Robert Harmel
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Research Subjects
Robert Harmel has a total of 11 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Yao-Yuan Yeh
Department of International Studies & Modern Languages University of St. Thomas Houston Texas USA
7 shared publications Chen Shen
Department of Political Science Texas A&M University College Station Texas USA
3 shared publicationsAlexander C Tan
University of Canterbury, New Zealand
2 shared publicationsHilmar Mjelde
Department of Pedagogy, Religion and Social Studies Western Norway University of Applied Sciences Bergen Norway
2 shared publicationsLars Svåsand
Department of Comparative Politics University of Bergen Bergen Norway
2 shared publicationsZhaoqing Li
Department of Political Science Texas A&M University College Station Texas USA
2 shared publications
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 18 February 2026
- Published by Wiley in Social Science Quarterly
- Vol. 107 (2)
Life‐Cycle and Generational Influences on Chinese Political Behavior and Attitudes: Age Matters, and so Does Context
Objective: This article aims to revisit the relative importance of age versus generation in explaining differences of political behavior and attitudes across age cohorts in China, assess the impact of contextual changes affecting multiple age groups, and identify special characteristics of attitudes and behavior of Generation Z. Method: Analysis of differences among age cohorts using survey data for 2019 and differences for each cohort between 2008 and 2019 using two nationwide surveys. Results: Findings suggest (1) roles for both age and generation in explaining differences among cohorts, (2) special features of Gen Z as compared to older generations, and (3) roles of contextual factors (period effects) in affecting change across multiple generations. Conclusion: Not only does age influence political behavior and attitudes in authoritarian China but so does context, both later in life and particularly during formative years. When taking age, generation, and period effects into account, there is no single explanation that applies to all types of attitude and behavior.
- 18 February 2026
- Published by Wiley in Social Science Quarterly
- Vol. 107 (2)
Open AccessLife‐Cycle and Generational Influences on Chinese Political Behavior and Attitudes: Age Matters, and so Does Context
Objective: This article aims to revisit the relative importance of age versus generation in explaining differences of political behavior and attitudes across age cohorts in China, assess the impact of contextual changes affecting multiple age groups, and identify special characteristics of attitudes and behavior of Generation Z. Method: Analysis of differences among age cohorts using survey data for 2019 and differences for each cohort between 2008 and 2019 using two nationwide surveys. Results: Findings suggest (1) roles for both age and generation in explaining differences among cohorts, (2) special features of Gen Z as compared to older generations, and (3) roles of contextual factors (period effects) in affecting change across multiple generations. Conclusion: Not only does age influence political behavior and attitudes in authoritarian China but so does context, both later in life and particularly during formative years. When taking age, generation, and period effects into account, there is no single explanation that applies to all types of attitude and behavior.
- Open Access
- 12 September 2024
- Published by Wiley in Social Science Quarterly
Monolithic Chinese political culture?: A cross‐regional exploration
Objective: This article explores whether authoritarian China has a monolithic political culture, or rather a set of somewhat different political cultures across a number of regions.Method: On the basis of several criteria we deem particularly important for identifying regions within which development, communication, and socialization of political attitudes are likely to be internally common but distinguishable from those of other regions, we divide China into six such regions. We then employ a combination of eight attitudinal measures from The China Survey of 2008 which are directly relevant to discerning political culture.Results: We find that there are indeed substantively different cultures across regions, some of which are more consistent with elite preferences than others.Conclusion: From our initial foray into possible explanation, we conclude that politico‐historical legacy—sometimes in interaction with certain aspects of geographic, demographic, and economic characteristics—may go furthest in explaining the cross‐region cultural differences.
- 12 September 2024
- Published by Wiley in Social Science Quarterly
Open AccessMonolithic Chinese political culture?: A cross‐regional exploration
Objective: This article explores whether authoritarian China has a monolithic political culture, or rather a set of somewhat different political cultures across a number of regions.Method: On the basis of several criteria we deem particularly important for identifying regions within which development, communication, and socialization of political attitudes are likely to be internally common but distinguishable from those of other regions, we divide China into six such regions. We then employ a combination of eight attitudinal measures from The China Survey of 2008 which are directly relevant to discerning political culture.Results: We find that there are indeed substantively different cultures across regions, some of which are more consistent with elite preferences than others.Conclusion: From our initial foray into possible explanation, we conclude that politico‐historical legacy—sometimes in interaction with certain aspects of geographic, demographic, and economic characteristics—may go furthest in explaining the cross‐region cultural differences.
- Open Access
- 15 April 2024
- Published by Wiley in Social Science Quarterly
- Vol. 105 (3) , 399-402
Personalization and de‐institutionalization: Our common conceptual framework
- 15 April 2024
- Published by Wiley in Social Science Quarterly
- Vol. 105 (3) , 399-402
Open AccessPersonalization and de‐institutionalization: Our common conceptual framework
- Open Access
- 21 February 2024
- Published by Wiley in Social Science Quarterly
- Vol. 105 (3) , 403-431
The Trumpization of the Grand Old Party
Background: The purposes of this article are to (1) detail the extent to which the Republican Party personalized in the period from Donald Trump's first becoming a presidential candidate through 2022 and the process by which it occurred, (2) suggest plausible explanatory factors, and (3) speculate as to possible consequences.Methods: The authors employ this special issue's common conceptual framework and glean evidence from a broad accumulation of reportage and expert impressions from professional journalists.Results and conclusion: It is found that “Trumpization” invaded all aspects of the Grand Old Party, with de‐institutionalization encompassing both de‐routinization and value‐displacement affecting all faces of the party: as organization, in elective office, and in the electorate.
