID-19 vaccination intention in the early phase of the pandemic (Fall 2020). Using a survey conducted in three US states (Idaho, Texas, and Vermont) just prior to the roll out of the first vaccines against COVID-19, we find that COVID-19 concern was the primary driver of vaccination intention. Concern was shaped mainly by two factors: political ideology and media sources. Yet, ideology and media were much more important in affecting concern for those who leaned politically conservative, as opposed to those who leaned liberal or remained moderate. The results from our Structural Equation Models affirm that the information politically conservative respondents were receiving reinforced the effects of their ideology, leading to a greater reduction in their concern. We discuss the potential implications of these findings for future pandemic preparedness.