SAShani Alkoby

Shani Alkoby

*This is an algorithmically generated author record based on publicly available information.

Current Organizations / Institutes

The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article

Previous Organizations / Institutes

The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years


Shani Alkoby has a total of 18 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:


Latest Publications

  • Open Access

    Structuring privacy policy: an AI approach

    by Shani Alkoby, Ron S. Hirschprung

    Introduction: Privacy has become a significant concern in the digital world, especially concerning the personal data collected by websites and other service providers on the World Wide Web network. One of the significant approaches to enable the individual to control privacy is the privacy policy document, which contains vital information on this matter. Publishing a privacy policy is required by regulation in most Western countries. However, the privacy policy document is a natural free text-based object, usually phrased in a legal language, and rapidly changes, making it consequently relatively hard to understand and almost always neglected by humans. Methods: This research proposes a novel methodology to receive an unstructured privacy policy text and automatically structure it into predefined parameters. The methodology is based on a two-layer artificial intelligence (AI) process. Results: In an empirical study that included 49 actual privacy policies from different websites, we demonstrated an average F1-score > 0.8 where five of six parameters achieved a very high classification accuracy. Discussion: This methodology can serve both humans and AI agents by addressing issues such as cognitive burden, non-standard formalizations, cognitive laziness, and the dynamics of the document across a timeline, which deters the use of the privacy policy as a resource. The study addresses a critical gap between the present regulations, aiming at enhancing privacy, and the abilities of humans to benefit from the mandatory published privacy policy.


  • Open Access

    Evaluating the Novelty of Information

    by Benji Eliav Azaria, Ron S. Hirschprung, Shani Alkoby

    In today's digital space, vast amounts of information circulate, including propositions about individuals. While most research examines whether a proposition is true or false, this study focused on novelty, the extent to which a proposition introduces new information into the public sphere. Treating novelty as a distinct preliminary layer can improve sensitivity evaluation and enhance privacy-protective systems by identifying new, potentially harmful disclosures. This work presents a fully automated seven-step pipeline that combines web search, text extraction, and semantic similarity using Sentence Bidirectional Encoder Representations from Transformers to evaluate novelty. Negated propositions were assessed based on the novelty of their underlying issue rather than the literal negation. To test the approach, a dataset of 54 propositions was constructed, evenly split between previously known and newly fabricated statements. The method achieved 96.3% accuracy, with perfect precision for detecting novel claims and strong performance on known ones.

  • Open Access

    Enhancing User Acceptance of an AI Agent’s Recommendation in Information-Sharing Environments

    by Rebecca Kehat, Ron S. Hirschprung, Shani Alkoby

    Information sharing (IS) occurs in almost every action daily. IS holds benefits for its users, but it is also a source of privacy violations and costs. Human users struggle to balance this trade-off. This reality calls for Artificial Intelligence (AI)-based agent assistance that surpasses humans’ bottom-line utility, as shown in previous research. However, convincing an individual to follow an AI agent’s recommendation is not trivial; therefore, this research’s goal is establishing trust in machines. Based on the Design of Experiments (DOE) approach, we developed a methodology that optimizes the user interface (UI) with a target function of maximizing the acceptance of the AI agent’s recommendation. To empirically demonstrate our methodology, we conducted an experiment with eight UI factors and n = 64 human participants, acting in a Facebook simulator environment, and accompanied by an AI agent assistant. We show how the methodology can be applied to enhance AI agent user acceptance on IS platforms by selecting the proper UI. Additionally, due to its versatility, this approach has the potential to optimize user acceptance in multiple domains as well.


  • Open Access

    Optimizing User Acceptance of AI Agents in Information-Sharing Environments

    by Rebecca Kehat, Ron Hirschprung, Shani Alkoby

    Information-sharing (IS) occurs in almost every action of our daily life. IS holds benefits for its users, but it is also a source of privacy violations. Human users struggle to balance this trade-off between the potential benefits and the resulting costs. This reality calls for Artificial-Intelligence (AI)-based agent assistance that surpasses humans’ bottom-line utility, as shown in previous research. However, convincing an individual to follow an AI agent’s recommendation is not trivial; therefore, the current research goal is establishing trust in the machine. To this end, based on the Design of Experiments (DOE) approach, we developed a methodology that optimizes the user-interface (UI) with a target function of maximizing the AI agent recommendation acceptance. To empirically demonstrate our methodology, we conducted an experiment with eight UI factors and (n=64) human participants acting in a Facebook simulator environment accompanied by an AI-agent assistant. Based on the results, we showed how the methodology can be implemented to optimize the agent’s users’ acceptance. Finally, while our methodology was tested empirically on an IS platform, it could be applied straightforwardly in other domains.

