Marjan Škrobot
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Marjan Škrobot has a total of 21 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Afonso Arriaga
SnT - University of Luxembourg
4 shared publications - Peter Y. A. Ryan
University of Luxembourg
3 shared publications - José Becerra
University of Luxembourg
2 shared publications - Petra Šala
SES Techcom
2 shared publications - Vincenzo Iovino
University of Luxembourg
2 shared publications - David Mestel
Department of Advanced Computing Sciences Maastricht University
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- 2 July 2026
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 127-154
HIC Is All You Need: Practical Post-Quantum Password-Authenticated Public-Key Encryption
- 2 July 2026
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 127-154
HIC Is All You Need: Practical Post-Quantum Password-Authenticated Public-Key Encryption
- 11 November 2025
- Published by Elsevier in Computers & Security
- Vol. 161
Secure authentication and traceability of physical objects
- 11 November 2025
- Published by Elsevier in Computers & Security
- Vol. 161
Secure authentication and traceability of physical objects
- 9 December 2024
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 3-33
C’est Très CHIC: A Compact Password-Authenticated Key Exchange from Lattice-Based KEM
- 9 December 2024
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 3-33
C’est Très CHIC: A Compact Password-Authenticated Key Exchange from Lattice-Based KEM
- Open Access
- 1 July 2024
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 1017-1033
SweetPAKE: Key exchange with decoy passwords
Decoy accounts are often used as an indicator of the compromise of sensitive data, such as password files. An attacker targeting only specific known-to-be-real accounts might, however, remain undetected. A more effective method proposed by Juels and Rivest at CCS'13 is to maintain additional fake passwords associated with each account. An attacker who gains access to the password file is unable to tell apart real passwords from fake passwords, and the attempted usage of a false password immediately sets off an alarm indicating a password file compromise. Password-Authenticated Key Exchange (PAKE) has long been recognised for its strong security guarantees when it comes to low-entropy password authentication and secure channel establishment, without having to rely on the setup of a PKI. In this paper, we introduce SweetPAKE, a new cryptographic primitive that offers the same security guarantees as PAKE for key exchange, while allowing clients with a single password to authenticate against servers with n candidate passwords for that account and establish a secure channel. Additional security properties are identified and formalized to ensure that (a) high-entropy session keys are indistinguishable from random, even if later on the long-term secret password becomes corrupted (forward secrecy); (b) upon password file leakage, an adversary cannot tell apart real from fake passwords; and (c) a malicious client cannot trigger a false alarm. We capture these properties by extending well-established game-based definitions of PAKE. Furthermore, we propose a new UC formulation that comprehensively unifies both SweetPAKE (session key indistinguishability and sugarword indistinguishability) and a related notion known as Oblivious-PAKE. Finally, we propose efficient SweetPAKE and Oblivious-PAKE protocols constructed from Password-Authenticated Public-Key Encryption (PAPKE) that satisfy all the proposed notions.
- 1 July 2024
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 1017-1033
Open AccessSweetPAKE: Key exchange with decoy passwords
Decoy accounts are often used as an indicator of the compromise of sensitive data, such as password files. An attacker targeting only specific known-to-be-real accounts might, however, remain undetected. A more effective method proposed by Juels and Rivest at CCS'13 is to maintain additional fake passwords associated with each account. An attacker who gains access to the password file is unable to tell apart real passwords from fake passwords, and the attempted usage of a false password immediately sets off an alarm indicating a password file compromise. Password-Authenticated Key Exchange (PAKE) has long been recognised for its strong security guarantees when it comes to low-entropy password authentication and secure channel establishment, without having to rely on the setup of a PKI. In this paper, we introduce SweetPAKE, a new cryptographic primitive that offers the same security guarantees as PAKE for key exchange, while allowing clients with a single password to authenticate against servers with n candidate passwords for that account and establish a secure channel. Additional security properties are identified and formalized to ensure that (a) high-entropy session keys are indistinguishable from random, even if later on the long-term secret password becomes corrupted (forward secrecy); (b) upon password file leakage, an adversary cannot tell apart real from fake passwords; and (c) a malicious client cannot trigger a false alarm. We capture these properties by extending well-established game-based definitions of PAKE. Furthermore, we propose a new UC formulation that comprehensively unifies both SweetPAKE (session key indistinguishability and sugarword indistinguishability) and a related notion known as Oblivious-PAKE. Finally, we propose efficient SweetPAKE and Oblivious-PAKE protocols constructed from Password-Authenticated Public-Key Encryption (PAPKE) that satisfy all the proposed notions.
- 19 April 2023
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 672-699
Wireless-Channel Key Exchange
- Open Access
- 5 June 2019
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 81-90
An Offline Dictionary Attack Against zkPAKE Protocol
- 5 June 2019
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 81-90
Open AccessAn Offline Dictionary Attack Against zkPAKE Protocol
- Open Access
- 18 January 2019
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 173-198
On the Relation Between SIM and IND-RoR Security Models for PAKEs with Forward Secrecy
- 18 January 2019
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 173-198
Open AccessOn the Relation Between SIM and IND-RoR Security Models for PAKEs with Forward Secrecy
- Open Access
- 9 June 2016
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 58-76
Two More Efficient Variants of the J-PAKE Protocol
- 9 June 2016
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 58-76
Open AccessTwo More Efficient Variants of the J-PAKE Protocol
- Open Access
- 27 August 2015
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 244-261
On the Provable Security of the Dragonfly Protocol
- 27 August 2015
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 244-261
Open AccessOn the Provable Security of the Dragonfly Protocol