Luis Gustavo Esteves

This article gives a conceptual review of the e-value, ev(H|X) -- the epistemic value of hypothesis H given observations X. This statistical significance measure was developed in order to allow logically coherent and consistent tests of hypotheses, including sharp or precise hypotheses, via the Full Bayesian Significance Test (FBST). Arguments of analysis allow a full characterization of this statistical test by its logical or compositional properties, showing a mutual complementarity between results of mathematical statistics and the logical desiderata lying at the foundations of this theory.

The Non-Informative Nuisance Parameter Principle concerns the problem of how inferences about a parameter of interest should be made in the presence of nuisance parameters. The principle is examined in the context of the hypothesis testing problem. We prove that the mixed test obeys the principle for discrete sample spaces. We also show how adherence of the mixed test to the principle can make performance of the test much easier. These findings are illustrated with new solutions to well-known problems of testing hypotheses for count data.

The full Bayesian significance test (FBST) for precise hypotheses is a Bayesian alternative to the traditional significance tests based on p-values. The FBST is characterized by the e-value as an evidence index in favor of the null hypothesis (H). An important practical issue for the implementation of the FBST is to establish how small the evidence against H must be in order to decide for its rejection. In this work, we present a method to find a cutoff value for the e-value in the FBST by minimizing the linear combination of the averaged type-I and type-II error probabilities for a given sample size and also for a given dimensionality of the parameter space. Furthermore, we compare our methodology with the results obtained from the test with adaptive significance level, which presents the capital-P P-value as a decision-making evidence measure. For this purpose, the scenario of linear regression models with unknown variance under the Bayesian approach is considered.

This paper introduces pragmatic hypotheses and relates this concept to the spiral of scientific evolution. Previous works determined a characterization of logically consistent statistical hypothesis tests and showed that the modal operators obtained from this test can be represented in the hexagon of oppositions. However, despite the importance of precise hypothesis in science, they cannot be accepted by logically consistent tests. Here, we show that this dilemma can be overcome by the use of pragmatic versions of precise hypotheses. These pragmatic versions allow a level of imprecision in the hypothesis that is small relative to other experimental conditions. The introduction of pragmatic hypotheses allows the evolution of scientific theories based on statistical hypothesis testing to be interpreted using the narratological structure of hexagonal spirals, as defined by Pierre Gallais.

Measuring the dependence between random variables is one of the most fundamental problems in statistics, and therefore, determining the joint distribution of the relevant variables is crucial. Copulas have recently become an important tool for properly inferring the joint distribution of the variables of interest. Although many studies have addressed the case of continuous variables, few studies have focused on treating discrete variables. This paper presents a nonparametric approach to the estimation of joint discrete distributions with bounded support using copulas and Bernstein polynomials. We present an application in real obsessive-compulsive disorder data.

The main objective of this paper is to find the relation between the adaptive significance level presented here and the sample size. We statisticians know of the inconsistency, or paradox, in the current classical tests of significance that are based on p-value statistics that are compared to the canonical significance levels (10%, 5%, and 1%): “Raise the sample to reject the null hypothesis” is the recommendation of some ill-advised scientists! This paper will show that it is possible to eliminate this problem of significance tests. We present here the beginning of a larger research project. The intention is to extend its use to more complex applications such as survival analysis, reliability tests, and other areas. The main tools used here are the Bayes factor and the extended Neyman–Pearson Lemma.

Simultaneous hypothesis tests can fail to provide results that meet logical requirements. For example, if A and B are two statements such that A implies B, there exist tests that, based on the same data, reject B but not A. Such outcomes are generally inconvenient to statisticians (who want to communicate the results to practitioners in a simple fashion) and non-statisticians (confused by conflicting pieces of information). Based on this inconvenience, one might want to use tests that satisfy logical requirements. However, Izbicki and Esteves shows that the only tests that are in accordance with three logical requirements (monotonicity, invertibility and consonance) are trivial tests based on point estimation, which generally lack statistical optimality. As a possible solution to this dilemma, this paper adapts the above logical requirements to agnostic tests, in which one can accept, reject or remain agnostic with respect to a given hypothesis. Each of the logical requirements is characterized in terms of a Bayesian decision theoretic perspective. Contrary to the results obtained for regular hypothesis tests, there exist agnostic tests that satisfy all logical requirements and also perform well statistically. In particular, agnostic tests that fulfill all logical requirements are characterized as region estimator-based tests. Examples of such tests are provided.

This work addresses an important issue regarding the performance of simultaneous test procedures: the construction of multiple tests that at the same time are optimal from a statistical perspective and that also yield logically-consistent results that are easy to communicate to practitioners of statistical methods. For instance, if hypothesis A implies hypothesis B, is it possible to create optimal testing procedures that reject A whenever they reject B? Unfortunately, several standard testing procedures fail in having such logical consistency. Although this has been deeply investigated under a frequentist perspective, the literature lacks analyses under a Bayesian paradigm. In this work, we contribute to the discussion by investigating three rational relationships under a Bayesian decision-theoretic standpoint: coherence, invertibility and union consonance. We characterize and illustrate through simple examples optimal Bayes tests that fulfill each of these requisites separately. We also explore how far one can go by putting these requirements together. We show that although fairly intuitive tests satisfy both coherence and invertibility, no Bayesian testing scheme meets the desiderata as a whole, strengthening the understanding that logical consistency cannot be combined with statistical optimality in general. Finally, we associate Bayesian hypothesis testing with Bayes point estimation procedures. We prove the performance of logically-consistent hypothesis testing by means of a Bayes point estimator to be optimal only under very restrictive conditions.