- 21 February 2024
- Published by Wiley in Social Science Quarterly
- Vol. 105 (3) , 403-431
Open AccessThe Trumpization of the Grand Old Party
Background: The purposes of this article are to (1) detail the extent to which the Republican Party personalized in the period from Donald Trump's first becoming a presidential candidate through 2022 and the process by which it occurred, (2) suggest plausible explanatory factors, and (3) speculate as to possible consequences.Methods: The authors employ this special issue's common conceptual framework and glean evidence from a broad accumulation of reportage and expert impressions from professional journalists.Results and conclusion: It is found that “Trumpization” invaded all aspects of the Grand Old Party, with de‐institutionalization encompassing both de‐routinization and value‐displacement affecting all faces of the party: as organization, in elective office, and in the electorate.
- Open Access
- 20 February 2024
- Published by Wiley in Social Science Quarterly
- Vol. 105 (3) , 432-443
The party of Reagan: External (but not internal) personalization
Objective: The purpose of this article is to assess whether the relationship that existed between Ronald Reagan and the Republican Party could reasonably be characterized as one of personalization/de‐institutionalization of the party.1Methods: The authors employ the common conceptual framework developed for this special issue. Evidence is drawn from both popular journalism and scholarly sources.Results and Conclusion: While bits of evidence exist for personalization, especially with regard to the external dimension, the collective evidence stops short of what is required to be considered de‐institutionalization of the party.
- 20 February 2024
- Published by Wiley in Social Science Quarterly
- Vol. 105 (3) , 432-443
Open AccessThe party of Reagan: External (but not internal) personalization
Objective: The purpose of this article is to assess whether the relationship that existed between Ronald Reagan and the Republican Party could reasonably be characterized as one of personalization/de‐institutionalization of the party.1Methods: The authors employ the common conceptual framework developed for this special issue. Evidence is drawn from both popular journalism and scholarly sources.Results and Conclusion: While bits of evidence exist for personalization, especially with regard to the external dimension, the collective evidence stops short of what is required to be considered de‐institutionalization of the party.
- 28 April 2022
- Published by Wiley in Social Science Quarterly
- Vol. 103 (3) , 670-685
Understanding Chinese nationalism: Does location matter?
Objective: The purpose of this research is to explore whether the location of a citizen's residence is an important source of explanation for nationalistic attitudes in China.Methods: Using data from a nationwide representative survey of Chinese adults and a multidimensional approach to nationalism, analyses include bivariate correlation and multiple regression.Results: Significant support is found for 12 of 16 hypotheses linking “location variables” to specific types of nationalistic attitudes, even when modeling with a substantial set of controls. The hypothesis‐supporting evidence touches on three of the four dimensions of nationalism covered here.Conclusion: In regard to the development of nationalistic attitudes in China, location matters.
- 28 April 2022
- Published by Wiley in Social Science Quarterly
- Vol. 103 (3) , 670-685
Understanding Chinese nationalism: Does location matter?
Objective: The purpose of this research is to explore whether the location of a citizen's residence is an important source of explanation for nationalistic attitudes in China.Methods: Using data from a nationwide representative survey of Chinese adults and a multidimensional approach to nationalism, analyses include bivariate correlation and multiple regression.Results: Significant support is found for 12 of 16 hypotheses linking “location variables” to specific types of nationalistic attitudes, even when modeling with a substantial set of controls. The hypothesis‐supporting evidence touches on three of the four dimensions of nationalism covered here.Conclusion: In regard to the development of nationalistic attitudes in China, location matters.
- 1 January 2021
- Published by Wiley in Social Science Quarterly
- Vol. 102 (1) , 154-165
Identifying and Understanding Distinctive Political Attitudes of Chinese Migrant Workers: A Research Note
- 1 January 2021
- Published by Wiley in Social Science Quarterly
- Vol. 102 (1) , 154-165
Identifying and Understanding Distinctive Political Attitudes of Chinese Migrant Workers: A Research Note
- 1 September 2020
- Published by Taylor & Francis in International Review of Sociology
- Vol. 30 (3) , 519-538
Perceived cadre corruption and government responsibility in China: does the blame stay local, and why (not)?
Using data from a 2008 nationwide survey in China, this study explores the relationship of perceived local-level corruption to government trust in an established authoritarian regime. With nearly two thirds of respondents considering cadre corruption to be a ‘serious problem,’ the authors find that perceptions of serious corruption are significantly and negatively related to trust in officials at all levels of government, including the central level. Contrary to extant findings that the Center is shielded from blame for well-intended policies that fail, the findings of this study suggest that when it comes to assigning blame for continued corruption, Chinese citizens – and especially urban Chinese – do not let Central officials off scot-free. Pushing further in an attempt to understand why some urban Chinese citizens seemingly hold the central government partly responsible for cadre corruption while others do not, analyses cast the spotlight on the level of education. As anticipated, education level is by itself negatively related to trust in the central government, but there is also unexpected evidence that among urbanites who perceive corruption to be a serious problem, it is actually the most highly educated who are most trusting.
