Siddharth Barman
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Research Subjects
Research Interests
Siddharth Barman has a total of 17 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Adam Wierman
California Institute of Technology, Pasadena, California, United States
3 shared publications - Katrina Ligett
Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Jerusalem, Israel
3 shared publications - Umang Bhaskar
Center for the Mathematics of Information California Institute of Technology
3 shared publications - Federico Echenique
Department of Economics UC Berkeley
2 shared publications - Yakov Babichenko
Center for the Mathematics of Information California Institute of Technology
2 shared publications - Adam Meyerson
Swinburne University of Technology † California Institute of Technology ‡ Google, Inc
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- 10 December 2015
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 285-296
Approximating Nash Equilibria in Tree Polymatrix Games
- 10 December 2015
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 285-296
Approximating Nash Equilibria in Tree Polymatrix Games
- Open Access
A Tale of Two Metrics: Simultaneous Bounds on Competitiveness and Regret
We consider algorithms for "smoothed online convex optimization" problems, a variant of the class of online convex optimization problems that is strongly related to metrical task systems. Prior literature on these problems has focused on two performance metrics: regret and the competitive ratio. There exist known algorithms with sublinear regret and known algorithms with constant competitive ratios; however, no known algorithm achieves both simultaneously. We show that this is due to a fundamental incompatibility between these two metrics - no algorithm (deterministic or randomized) can achieve sublinear regret and a constant competitive ratio, even in the case when the objective functions are linear. However, we also exhibit an algorithm that, for the important special case of one-dimensional decision spaces, provides sublinear regret while maintaining a competitive ratio that grows arbitrarily slowly.
Open AccessA Tale of Two Metrics: Simultaneous Bounds on Competitiveness and Regret
We consider algorithms for "smoothed online convex optimization" problems, a variant of the class of online convex optimization problems that is strongly related to metrical task systems. Prior literature on these problems has focused on two performance metrics: regret and the competitive ratio. There exist known algorithms with sublinear regret and known algorithms with constant competitive ratios; however, no known algorithm achieves both simultaneously. We show that this is due to a fundamental incompatibility between these two metrics - no algorithm (deterministic or randomized) can achieve sublinear regret and a constant competitive ratio, even in the case when the objective functions are linear. However, we also exhibit an algorithm that, for the important special case of one-dimensional decision spaces, provides sublinear regret while maintaining a competitive ratio that grows arbitrarily slowly.
- Open Access
Computing Optimal Tolls in Routing Games without Knowing the Latency Functions
We consider the following question: in a nonatomic routing game, can the tolls that induce the minimum latency flow be computed without knowing the latency functions? Since the latency functions are unknown, we assume we are given an oracle that has access to the underlying routing game. A query to the oracle consists of tolls on edges, and the response is the resulting equilibrium flow. We show that in this model, it is impossible to obtain optimal tolls. However, if we augment the oracle so that it returns the total latency of the equilibrium flow induced by the tolls in addition to the flow itself, then the required tolls can be computed with a polynomial number of queries.
Open AccessComputing Optimal Tolls in Routing Games without Knowing the Latency Functions
We consider the following question: in a nonatomic routing game, can the tolls that induce the minimum latency flow be computed without knowing the latency functions? Since the latency functions are unknown, we assume we are given an oracle that has access to the underlying routing game. A query to the oracle consists of tolls on edges, and the response is the resulting equilibrium flow. We show that in this model, it is impossible to obtain optimal tolls. However, if we augment the oracle so that it returns the total latency of the equilibrium flow induced by the tolls in addition to the flow itself, then the required tolls can be computed with a polynomial number of queries.
- Open Access
Finding Any Nontrivial Coarse Correlated Equilibrium Is Hard
One of the most appealing aspects of the (coarse) correlated equilibrium concept is that natural dynamics quickly arrive at approximations of such equilibria, even in games with many players. In addition, there exist polynomial-time algorithms that compute exact (coarse) correlated equilibria. In light of these results, a natural question is how good are the (coarse) correlated equilibria that can arise from any efficient algorithm or dynamics. In this paper we address this question, and establish strong negative results. In particular, we show that in multiplayer games that have a succinct representation, it is NP-hard to compute any coarse correlated equilibrium (or approximate coarse correlated equilibrium) with welfare strictly better than the worst possible. The focus on succinct games ensures that the underlying complexity question is interesting; many multiplayer games of interest are in fact succinct. Our results imply that, while one can efficiently compute a coarse correlated equilibrium, one cannot provide any nontrivial welfare guarantee for the resulting equilibrium, unless P=NP. We show that analogous hardness results hold for correlated equilibria, and persist under the egalitarian objective or Pareto optimality. To complement the hardness results, we develop an algorithmic framework that identifies settings in which we can efficiently compute an approximate correlated equilibrium with near-optimal welfare. We use this framework to develop an efficient algorithm for computing an approximate correlated equilibrium with near-optimal welfare in aggregative games.