  • Open Access

    On the Reality of Signaling in Auctions

    by Aviad Levi, Shani Alkoby

    Over the last two decades, auctions have become an integral part of e-commerce and a promising field for applying artificial intelligence technologies. The use of signals has been studied extensively in the existing auction literature. Specifically, it has been shown that when an external strategic entity (such as an information broker) is present, it can be beneficial to use signaling as a preliminary step before offering to sell information. However, these results apply only in cases where all auction participants are completely rational agents. However, in many real-life scenarios some of the participants are humans, and hence are easily affected by external factors, i.e., their rationality is bounded. In this paper, we offer a thorough investigation of a case in which the prospective information buyer is a human auctioneer. Using a set of MTurk-based experiments with people, we tested 10,000 independent auctions with diverse characteristics, and were able to identify a varied set of practical insights regarding human behavior. Real-life strategic information brokers could potentially use these insights to achieve a better understanding of how humans operate, paving the way for optimizing the benefit obtainable from the information they own.


  • Open Access

    A Game Theory Approach for Assisting Humans in Online Information-Sharing

    by Ron S. Hirschprung, Shani Alkoby

    Contemporary information-sharing environments such as Facebook offer a wide range of social and practical benefits. These environments, however, may also lead to privacy and security violations. Moreover, there is usually a trade-off between the benefits gained and the accompanying costs. Due to the uncertain nature of the information-sharing environment and the lack of technological literacy, the layperson user often fails miserably in balancing this trade-off. In this paper, we use game theory concepts to formally model this problem as a “game”, in which the players are the users and the pay-off function is a combination of the benefits and costs of the information-sharing process. We introduce a novel theoretical framework called Online Information-Sharing Assistance (OISA) to evaluate the interactive nature of the information-sharing trade-off problem. Using these theoretical foundations, we develop a set of AI agents that attempt to calculate a strategy for balancing this trade-off. Finally, as a proof of concept, we conduct an empirical study in a simulated Facebook environment in which human participants compete against OISA-based AI agents, showing that significantly higher utility can be achieved using OISA.


  • Open Access

    Obtaining costly unverifiable valuations from a single agent

    by Erel Segal-Halevi, Shani Alkoby, David Sarne


  • Strategic Signaling for Selling Information Goods

    by Shani Alkoby, David Sarne, Igal Milchtaich

    This paper studies the benefit in using signaling by an information seller holding information that can completely disambiguate some uncertainty concerning the state of the world for the information buyer. We show that a necessary condition for having the information seller benefit from signaling in this model is having some ``seed of truth" in the signaling scheme used. We then introduce two natural signaling mechanisms that adhere to this condition, one where the seller pre-commits to the signaling scheme to be used and the other where she commits to use a signaling scheme that contains a ``seed of truth". Finally, we analyze the equilibrium resulting from each and show that, somehow counter-intuitively, despite the inherent differences between the two mechanisms, they are equivalent in the sense that for any equilibrium associated with the maximum revenue in one there is an equilibrium offering the seller the same revenue in the other.


  • Ad Hoc Teamwork With Behavior Switching Agents

    by Manish Ravula, Shani Alkoby, Peter Stone

    As autonomous AI agents proliferate in the real world, they will increasingly need to cooperate with each other to achieve complex goals without always being able to coordinate in advance. This kind of cooperation, in which agents have to learn to cooperate on the fly, is called ad hoc teamwork. Many previous works investigating this setting assumed that teammates behave according to one of many predefined types that is fixed throughout the task. This assumption of stationarity in behaviors, is a strong assumption which cannot be guaranteed in many real-world settings. In this work, we relax this assumption and investigate settings in which teammates can change their types during the course of the task. This adds complexity to the planning problem as now an agent needs to recognize that a change has occurred in addition to figuring out what is the new type of the teammate it is interacting with. In this paper, we present a novel Convolutional-Neural-Network-based Change point Detection (CPD) algorithm for ad hoc teamwork. When evaluating our algorithm on the modified predator prey domain, we find that it outperforms existing Bayesian CPD algorithms.


  • Open Access

    Making Money from What You Know - How to Sell Information?

    by Shani Alkoby, Zihe Wang, David Sarne, Pingzhong Tang

    Information plays a key role in many decision situations. The rapid advancement in communication technologies makes information providers more accessible, and various information providing platforms can be found nowadays, most of which are strategic in the sense that their goal is to maximize the providers’ expected profit. In this paper, we consider the common problem of a strategic information provider offering prospective buyers information which can disambiguate uncertainties the buyers have, which can be valuable for their decision making. Unlike prior work, we do not limit the information provider’s strategy to price setting but rather enable her flexibility over the way information is sold, specifically enabling querying about specific outcomes and the elimination of a subset of non-true world states alongside the traditional approach of disclosing the true world state. We prove that for the case where the buyer is self-interested (and the information provider does not know the true world state beforehand) all three methods (i.e., disclosing the true worldstate value, offering to check a specific value, and eliminating a random value) are equivalent, yielding the same expected profit to the information provider. For the case where buyers are human subjects, using an extensive set of experiments we show that the methods result in substantially different outcomes. Furthermore, using standard machine learning techniques the information provider can rather accurately predict the performance of the different methods for new problem settings, hence substantially increase profit.