Nicholas Tsagourias
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Nicholas Tsagourias has a total of 6 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Russell Buchan2 shared publications
Alasdair Morrison
Land Warfare Centre
1 shared publicationAndrea Harrison
Andrea Harrison, Ph.D candidate, School of Law, University of Leicester
1 shared publicationEmanuele Cimiotta
Emanuele Cimiotta, Associate Professor of International Law, Università degli Studi di Roma ‘La Sapienza’, Italy
1 shared publicationMichael Farrell
Institute for Information Security & Privacy, Georgia Institute of Technology, USA
1 shared publication- Russell Buchan
School of Law, University of Sheffield, Sheffield, United Kingdom
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- 16 July 2024
- Published by Edward Elgar Publishing
- p. 317-334
Cyberwarfare and international law
This chapter focuses on the regulation of cyberwarfare in international law by looking at the law on the use of force (jus ad bellum). First, it analyses whether the principle of non-use of force applies to cyber attacks and, in particular, examines whether this principle covers cyber attacks producing online harmful effects, is subject to a de minimis threshold, and whether a cyber attack’s reverberating effects can be considered when determining whether this principle has been breached. Second, this chapter analyses whether cyber attacks can qualify as armed attacks and thus engage a victim state’s right of self-defence; and, if so, to what limits defensive action is subject. Finally, it examines the legality of anticipatory self-defence in the form of pre-emptive and preventive self-defence against prospective cyber attacks. It conceptualizes the contemporary cyber security landscape as a risk environment and examines pre-emptive and preventive self-defence through the lens of risk by also looking at current States’ cyber policies of active defence, defend forward, and persistent engagement.
- 16 July 2024
- Published by Edward Elgar Publishing
- p. 317-334
Cyberwarfare and international law
This chapter focuses on the regulation of cyberwarfare in international law by looking at the law on the use of force (jus ad bellum). First, it analyses whether the principle of non-use of force applies to cyber attacks and, in particular, examines whether this principle covers cyber attacks producing online harmful effects, is subject to a de minimis threshold, and whether a cyber attack’s reverberating effects can be considered when determining whether this principle has been breached. Second, this chapter analyses whether cyber attacks can qualify as armed attacks and thus engage a victim state’s right of self-defence; and, if so, to what limits defensive action is subject. Finally, it examines the legality of anticipatory self-defence in the form of pre-emptive and preventive self-defence against prospective cyber attacks. It conceptualizes the contemporary cyber security landscape as a risk environment and examines pre-emptive and preventive self-defence through the lens of risk by also looking at current States’ cyber policies of active defence, defend forward, and persistent engagement.
- Open Access
- 1 April 2023
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in German Law Journal
- Vol. 24 (3) , 494-507
Digitalization and its Systemic Impact on the Use of Force Regime: Legal Uncertainty and the Replacement of International Law
This article explores the systemic impact of digitalization on the use of force regime. It identifies two types of impact: (i) legal uncertainty; and (ii) the replacement of international law. The article discusses legal uncertainty in relation to the content of the rules on the use of force and their application to digital uses of force as well as in relation to the facts that underpin digital uses of force. It then goes on to discuss the replacement of international law as a regulatory tool of the use of force by considering the impact of digitalization on the creation of customary law, legal personhood, and international law’s regulatory modality. The article’s findings are not limited to the impact of digitalization on the use of force regime but extend to international law in general.
- 1 April 2023
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in German Law Journal
- Vol. 24 (3) , 494-507
Open AccessDigitalization and its Systemic Impact on the Use of Force Regime: Legal Uncertainty and the Replacement of International Law
This article explores the systemic impact of digitalization on the use of force regime. It identifies two types of impact: (i) legal uncertainty; and (ii) the replacement of international law. The article discusses legal uncertainty in relation to the content of the rules on the use of force and their application to digital uses of force as well as in relation to the facts that underpin digital uses of force. It then goes on to discuss the replacement of international law as a regulatory tool of the use of force by considering the impact of digitalization on the creation of customary law, legal personhood, and international law’s regulatory modality. The article’s findings are not limited to the impact of digitalization on the use of force regime but extend to international law in general.
