Alex Schwartz
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Research Subjects
Alex Schwartz has a total of 5 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
Brendan O’leary
1 shared publication- Christopher McCrudden
Queen’s University Belfast and University of Michigan Law School
1 shared publication - John McGarry
Queen's University
1 shared publication - Kieran McEvoy
Queens University Belfast, UK
1 shared publication Melanie Janelle Murchison
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 1 December 2016
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Law & Society Review
- Vol. 50 (4) , 821-855
Judicial Impartiality and Independence in Divided Societies: An Empirical Analysis of the Constitutional Court of Bosnia-Herzegovina
The role of constitutional courts in deeply divided societies is complicated by the danger that the salient societal cleavages may influence judicial decision-making and, consequently, undermine judicial impartiality and independence. With reference to the decisions of the Constitutional Court of Bosnia-Herzegovina, this article investigates the influence of ethno-national affiliation on judicial behaviour and the extent to which variation in judicial tenure amplifies or dampens that influence. Based on a statistical analysis of an original dataset of the Court's decisions, we find that the judges do in fact divide predictably along ethno-national lines, at least in certain types of cases, and that these divisions cannot be reduced to a residual loyalty to their appointing political parties. Contrary to some theoretical expectations, however, we find that long-term tenure does little to dampen the influence of ethno-national affiliation on judicial behaviour. Moreover, our findings suggest that this influence may actually increase as a judge acclimates to the dynamics of a divided court. We conclude by considering how alternative arrangements for the selection and tenure of judges might help to ameliorate this problem.
- 1 December 2016
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Law & Society Review
- Vol. 50 (4) , 821-855
Open AccessJudicial Impartiality and Independence in Divided Societies: An Empirical Analysis of the Constitutional Court of Bosnia-Herzegovina
The role of constitutional courts in deeply divided societies is complicated by the danger that the salient societal cleavages may influence judicial decision-making and, consequently, undermine judicial impartiality and independence. With reference to the decisions of the Constitutional Court of Bosnia-Herzegovina, this article investigates the influence of ethno-national affiliation on judicial behaviour and the extent to which variation in judicial tenure amplifies or dampens that influence. Based on a statistical analysis of an original dataset of the Court's decisions, we find that the judges do in fact divide predictably along ethno-national lines, at least in certain types of cases, and that these divisions cannot be reduced to a residual loyalty to their appointing political parties. Contrary to some theoretical expectations, however, we find that long-term tenure does little to dampen the influence of ethno-national affiliation on judicial behaviour. Moreover, our findings suggest that this influence may actually increase as a judge acclimates to the dynamics of a divided court. We conclude by considering how alternative arrangements for the selection and tenure of judges might help to ameliorate this problem.
- 8 November 2015
- Published by Wiley in Journal of Law and Society
- Vol. 42 (4) , 528-555
Judges, Conflict, and the Past
- 8 November 2015
- Published by Wiley in Journal of Law and Society
- Vol. 42 (4) , 528-555
Judges, Conflict, and the Past
- 13 August 2015
- Published by Wiley in Ratio Juris
- Vol. 28 (3) , 354-371
Authority, Nationality, and Minorities
- 13 August 2015
- Published by Wiley in Ratio Juris
- Vol. 28 (3) , 354-371
Authority, Nationality, and Minorities
- 11 August 2014
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Government and Opposition
- Vol. 51 (1) , 30-58
Why Northern Ireland’s Institutions Need Stability
Northern Ireland’s consociational institutions were reviewed by a committee of its Assembly in 2012–13. The arguments of both critics and exponents of the arrangements are of general interest to scholars of comparative politics, power-sharing and constitutional design. The authors of this article review the debates and evidence on the d’Hondt rule of executive formation, political designation, the likely impact of changing district magnitudes for assembly elections, and existing patterns of opposition and accountability. They evaluate the scholarly, political and legal literature before commending the merits of maintaining the existing system, including the rules under which the system might be modified in future.
- 11 August 2014
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Government and Opposition
- Vol. 51 (1) , 30-58
Why Northern Ireland’s Institutions Need Stability
Northern Ireland’s consociational institutions were reviewed by a committee of its Assembly in 2012–13. The arguments of both critics and exponents of the arrangements are of general interest to scholars of comparative politics, power-sharing and constitutional design. The authors of this article review the debates and evidence on the d’Hondt rule of executive formation, political designation, the likely impact of changing district magnitudes for assembly elections, and existing patterns of opposition and accountability. They evaluate the scholarly, political and legal literature before commending the merits of maintaining the existing system, including the rules under which the system might be modified in future.