- 1 September 2020
- Published by Taylor & Francis in International Review of Sociology
- Vol. 30 (3) , 519-538
Perceived cadre corruption and government responsibility in China: does the blame stay local, and why (not)?
Using data from a 2008 nationwide survey in China, this study explores the relationship of perceived local-level corruption to government trust in an established authoritarian regime. With nearly two thirds of respondents considering cadre corruption to be a ‘serious problem,’ the authors find that perceptions of serious corruption are significantly and negatively related to trust in officials at all levels of government, including the central level. Contrary to extant findings that the Center is shielded from blame for well-intended policies that fail, the findings of this study suggest that when it comes to assigning blame for continued corruption, Chinese citizens – and especially urban Chinese – do not let Central officials off scot-free. Pushing further in an attempt to understand why some urban Chinese citizens seemingly hold the central government partly responsible for cadre corruption while others do not, analyses cast the spotlight on the level of education. As anticipated, education level is by itself negatively related to trust in the central government, but there is also unexpected evidence that among urbanites who perceive corruption to be a serious problem, it is actually the most highly educated who are most trusting.
- 12 June 2019
- Published by Wiley in Social Science Quarterly
- Vol. 100 (5) , 1744-1754
Impacts of Internet on Openness to Change in China: Millennials Versus Pre‐Millennials
Objective: This article explores whether there are different consequences from Internet use—in the form of changed political attitudes—for older Chinese as compared to their younger counterparts.Methods: Using data from a nationwide representative survey of Chinese adults, analyses include both cross‐tabulation and multiple regression.Results: It is found that millennials are more open to political change than are older Chinese, that older Internet users—as compared to older nonusers—have attitudes more similar to those of millennials, and that differences in attitudes are greater between older users and nonusers than between millennial users and nonusers.Conclusion: The findings support the conclusion that Internet use has had greater consequences for changed political attitudes for older Chinese than for their younger counterparts.
- 12 June 2019
- Published by Wiley in Social Science Quarterly
- Vol. 100 (5) , 1744-1754
Impacts of Internet on Openness to Change in China: Millennials Versus Pre‐Millennials
Objective: This article explores whether there are different consequences from Internet use—in the form of changed political attitudes—for older Chinese as compared to their younger counterparts.Methods: Using data from a nationwide representative survey of Chinese adults, analyses include both cross‐tabulation and multiple regression.Results: It is found that millennials are more open to political change than are older Chinese, that older Internet users—as compared to older nonusers—have attitudes more similar to those of millennials, and that differences in attitudes are greater between older users and nonusers than between millennial users and nonusers.Conclusion: The findings support the conclusion that Internet use has had greater consequences for changed political attitudes for older Chinese than for their younger counterparts.
- 9 June 2019
- Published by Wiley in Social Science Quarterly
- Vol. 100 (5) , 1755-1767
Age Versus Socialization in Understanding Attitudes Toward Economic Reforms in China
Objective: The objective of this research is to address the roles of age and socialization in explanation for attitudes toward economic reforms in China.Method: Using data from the China Survey 2008 and the China Governance and Policy Survey of 2016, this note reports age/cohort‐related differences in both abstract and concrete attitudes toward economic reforms, and addresses two competing (or complementary) explanations for those differences, one attributing differences to life cycle and the other attributing differences to the different environments within which Chinese adults were socialized.Results: While socialization/generation explanations seem to apply for the more abstract “market reform would bring chaos” attitudes, an age/life‐cycle explanation alone seems sufficient to explain attitudes toward the more concrete subject of “privatization.”Conclusion: Consistent with our literature‐based theoretical expectations, “life cycle” tends to explain more concrete attitudes while “socialization”—in early and/or lifelong forms—is a more potent explanation for abstract attitudes.
- 9 June 2019
- Published by Wiley in Social Science Quarterly
- Vol. 100 (5) , 1755-1767
Age Versus Socialization in Understanding Attitudes Toward Economic Reforms in China
Objective: The objective of this research is to address the roles of age and socialization in explanation for attitudes toward economic reforms in China.Method: Using data from the China Survey 2008 and the China Governance and Policy Survey of 2016, this note reports age/cohort‐related differences in both abstract and concrete attitudes toward economic reforms, and addresses two competing (or complementary) explanations for those differences, one attributing differences to life cycle and the other attributing differences to the different environments within which Chinese adults were socialized.Results: While socialization/generation explanations seem to apply for the more abstract “market reform would bring chaos” attitudes, an age/life‐cycle explanation alone seems sufficient to explain attitudes toward the more concrete subject of “privatization.”Conclusion: Consistent with our literature‐based theoretical expectations, “life cycle” tends to explain more concrete attitudes while “socialization”—in early and/or lifelong forms—is a more potent explanation for abstract attitudes.