Shuhei Kurizaki
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Shuhei Kurizaki has a total of 3 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- R. Capistrano Andrew1 shared publication
Shohei Doi
Affiliation Public Policy School, Hokkaido University, Sapporo, Hokkaido, Japan
1 shared publication- Takayuki Mizuno
National Institute of Informatics, Tokyo, Japan
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 24 August 2023
- Published by Public Library of Science (PLoS) in PLOS ONE
- Vol. 18 (8) , e0290229
The flow of corporate control in the global ownership network
We propose a model and algorithm to measure the amount of influence a shareholder has over the flow of corporate control held by the ultimate owners. Existing models of corporate ownership and control either focus on the ultimate owners’ influence or inadequately evaluate the influence possessed by intermediate shareholders in a ownership network. As it extends Network Power Index (NPI) that describes the the power of corporate control possessed by the ultimate owners, our new model, Network Power Flow (NPF), delineates the distribution of ownership influence among shareholders across the network and identifies the channels through which the ultimate owners’ corporate control travel through the global shareholding network. Our analysis of NPI and NPF values for 7 million ultimate owners and 16 million shareholders reveals a new landscape of ownership and control in the global shareholding network that remained opaque before.
- 24 August 2023
- Published by Public Library of Science (PLoS) in PLOS ONE
- Vol. 18 (8) , e0290229
Open AccessThe flow of corporate control in the global ownership network
We propose a model and algorithm to measure the amount of influence a shareholder has over the flow of corporate control held by the ultimate owners. Existing models of corporate ownership and control either focus on the ultimate owners’ influence or inadequately evaluate the influence possessed by intermediate shareholders in a ownership network. As it extends Network Power Index (NPI) that describes the the power of corporate control possessed by the ultimate owners, our new model, Network Power Flow (NPF), delineates the distribution of ownership influence among shareholders across the network and identifies the channels through which the ultimate owners’ corporate control travel through the global shareholding network. Our analysis of NPI and NPF values for 7 million ultimate owners and 16 million shareholders reveals a new landscape of ownership and control in the global shareholding network that remained opaque before.
- 8 February 2017
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 31-55
Signaling Game of Collective Self-Defense in the U.S.-Japan Alliance
- 8 February 2017
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 31-55
Signaling Game of Collective Self-Defense in the U.S.-Japan Alliance
- 23 June 2016
- Published by SAGE Publications in Journal of Theoretical Politics
- Vol. 28 (4) , 625-654
Signaling and perception in international crises: Two approaches
This study contrasts the rationalist and psychologist approaches to information failure as the cause of crisis escalation and war. Building on the psychological insights on misperception, it presents a simple game-theoretic model of crisis bargaining, where signals are subject to perceptual errors and thereby multiple interpretations. The model allows us to analyze the interplay between the problem of misrepresentation in sending signals and the problem of misperception in forming beliefs. The analysis offers a rationalist logic of signaling and perception, which links Bayesian learning, incentive problems, misperception, and war. The analysis also shows that misperception generates more than pathologies in crises—misperception, under the right condition, makes signals fully informative, reduces the risk of war, and attenuates the adverse impact of incomplete information on the risk of crisis escalation and war.
- 23 June 2016
- Published by SAGE Publications in Journal of Theoretical Politics
- Vol. 28 (4) , 625-654
Signaling and perception in international crises: Two approaches
This study contrasts the rationalist and psychologist approaches to information failure as the cause of crisis escalation and war. Building on the psychological insights on misperception, it presents a simple game-theoretic model of crisis bargaining, where signals are subject to perceptual errors and thereby multiple interpretations. The model allows us to analyze the interplay between the problem of misrepresentation in sending signals and the problem of misperception in forming beliefs. The analysis offers a rationalist logic of signaling and perception, which links Bayesian learning, incentive problems, misperception, and war. The analysis also shows that misperception generates more than pathologies in crises—misperception, under the right condition, makes signals fully informative, reduces the risk of war, and attenuates the adverse impact of incomplete information on the risk of crisis escalation and war.
- Open Access
- 30 April 2016
- Published by Korean Association of International Studies in The Korean Journal of International Studies
- Vol. 14 (1) , 77-104
Japan’s Changing Defense Posture and Security Relations in East Asia
Andrew R. Capistrano and Shuhei Kurizaki. KJIS 2016;14:77-104. https://doi.org/10.14731/kjis.2016.4.14.1.77
- 30 April 2016
- Published by Korean Association of International Studies in The Korean Journal of International Studies
- Vol. 14 (1) , 77-104
Open AccessJapan’s Changing Defense Posture and Security Relations in East Asia
Andrew R. Capistrano and Shuhei Kurizaki. KJIS 2016;14:77-104. https://doi.org/10.14731/kjis.2016.4.14.1.77