Open AccessFinding Any Nontrivial Coarse Correlated Equilibrium Is Hard
One of the most appealing aspects of the (coarse) correlated equilibrium concept is that natural dynamics quickly arrive at approximations of such equilibria, even in games with many players. In addition, there exist polynomial-time algorithms that compute exact (coarse) correlated equilibria. In light of these results, a natural question is how good are the (coarse) correlated equilibria that can arise from any efficient algorithm or dynamics. In this paper we address this question, and establish strong negative results. In particular, we show that in multiplayer games that have a succinct representation, it is NP-hard to compute any coarse correlated equilibrium (or approximate coarse correlated equilibrium) with welfare strictly better than the worst possible. The focus on succinct games ensures that the underlying complexity question is interesting; many multiplayer games of interest are in fact succinct. Our results imply that, while one can efficiently compute a coarse correlated equilibrium, one cannot provide any nontrivial welfare guarantee for the resulting equilibrium, unless P=NP. We show that analogous hardness results hold for correlated equilibria, and persist under the egalitarian objective or Pareto optimality. To complement the hardness results, we develop an algorithmic framework that identifies settings in which we can efficiently compute an approximate correlated equilibrium with near-optimal welfare. We use this framework to develop an efficient algorithm for computing an approximate correlated equilibrium with near-optimal welfare in aggregative games.
- Open Access
Approximating Nash Equilibria and Dense Subgraphs via an Approximate Version of Carathéodory's Theorem
We present algorithmic applications of an approximate version of Carath\'{e}odory's theorem. The theorem states that given a set of vectors $X$ in $\mathbb{R}^d$, for every vector in the convex hull of $X$ there exists an $\varepsilon$-close (under the $p$-norm distance, for $2\leq p < \infty$) vector that can be expressed as a convex combination of at most $b$ vectors of $X$, where the bound $b$ depends on $\varepsilon$ and the norm $p$ and is independent of the dimension $d$. This theorem can be derived by instantiating Maurey's lemma, early references to which can be found in the work of Pisier (1981) and Carl (1985). However, in this paper we present a self-contained proof of this result. Using this theorem we establish that in a bimatrix game with $ n \times n$ payoff matrices $A, B$, if the number of non-zero entries in any column of $A+B$ is at most $s$ then an $\varepsilon$-Nash equilibrium of the game can be computed in time $n^{O\left(\frac{\log s }{\varepsilon^2}\right)}$. This, in particular, gives us a polynomial-time approximation scheme for Nash equilibrium in games with fixed column sparsity $s$. Moreover, for arbitrary bimatrix games---since $s$ can be at most $n$---the running time of our algorithm matches the best-known upper bound, which was obtained by Lipton, Markakis, and Mehta (2003). The approximate Carath\'{e}odory's theorem also leads to an additive approximation algorithm for the normalized densest $k$-subgraph problem. Given a graph with $n$ vertices and maximum degree $d$, the developed algorithm determines a subgraph with exactly $k$ vertices with normalized density within $\varepsilon$ (in the additive sense) of the optimal in time $n^{O\left( \frac{\log d}{\varepsilon^2}\right)}$. Additionally, we show that a similar approximation result can be achieved for the problem of finding a $k \times k$-bipartite subgraph of maximum normalized density.Open AccessApproximating Nash Equilibria and Dense Subgraphs via an Approximate Version of Carathéodory's Theorem
We present algorithmic applications of an approximate version of Carath\'{e}odory's theorem. The theorem states that given a set of vectors $X$ in $\mathbb{R}^d$, for every vector in the convex hull of $X$ there exists an $\varepsilon$-close (under the $p$-norm distance, for $2\leq p < \infty$) vector that can be expressed as a convex combination of at most $b$ vectors of $X$, where the bound $b$ depends on $\varepsilon$ and the norm $p$ and is independent of the dimension $d$. This theorem can be derived by instantiating Maurey's lemma, early references to which can be found in the work of Pisier (1981) and Carl (1985). However, in this paper we present a self-contained proof of this result. Using this theorem we establish that in a bimatrix game with $ n \times n$ payoff matrices $A, B$, if the number of non-zero entries in any column of $A+B$ is at most $s$ then an $\varepsilon$-Nash equilibrium of the game can be computed in time $n^{O\left(\frac{\log s }{\varepsilon^2}\right)}$. This, in particular, gives us a polynomial-time approximation scheme for Nash equilibrium in games with fixed column sparsity $s$. Moreover, for arbitrary bimatrix games---since $s$ can be at most $n$---the running time of our algorithm matches the best-known upper bound, which was obtained by Lipton, Markakis, and Mehta (2003). The approximate Carath\'{e}odory's theorem also leads to an additive approximation algorithm for the normalized densest $k$-subgraph problem. Given a graph with $n$ vertices and maximum degree $d$, the developed algorithm determines a subgraph with exactly $k$ vertices with normalized density within $\varepsilon$ (in the additive sense) of the optimal in time $n^{O\left( \frac{\log d}{\varepsilon^2}\right)}$. Additionally, we show that a similar approximation result can be achieved for the problem of finding a $k \times k$-bipartite subgraph of maximum normalized density. - Open Access
