Guoqiang Tian
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Previous Organizations / Institutes
The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years
Research Subjects
Guoqiang Tian has a total of 6 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Xiaoyong Cao
Department of Economics, University of International Business and Economics, Beijing, China
3 shared publications - Shao-Chieh Hsueh
Xiamen University of Technology
2 shared publications - Guofu Tan
University of Southern California
1 shared publication - Okan Yilankaya
Department of Economics, Nazarbayev University, Astana, Kazakhstan
1 shared publication - Wei Wang
School of International Trade and Economics University of International Business and Economics Beijing China
1 shared publication Xiaoyong Cao
Department of Economics University of International Business and Economics Beijing 100029, China
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- 10 February 2024
- Published by Springer Nature in International Journal of Game Theory
- Vol. 53 (2) , 609-634
Participation constraints in first-price auctions
- 10 February 2024
- Published by Springer Nature in International Journal of Game Theory
- Vol. 53 (2) , 609-634
Participation constraints in first-price auctions
- 21 November 2019
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in Oxford Economic Papers
- Vol. 73 (1) , 446-459
On the ratifiability of efficient cartel mechanisms in first-price auctions with participation costs and information leakage
This paper addresses the ratifiability of an efficient cartel mechanism in a first-price auction. When a seller uses a first-price sealed-bid auction, the efficient all-inclusive cartel mechanism will no longer be ratifiable in the presence of both participation costs and potential information leakage. A bidder whose value is higher than a cut-off in the cartel will have an incentive to leave the cartel, thereby sending a credible signal of his high value, which discourages other bidders from participating in the seller’s auction. However, the cartel mechanism is still ratifiable where either the participation cost or information leakage is absent.
- 21 November 2019
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in Oxford Economic Papers
- Vol. 73 (1) , 446-459
On the ratifiability of efficient cartel mechanisms in first-price auctions with participation costs and information leakage
This paper addresses the ratifiability of an efficient cartel mechanism in a first-price auction. When a seller uses a first-price sealed-bid auction, the efficient all-inclusive cartel mechanism will no longer be ratifiable in the presence of both participation costs and potential information leakage. A bidder whose value is higher than a cut-off in the cartel will have an incentive to leave the cartel, thereby sending a credible signal of his high value, which discourages other bidders from participating in the seller’s auction. However, the cartel mechanism is still ratifiable where either the participation cost or information leakage is absent.
- 2 January 2017
- Published by Springer Nature in Economic Theory
- Vol. 65 (2) , 231-249
Equilibria in second-price auctions with private participation costs
- 2 January 2017
- Published by Springer Nature in Economic Theory
- Vol. 65 (2) , 231-249
Equilibria in second-price auctions with private participation costs
- 9 January 2013
- Published by Wiley in Journal of Economics & Management Strategy
- Vol. 22 (1) , 184-205
Second‐Price Auctions with Different Participation Costs
This paper studies equilibria of second‐price auctions in independent private value environments with different participation costs. Two types of equilibria are identified: monotonic equilibria in which a bidder with a lower participation cost results in a lower cutoff for submitting a bid, and nonmonotonic equilibria in which a lower participation cost results in a higher cutoff. We show that there always exists a monotonic equilibrium, and further, that the monotonic equilibrium is unique for either concave distribution functions or strictly convex distribution functions with nonincreasing reverse hazard rates. There exist nonmonotonic equilibria when the distribution functions are strictly convex and the difference of the participation costs is sufficiently small. We also provide comparative static analysis and study the limiting properties of equilibria when the difference in bidders’ participation costs approaches zero.
- 9 January 2013
- Published by Wiley in Journal of Economics & Management Strategy
- Vol. 22 (1) , 184-205
Second‐Price Auctions with Different Participation Costs
This paper studies equilibria of second‐price auctions in independent private value environments with different participation costs. Two types of equilibria are identified: monotonic equilibria in which a bidder with a lower participation cost results in a lower cutoff for submitting a bid, and nonmonotonic equilibria in which a lower participation cost results in a higher cutoff. We show that there always exists a monotonic equilibrium, and further, that the monotonic equilibrium is unique for either concave distribution functions or strictly convex distribution functions with nonincreasing reverse hazard rates. There exist nonmonotonic equilibria when the distribution functions are strictly convex and the difference of the participation costs is sufficiently small. We also provide comparative static analysis and study the limiting properties of equilibria when the difference in bidders’ participation costs approaches zero.