- Open Access
- 1 July 2022
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in Journal of Conflict and Security Law
- Vol. 27 (2) , 131-134
Introduction to the Special Issue on Partnered Operations and International Law
- 1 July 2022
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in Journal of Conflict and Security Law
- Vol. 27 (2) , 131-134
Open AccessIntroduction to the Special Issue on Partnered Operations and International Law
- Open Access
- 15 June 2021
- Published by Edward Elgar Publishing
Introduction
The introduction provides an overview of the main features of the international legal framework regulating the use of force. It raises a number of important and timely questions relating to this framework’s interpretation and application and which will be addressed as this book progresses. The introduction also maps out the structure of the book and summarises the key issues dealt with in each chapter.
- 15 June 2021
- Published by Edward Elgar Publishing
Open AccessIntroduction
The introduction provides an overview of the main features of the international legal framework regulating the use of force. It raises a number of important and timely questions relating to this framework’s interpretation and application and which will be addressed as this book progresses. The introduction also maps out the structure of the book and summarises the key issues dealt with in each chapter.
- Top Cited Papers
- 1 August 2020
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in European Journal of International Law
- Vol. 31 (3) , 941-967
Cyber Attribution: Technical and Legal Approaches and Challenges
Considering the role of attribution in the law of state responsibility, this article examines the technical and international law methodologies and determinants used when attributing malicious cyber activities falling below the use-of-force threshold to a state, and identifies the challenges that arise which lead to responsibility gaps. The article goes on to discuss a number of proposals that aim to improve the effectiveness of the attribution process and also close some of the existing responsibility gaps. They include institutional proposals envisaging the creation of an international attribution agency; normative proposals advocating the revision of the legal determinants of attribution; and proposals concerning the standard of proof. The aim of the article is to reconstruct the theory and practice of cyber attribution in order to enhance the regulatory potential of international law in this area.
- 1 August 2020
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in European Journal of International Law
- Vol. 31 (3) , 941-967
Top Cited PapersCyber Attribution: Technical and Legal Approaches and Challenges
Considering the role of attribution in the law of state responsibility, this article examines the technical and international law methodologies and determinants used when attributing malicious cyber activities falling below the use-of-force threshold to a state, and identifies the challenges that arise which lead to responsibility gaps. The article goes on to discuss a number of proposals that aim to improve the effectiveness of the attribution process and also close some of the existing responsibility gaps. They include institutional proposals envisaging the creation of an international attribution agency; normative proposals advocating the revision of the legal determinants of attribution; and proposals concerning the standard of proof. The aim of the article is to reconstruct the theory and practice of cyber attribution in order to enhance the regulatory potential of international law in this area.
- 10 August 2018
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP)
- p. 39-54
Fundamental Principles of International Humanitarian Law
INTRODUCTION International humanitarian law is based on two foundational principles: the principle of humanity and the principle of military necessity. The principle of humanity attempts to ‘humanise’ the conduct of war by imposing limits on the means and methods of warfare, by according protection to certain categories of persons, by requiring humane treatment of captured persons and, in general, by limiting or mitigating unnecessary suffering. The principle of humanity was first proclaimed in the context of armed conflicts by Professor de Martens, the Russian Delegate to the Hague Peace Conferences of 1899, and for this reason it is often referred to as the Martens Principle or the Martens Clause. The principle of military necessity allows a belligerent to use lawful means and methods of war in order to overpower an enemy. The principles of humanity and military necessity inform all the rules of humanitarian law and, in cases of doubt, they assist in the interpretation of IHL rules. Two other principles that derive from the principles of humanity and military necessity are the principle of distinction and the principle of proportionality. According to the principle of distinction, parties to the conflict should at all times distinguish civilians and civilian objects from combatants and military objectives and afford protection to the former. According to the principle of proportionality, any harm caused by military action to civilians and civilian objects should not exceed the anticipated military advantage expected from the operation. The content and scope of these principles, and how they interact with each other in general or in particular situations, are important issues to be examined in this chapter but also in subsequent chapters. Resources: Preamble and Art. 6, Hague Convention II (HCII); Art. 5, Hague Convention V (HCV); Common Article 3, GCs; Arts 12 and 63, Geneva Convention I (GCI); Arts 12 and 62, Geneva Convention II (GCII); Arts 4, 13, 55 and 142, Geneva Convention III (GCIII); Arts 27 and 158, Geneva Convention IV (GCIV); Arts 1, 35, 43, 48–51 and 57, API; Arts 4 and 17, APII