On the Existence of Low-Rank Explanations for Mixed Strategy Behavior
Nash equilibrium is used as a model to explain the observed behavior of players in strategic settings. For example, in many empirical applications we observe player behavior, and the problem is to determine if there exist payoffs for the players for which the equilibrium corresponds to observed player behavior. Computational complexity of Nash equilibria is an important consideration in this framework. If the instance of the model that explains observed player behavior requires players to have solved a computationally hard problem, then the explanation provided is questionable. In this paper we provide conditions under which Nash equilibrium is a reasonable explanation for strategic behavior, i.e., conditions under which observed behavior of players can be explained by games in which Nash equilibria are easy to compute. We identify three structural conditions and show that if the data set of observed behavior satisfies any of these conditions, then it is consistent with payoff matrices for which the observed Nash equilibria could have been computed efficiently. Our conditions admit large and structurally complex data sets of observed behavior, showing that even with complexity considerations, Nash equilibrium is often a reasonable model.
Open AccessOn the Existence of Low-Rank Explanations for Mixed Strategy Behavior
Nash equilibrium is used as a model to explain the observed behavior of players in strategic settings. For example, in many empirical applications we observe player behavior, and the problem is to determine if there exist payoffs for the players for which the equilibrium corresponds to observed player behavior. Computational complexity of Nash equilibria is an important consideration in this framework. If the instance of the model that explains observed player behavior requires players to have solved a computationally hard problem, then the explanation provided is questionable. In this paper we provide conditions under which Nash equilibrium is a reasonable explanation for strategic behavior, i.e., conditions under which observed behavior of players can be explained by games in which Nash equilibria are easy to compute. We identify three structural conditions and show that if the data set of observed behavior satisfies any of these conditions, then it is consistent with payoff matrices for which the observed Nash equilibria could have been computed efficiently. Our conditions admit large and structurally complex data sets of observed behavior, showing that even with complexity considerations, Nash equilibrium is often a reasonable model.
- Open Access
On Load Shedding in Complex Event Processing
Complex Event Processing (CEP) is a stream processing model that focuses on detecting event patterns in continuous event streams. While the CEP model has gained popularity in the research communities and commercial technologies, the problem of gracefully degrading performance under heavy load in the presence of resource constraints, or load shedding, has been largely overlooked. CEP is similar to "classical" stream data management, but addresses a substantially different class of queries. This unfortunately renders the load shedding algorithms developed for stream data processing inapplicable. In this paper we study CEP load shedding under various resource constraints. We formalize broad classes of CEP load-shedding scenarios as different optimization problems. We demonstrate an array of complexity results that reveal the hardness of these problems and construct shedding algorithms with performance guarantees. Our results shed some light on the difficulty of developing load-shedding algorithms that maximize utility.
Open AccessOn Load Shedding in Complex Event Processing
Complex Event Processing (CEP) is a stream processing model that focuses on detecting event patterns in continuous event streams. While the CEP model has gained popularity in the research communities and commercial technologies, the problem of gracefully degrading performance under heavy load in the presence of resource constraints, or load shedding, has been largely overlooked. CEP is similar to "classical" stream data management, but addresses a substantially different class of queries. This unfortunately renders the load shedding algorithms developed for stream data processing inapplicable. In this paper we study CEP load shedding under various resource constraints. We formalize broad classes of CEP load-shedding scenarios as different optimization problems. We demonstrate an array of complexity results that reveal the hardness of these problems and construct shedding algorithms with performance guarantees. Our results shed some light on the difficulty of developing load-shedding algorithms that maximize utility.
