Qinsi Wang
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Research Subjects
Qinsi Wang has a total of 14 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Edmund M. Clarke
Carnegie Mellon University
2 shared publications - Paolo Zuliani
Dipartimento di Informatica, Università di Roma “La Sapienza”, Rome, Italy
2 shared publications - Sicun Gao
Massachusetts Institute of Technology
2 shared publications - Soonho Kong
Carnegie Mellon University
2 shared publications - Bing Liu
University of Pittsburgh
1 shared publication Edmund M. Clarke
Carnegie Mellon University
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- 1 January 2020
- Published by River Publishers in Journal of Web Engineering
- Vol. 19 (3-4) , 521-555
Verification of the Instantiation and Integration of Security Patterns
As software applications suffer from increasing malicious attacks, security becomes a critically important issue for software development. To avoid security problems and increase efficiency, a large software system design may reuse good security solutions for existing security patterns. While security patterns document expert solutions to common security problems and capture well-examined practices on secure software design, implementing them in a particular context (pattern instantiation) and composing them with other related patterns (pattern integration) are prone to flaws and may break expected security properties. In this paper, we present an approach to verify security patterns instantiation and integration automatically. We offer formal definitions for security pattern instantiation and integration, and establish rules to transform sequence diagrams (representing the behaviors of security patterns) to expressions in Milner's Calculus of Communicating Systems (CCS). We prove the correctness of the proposed transformation, and propose an algorithm to carry out this transformation automatically. In particular, we formally specify the alternative flows of UML sequence diagrams guarded by constraint conditions, which allows us to model choice making behaviors of security patterns precisely. The properties of the instantiation and integration can be verified by model checking against their CCS expressions. Flaws of instantiation and integration can, therefore, be discovered early in the design stage. We use two case studies to illustrate our approach and show the capability to prove security in integration and detect design errors in instantiation respectively.
- 1 January 2020
- Published by River Publishers in Journal of Web Engineering
- Vol. 19 (3-4) , 521-555
Verification of the Instantiation and Integration of Security Patterns
As software applications suffer from increasing malicious attacks, security becomes a critically important issue for software development. To avoid security problems and increase efficiency, a large software system design may reuse good security solutions for existing security patterns. While security patterns document expert solutions to common security problems and capture well-examined practices on secure software design, implementing them in a particular context (pattern instantiation) and composing them with other related patterns (pattern integration) are prone to flaws and may break expected security properties. In this paper, we present an approach to verify security patterns instantiation and integration automatically. We offer formal definitions for security pattern instantiation and integration, and establish rules to transform sequence diagrams (representing the behaviors of security patterns) to expressions in Milner's Calculus of Communicating Systems (CCS). We prove the correctness of the proposed transformation, and propose an algorithm to carry out this transformation automatically. In particular, we formally specify the alternative flows of UML sequence diagrams guarded by constraint conditions, which allows us to model choice making behaviors of security patterns precisely. The properties of the instantiation and integration can be verified by model checking against their CCS expressions. Flaws of instantiation and integration can, therefore, be discovered early in the design stage. We use two case studies to illustrate our approach and show the capability to prove security in integration and detect design errors in instantiation respectively.
- 4 September 2016
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 289-305
Formal Modeling and Analysis of Pancreatic Cancer Microenvironment
- 4 September 2016
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 289-305
Formal Modeling and Analysis of Pancreatic Cancer Microenvironment
- Open Access
- 2 September 2015
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 15-27
SReach: A Probabilistic Bounded Delta-Reachability Analyzer for Stochastic Hybrid Systems
- 2 September 2015
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 15-27
Open AccessSReach: A Probabilistic Bounded Delta-Reachability Analyzer for Stochastic Hybrid Systems
- Open Access
SReach: A Bounded Model Checker for Stochastic Hybrid Systems
In this paper we describe a new tool, SReach, which solves probabilistic bounded reachability problems for two classes of stochastic hybrid systems. The first one is (nonlinear) hybrid automata with parametric uncertainty. The second one is probabilistic hybrid automata with additional randomness for both transition probabilities and variable resets. Standard approaches to reachability problems for linear hybrid systems require numerical solutions for large optimization problems, and become infeasible for systems involving both nonlinear dynamics over the reals and stochasticity. Our approach encodes stochastic information by using random variables, and combines the randomized sampling, a $\delta$-complete decision procedure, and statistical tests. SReach utilizes the $\delta$-complete decision procedure to solve reachability problems in a sound manner, i.e., it always decides correctly if, for a given assignment to all random variables, the system actually reaches the unsafe region. The statistical tests adapted guarantee arbitrary small error bounds between probabilities estimated by SReach and real ones. Compared to standard simulation-based methods, our approach supports non-deterministic branching, increases the coverage of simulation, and avoids the zero-crossing problem. We demonstrate our method's feasibility by applying SReach to three representative biological models and to additional benchmarks for nonlinear hybrid systems with multiple probabilistic system parameters.
Open AccessSReach: A Bounded Model Checker for Stochastic Hybrid Systems
In this paper we describe a new tool, SReach, which solves probabilistic bounded reachability problems for two classes of stochastic hybrid systems. The first one is (nonlinear) hybrid automata with parametric uncertainty. The second one is probabilistic hybrid automata with additional randomness for both transition probabilities and variable resets. Standard approaches to reachability problems for linear hybrid systems require numerical solutions for large optimization problems, and become infeasible for systems involving both nonlinear dynamics over the reals and stochasticity. Our approach encodes stochastic information by using random variables, and combines the randomized sampling, a $\delta$-complete decision procedure, and statistical tests. SReach utilizes the $\delta$-complete decision procedure to solve reachability problems in a sound manner, i.e., it always decides correctly if, for a given assignment to all random variables, the system actually reaches the unsafe region. The statistical tests adapted guarantee arbitrary small error bounds between probabilities estimated by SReach and real ones. Compared to standard simulation-based methods, our approach supports non-deterministic branching, increases the coverage of simulation, and avoids the zero-crossing problem. We demonstrate our method's feasibility by applying SReach to three representative biological models and to additional benchmarks for nonlinear hybrid systems with multiple probabilistic system parameters.