- 10 August 2018
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP)
- p. 39-54
Fundamental Principles of International Humanitarian Law
INTRODUCTION International humanitarian law is based on two foundational principles: the principle of humanity and the principle of military necessity. The principle of humanity attempts to ‘humanise’ the conduct of war by imposing limits on the means and methods of warfare, by according protection to certain categories of persons, by requiring humane treatment of captured persons and, in general, by limiting or mitigating unnecessary suffering. The principle of humanity was first proclaimed in the context of armed conflicts by Professor de Martens, the Russian Delegate to the Hague Peace Conferences of 1899, and for this reason it is often referred to as the Martens Principle or the Martens Clause. The principle of military necessity allows a belligerent to use lawful means and methods of war in order to overpower an enemy. The principles of humanity and military necessity inform all the rules of humanitarian law and, in cases of doubt, they assist in the interpretation of IHL rules. Two other principles that derive from the principles of humanity and military necessity are the principle of distinction and the principle of proportionality. According to the principle of distinction, parties to the conflict should at all times distinguish civilians and civilian objects from combatants and military objectives and afford protection to the former. According to the principle of proportionality, any harm caused by military action to civilians and civilian objects should not exceed the anticipated military advantage expected from the operation. The content and scope of these principles, and how they interact with each other in general or in particular situations, are important issues to be examined in this chapter but also in subsequent chapters. Resources: Preamble and Art. 6, Hague Convention II (HCII); Art. 5, Hague Convention V (HCV); Common Article 3, GCs; Arts 12 and 63, Geneva Convention I (GCI); Arts 12 and 62, Geneva Convention II (GCII); Arts 4, 13, 55 and 142, Geneva Convention III (GCIII); Arts 27 and 158, Geneva Convention IV (GCIV); Arts 1, 35, 43, 48–51 and 57, API; Arts 4 and 17, APII
- 1 January 2017
- Published by Duncker & Humblot GmbH in German Yearbook of International Law
- Vol. 60 (1) , 203-237
Automatic Cyber Defence and the Laws of War
Duncker & Humblot - Berlin. Ein Forum für die Wissenschaft seit 1798
- 1 January 2017
- Published by Duncker & Humblot GmbH in German Yearbook of International Law
- Vol. 60 (1) , 203-237
Automatic Cyber Defence and the Laws of War
Duncker & Humblot - Berlin. Ein Forum für die Wissenschaft seit 1798
- 26 October 2016
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in Journal of Conflict and Security Law
- Vol. 21 (3) , 455-474
Non-State Actors, Ungoverned Spaces and International Responsibility for Cyber Acts
This article examines the question of whether states can be held responsible for the malicious cyber activities of non-state actors operating from ungoverned spaces. After examining relevant rules of the law of state responsibility, it concludes that there is a responsibility deficit. For this reason, it puts forward a proposal for holding non-state actors that exercise effective power over territories and people directly responsible for their malicious cyber activities. In this respect, it considers the scope of their obligations, issues of attribution as well as issues concerning the implementation of their responsibility. It, however, acknowledges that many non-state actors, including ‘virtual’ groups, still remain outside legal regulation.
- 26 October 2016
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in Journal of Conflict and Security Law
- Vol. 21 (3) , 455-474
Non-State Actors, Ungoverned Spaces and International Responsibility for Cyber Acts
This article examines the question of whether states can be held responsible for the malicious cyber activities of non-state actors operating from ungoverned spaces. After examining relevant rules of the law of state responsibility, it concludes that there is a responsibility deficit. For this reason, it puts forward a proposal for holding non-state actors that exercise effective power over territories and people directly responsible for their malicious cyber activities. In this respect, it considers the scope of their obligations, issues of attribution as well as issues concerning the implementation of their responsibility. It, however, acknowledges that many non-state actors, including ‘virtual’ groups, still remain outside legal regulation.
- 23 February 2015
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Policing and Society
- Vol. 25 (4) , 1-2
War power, police power
- 23 February 2015
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Policing and Society
- Vol. 25 (4) , 1-2
War power, police power