- Open Access
Decomposition Methods for Large Scale LP Decoding
When binary linear error-correcting codes are used over symmetric channels, a relaxed version of the maximum likelihood decoding problem can be stated as a linear program (LP). This LP decoder can be used to decode error-correcting codes at bit-error-rates comparable to state-of-the-art belief propagation (BP) decoders, but with significantly stronger theoretical guarantees. However, LP decoding when implemented with standard LP solvers does not easily scale to the block lengths of modern error correcting codes. In this paper we draw on decomposition methods from optimization theory, specifically the Alternating Directions Method of Multipliers (ADMM), to develop efficient distributed algorithms for LP decoding. The key enabling technical result is a "two-slice" characterization of the geometry of the parity polytope, which is the convex hull of all codewords of a single parity check code. This new characterization simplifies the representation of points in the polytope. Using this simplification, we develop an efficient algorithm for Euclidean norm projection onto the parity polytope. This projection is required by ADMM and allows us to use LP decoding, with all its theoretical guarantees, to decode large-scale error correcting codes efficiently. We present numerical results for LDPC codes of lengths more than 1000. The waterfall region of LP decoding is seen to initiate at a slightly higher signal-to-noise ratio than for sum-product BP, however an error floor is not observed for LP decoding, which is not the case for BP. Our implementation of LP decoding using ADMM executes as fast as our baseline sum-product BP decoder, is fully parallelizable, and can be seen to implement a type of message-passing with a particularly simple schedule.
Open AccessDecomposition Methods for Large Scale LP Decoding
When binary linear error-correcting codes are used over symmetric channels, a relaxed version of the maximum likelihood decoding problem can be stated as a linear program (LP). This LP decoder can be used to decode error-correcting codes at bit-error-rates comparable to state-of-the-art belief propagation (BP) decoders, but with significantly stronger theoretical guarantees. However, LP decoding when implemented with standard LP solvers does not easily scale to the block lengths of modern error correcting codes. In this paper we draw on decomposition methods from optimization theory, specifically the Alternating Directions Method of Multipliers (ADMM), to develop efficient distributed algorithms for LP decoding. The key enabling technical result is a "two-slice" characterization of the geometry of the parity polytope, which is the convex hull of all codewords of a single parity check code. This new characterization simplifies the representation of points in the polytope. Using this simplification, we develop an efficient algorithm for Euclidean norm projection onto the parity polytope. This projection is required by ADMM and allows us to use LP decoding, with all its theoretical guarantees, to decode large-scale error correcting codes efficiently. We present numerical results for LDPC codes of lengths more than 1000. The waterfall region of LP decoding is seen to initiate at a slightly higher signal-to-noise ratio than for sum-product BP, however an error floor is not observed for LP decoding, which is not the case for BP. Our implementation of LP decoding using ADMM executes as fast as our baseline sum-product BP decoder, is fully parallelizable, and can be seen to implement a type of message-passing with a particularly simple schedule.
- Open Access
Small-Support Approximate Correlated Equilibria
We prove the existence of approximate correlated equilibrium of support size polylogarithmic in the number of players and the number of actions per player. In particular, using the probabilistic method, we show that there exists a multiset of polylogarithmic size such that the uniform distribution over this multiset forms an approximate correlated equilibrium. Along similar lines, we establish the existence of approximate coarse correlated equilibrium with logarithmic support. We complement these results by considering the computational complexity of determining small-support approximate equilibria. We show that random sampling can be used to efficiently determine an approximate coarse correlated equilibrium with logarithmic support. But, such a tight result does not hold for correlated equilibrium, i.e., sampling might generate an approximate correlated equilibrium of support size \Omega(m) where m is the number of actions per player. Finally, we show that finding an exact correlated equilibrium with smallest possible support is NP-hard under Cook reductions, even in the case of two-player zero-sum games.
Open AccessSmall-Support Approximate Correlated Equilibria
We prove the existence of approximate correlated equilibrium of support size polylogarithmic in the number of players and the number of actions per player. In particular, using the probabilistic method, we show that there exists a multiset of polylogarithmic size such that the uniform distribution over this multiset forms an approximate correlated equilibrium. Along similar lines, we establish the existence of approximate coarse correlated equilibrium with logarithmic support. We complement these results by considering the computational complexity of determining small-support approximate equilibria. We show that random sampling can be used to efficiently determine an approximate coarse correlated equilibrium with logarithmic support. But, such a tight result does not hold for correlated equilibrium, i.e., sampling might generate an approximate correlated equilibrium of support size \Omega(m) where m is the number of actions per player. Finally, we show that finding an exact correlated equilibrium with smallest possible support is NP-hard under Cook reductions, even in the case of two-player zero-sum games.
- Open Access
Query Complexity of Correlated Equilibrium
We study lower bounds on the query complexity of determining correlated equilibrium. In particular, we consider a query model in which an n-player game is specified via a black box that returns players' utilities at pure action profiles. In this model we establish that in order to compute a correlated equilibrium any deterministic algorithm must query the black box an exponential (in n) number of times.
Open AccessQuery Complexity of Correlated Equilibrium
We study lower bounds on the query complexity of determining correlated equilibrium. In particular, we consider a query model in which an n-player game is specified via a black box that returns players' utilities at pure action profiles. In this model we establish that in order to compute a correlated equilibrium any deterministic algorithm must query the black box an exponential (in n) number of times.