Alan M. Dunn
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Research Subjects
Alan M. Dunn has a total of 6 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Emmett Witchel
The University of Texas at Austin, Austin, Texas, United States
2 shared publications - Michael Z. Lee
The University of Texas at Austin
2 shared publications - Brent Waters
University of Texas at Austin
1 shared publication - Jonathan Katz
Google & University of Maryland, Washington DC, USA
1 shared publication Owen S. Hofmann
The University of Texas at Auatin, Austin, TX, USA
1 shared publication- Sangman Kim
C, Austin, TX, USA
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 1 May 2013
- Published by Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE)
- Vol. 403 (10816011) , 319-333
Anon-Pass: Practical Anonymous Subscriptions
We present the design, security proof, and implementation of an anonymous subscription service. Users register for the service by providing some form of identity, which might or might not be linked to a real-world identity such as a credit card, a web login, or a public key. A user logs on to the system by presenting a credential derived from information received at registration. Each credential allows only a single login in any authentication window, or epoch. Logins are anonymous in the sense that the service cannot distinguish which user is logging in any better than random guessing. This implies unlinkability of a user across different logins. We find that a central tension in an anonymous subscription service is the service provider's desire for a long epoch (to reduce server-side computation) versus users' desire for a short epoch (so they can repeatedly "re-anonymize" their sessions). We balance this tension by having short epochs, but adding an efficient operation for clients who do not need unlinkability to cheaply re-authenticate themselves for the next time period. We measure performance of a research prototype of our protocol that allows an independent service to offer anonymous access to existing services. We implement a music service, an Android-based subway-pass application, and a web proxy, and show that adding anonymity adds minimal client latency and only requires 33 KB of server memory per active user.
- 1 May 2013
- Published by Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE)
- Vol. 403 (10816011) , 319-333
Open AccessAnon-Pass: Practical Anonymous Subscriptions
We present the design, security proof, and implementation of an anonymous subscription service. Users register for the service by providing some form of identity, which might or might not be linked to a real-world identity such as a credit card, a web login, or a public key. A user logs on to the system by presenting a credential derived from information received at registration. Each credential allows only a single login in any authentication window, or epoch. Logins are anonymous in the sense that the service cannot distinguish which user is logging in any better than random guessing. This implies unlinkability of a user across different logins. We find that a central tension in an anonymous subscription service is the service provider's desire for a long epoch (to reduce server-side computation) versus users' desire for a short epoch (so they can repeatedly "re-anonymize" their sessions). We balance this tension by having short epochs, but adding an efficient operation for clients who do not need unlinkability to cheaply re-authenticate themselves for the next time period. We measure performance of a research prototype of our protocol that allows an independent service to offer anonymous access to existing services. We implement a music service, an Android-based subway-pass application, and a web proxy, and show that adding anonymity adds minimal client latency and only requires 33 KB of server memory per active user.
- Open Access
- 16 March 2013
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- Vol. 41 (1) , 265-278
InkTag
InkTag is a virtualization-based architecture that gives strong safety guarantees to high-assurance processes even in the presence of a malicious operating system. InkTag advances the state of the art in untrusted operating systems in both the design of its hypervisor and in the ability to run useful applications without trusting the operating system. We introduce paraverification, a technique that simplifies the InkTag hypervisor by forcing the untrusted operating system to participate in its own verification. Attribute-based access control allows trusted applications to create decentralized access control policies. InkTag is also the first system of its kind to ensure consistency between secure data and metadata, ensuring recoverability in the face of system crashes.
- 16 March 2013
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- Vol. 41 (1) , 265-278
Open AccessInkTag
InkTag is a virtualization-based architecture that gives strong safety guarantees to high-assurance processes even in the presence of a malicious operating system. InkTag advances the state of the art in untrusted operating systems in both the design of its hypervisor and in the ability to run useful applications without trusting the operating system. We introduce paraverification, a technique that simplifies the InkTag hypervisor by forcing the untrusted operating system to participate in its own verification. Attribute-based access control allows trusted applications to create decentralized access control policies. InkTag is also the first system of its kind to ensure consistency between secure data and metadata, ensuring recoverability in the face of system crashes.