Keith Ransom

Traditional psychological models of belief revision focus on face-to-face interactions, but with the rise of social media, more effective models are needed to capture belief revision at scale, in this rich text-based online discourse. Here, we use a hybrid approach, utilizing large language models (LLMs) to develop a model that predicts successful persuasion using features derived from psychological experiments. Our approach leverages LLM generated ratings of features previously examined in the literature to build a random forest classification model that predicts whether a message will result in belief change. Of the eight features tested, \textit{epistemic emotion} and \textit{willingness to share} were the top-ranking predictors of belief change in the model. Our findings provide insights into the characteristics of persuasive messages and demonstrate how LLMs can enhance models of successful persuasion based on psychological theory. Given these insights, this work has broader applications in fields such as online influence detection and misinformation mitigation, as well as measuring the effectiveness of online narratives.

Corrections given by ordinary social media users, also referred to as Social Correction have emerged as a viable intervention against misinformation as per the recent literature. However, little is known about how often users give disputing or endorsing comments and how reliable those comments are. An online experiment was conducted to investigate how users' credibility evaluations of social media posts and their confidence in those evaluations combined with online reputational concerns affect their commenting behaviour. The study found that participants exhibited a more conservative approach when giving disputing comments compared to endorsing ones. Nevertheless, participants were more discerning in their disputing comments than endorsing ones. These findings contribute to a better understanding of social correction on social media and highlight the factors influencing comment behaviour and reliability.

Everyday reasoning requires more evidence than raw data alone can provide. We explore the idea that people can go beyond this data by reasoning about how the data was sampled. This idea is investigated through an examination of premise non‐monotonicity, in which adding premises to a category‐based argument weakens rather than strengthens it. Relevance theories explain this phenomenon in terms of people's sensitivity to the relationships among premise items. We show that a Bayesian model of category‐based induction taking premise sampling assumptions and category similarity into account complements such theories and yields two important predictions: First, that sensitivity to premise relationships can be violated by inducing a weak sampling assumption; and second, that premise monotonicity should be restored as a result. We test these predictions with an experiment that manipulates people's assumptions in this regard, showing that people draw qualitatively different conclusions in each case.