Loretta M. Kopelman

Our cultural disagreements can often be anticipated, negotiated and resolved using shared methods of moral reasoning. This claim is incompatible with any extreme version of communitarianism or strong ethical relativism, which hold that one's culture is the final arbiter of good, bad, right and wrong, or that the rights of the community should trump individual rights within that community. This view is discussed and found to be implausible using the example of common grounds for responding to different cultural views about being truthful in medical practice. Its implausibility stems from difficulties individuating cultures, and accounting for intercultural goals, values and methods. Given our increasingly diverse populations, problems arise as clinicians from one culture try to care respectfully and compassionately for people from other groups. Yet working from shared values and goals, we can use some bridging methods such as discussing grim news in the third person. Claims that something is a cultural belief or attitude, moreover, cannot always be taken at face value. Various meanings of ‘multiculturalism’ are distinguished.

Courses in medical ethics , bioethics , and other humanities subjects flourish in professional schools , yet a tension exists about whether their teaching goals should include trying to make students more humane and virtuous . Some hold that these courses should help instill values and virtues professed by the medical community , such as fidelity , compassion , empathy , respect , and other qualities that will make students not only better professionals but also better and more humane people . Others reject this role , arguing that humanities courses should teach students the knowledge and skills to become better problem solvers regarding theoretical , moral , and social issues ; they regard it to be counterproductive , presumptuous , or futile to try to make students better persons . The author examines the extent to which these views are incompatible , arguing that a cogent philosophy of education can be neither value-free nor fully independent of moral choices . Within limits , diverse approaches to incorporating values in teaching can be a strength .