Erwin Amann
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Previous Organizations / Institutes
The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years
Research Subjects
Research Interests
Erwin Amann has a total of 11 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
Wolfgang Leininger
2 shared publications- Alex Possajennikov
University of Nottingham, Nottingham, UK
1 shared publication Chun-Lei Yang
1 shared publication- Claudia Freimuth
University of Duisburg-Essen, Universitätsstr. 2, Essen 45141, Germany
1 shared publication Dalia Marin
1 shared publicationGeorg Winckler
Department of Economic, University of Vienna, Vienna, Austria
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- 23 April 2025
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 3-11
Einleitung
- 23 April 2025
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 213-243
Bayesianische Spiele – Mechanismus-Design
- 23 April 2025
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 13-34
Entscheidung unter Sicherheit
- 23 April 2025
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 263-268
Anhang A: Optimierung
- 23 April 2025
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 61-79
Wohlfahrtsanalyse und kollektive Entscheidung
- 23 April 2025
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 141-153
Externalitäten und öffentliche Güter
- 23 April 2025
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 245-262
Verhandlungstheorie
- 23 April 2025
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 35-57
Entscheidung unter Unsicherheit
- 23 April 2025
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 157-212
Spieltheorie – Strategische Entscheidung
- 26 September 2024
- Published by Walter de Gruyter GmbH in Zeitschrift für Wirtschaftspolitik
Gewerkschaften und Streiks aus einer ökonomisch-spieltheoretischen Perspektive
Strikes can sometimes place a significant burden on affected third parties, particularly when they last for a long time, cannot be planned and affect many people or companies. This raises the question of the extent to which the effective conduct of strikes is necessary to enforce fair collective agreements or whether they could be avoided. The following discussion addresses this question from a game theoretic perspective.
- 26 September 2024
- Published by Walter de Gruyter GmbH in Zeitschrift für Wirtschaftspolitik
Gewerkschaften und Streiks aus einer ökonomisch-spieltheoretischen Perspektive
Strikes can sometimes place a significant burden on affected third parties, particularly when they last for a long time, cannot be planned and affect many people or companies. This raises the question of the extent to which the effective conduct of strikes is necessary to enforce fair collective agreements or whether they could be avoided. The following discussion addresses this question from a game theoretic perspective.