Jae-Woo Kim
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Research Subjects
Jae-Woo Kim has a total of 1 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
Robert Hanneman
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 1 January 2011
- Published by Journal of Artificial Societies and Social Simulation in Journal of Artificial Societies and Social Simulation
- Vol. 14 (3)
A Computational Model of Worker Protest
This paper presents an agent-based model of worker protest. Workers have varying degrees of grievance depending on the difference between their wage and the average of their neighbors. They protest with probabilities proportional to grievance, but are inhibited by the risk of being arrested—which is determined by the ratio of coercive agents to probable rebels in the local area. We explore the effect of similarity perception on the dynamics of collective behavior. If workers are surrounded by more in-group members, they are more risk-taking; if surrounded by more out-group members, more risk-averse. Individual interest and group membership jointly affect patterns of workers protest: rhythm, frequency, strength, and duration of protest outbreaks. Results indicate that when wages are more unequally distributed, the previous outburst tends to suppress the next one, protests occur more frequently, and they become more intensive and persistent. Group identification does not seriously influence the frequency of local uprisings. Both their strength and duration, however, are negatively affected by the ingroup-outgroup assessment. The overall findings are valid when workers distinguish 'us' from 'them' through simple binary categorization, as well as when they perceive degrees of similarity and difference from their neighbors.
- 1 January 2011
- Published by Journal of Artificial Societies and Social Simulation in Journal of Artificial Societies and Social Simulation
- Vol. 14 (3)
Open AccessA Computational Model of Worker Protest
This paper presents an agent-based model of worker protest. Workers have varying degrees of grievance depending on the difference between their wage and the average of their neighbors. They protest with probabilities proportional to grievance, but are inhibited by the risk of being arrested—which is determined by the ratio of coercive agents to probable rebels in the local area. We explore the effect of similarity perception on the dynamics of collective behavior. If workers are surrounded by more in-group members, they are more risk-taking; if surrounded by more out-group members, more risk-averse. Individual interest and group membership jointly affect patterns of workers protest: rhythm, frequency, strength, and duration of protest outbreaks. Results indicate that when wages are more unequally distributed, the previous outburst tends to suppress the next one, protests occur more frequently, and they become more intensive and persistent. Group identification does not seriously influence the frequency of local uprisings. Both their strength and duration, however, are negatively affected by the ingroup-outgroup assessment. The overall findings are valid when workers distinguish 'us' from 'them' through simple binary categorization, as well as when they perceive degrees of similarity and difference from their neighbors.
- Open Access
- 2 November 2010
- Published by California Digital Library (CDL) in Structure and Dynamics: eJournal of Anthropological and Related Sciences
- Vol. 4 (2)
Evolution of Cultural Groups and Persistent Parochialism
Discriminators who have limited tolerance for helping dissimilar others are necessary for the evolution of costly cooperation in a one-shot Prisoner’s Dilemma. Existing research reports that trust in societies decreases when agents copy markers and tolerance from more successful others. Global cooperation is possible only in highly homogenized societies. Emergent cooperative societies are not robust against mutant defectors with tolerably similar markers. Our simulation experiments compare one society where each agent has immutable binary tags at the same dimension (‘caste society’) to the other where such markers are distributed across different dimensions (‘modern society’). In both societies, the majority of population display strong parochialism. However, cooperation is significantly stable in modern societies although members are more tolerant than those in caste societies. Modern societies are characterized by loosely coupled small-sized groups with different cultural markers. In terms of efficiency, they achieve higher levels of cooperation than do societies where agents change markers rapidly before defectors attack cooperative clusters.
- 2 November 2010
- Published by California Digital Library (CDL) in Structure and Dynamics: eJournal of Anthropological and Related Sciences
- Vol. 4 (2)
Open AccessEvolution of Cultural Groups and Persistent Parochialism
Discriminators who have limited tolerance for helping dissimilar others are necessary for the evolution of costly cooperation in a one-shot Prisoner’s Dilemma. Existing research reports that trust in societies decreases when agents copy markers and tolerance from more successful others. Global cooperation is possible only in highly homogenized societies. Emergent cooperative societies are not robust against mutant defectors with tolerably similar markers. Our simulation experiments compare one society where each agent has immutable binary tags at the same dimension (‘caste society’) to the other where such markers are distributed across different dimensions (‘modern society’). In both societies, the majority of population display strong parochialism. However, cooperation is significantly stable in modern societies although members are more tolerant than those in caste societies. Modern societies are characterized by loosely coupled small-sized groups with different cultural markers. In terms of efficiency, they achieve higher levels of cooperation than do societies where agents change markers rapidly before defectors attack cooperative clusters.
- Open Access
- 1 January 2010
- Published by Journal of Artificial Societies and Social Simulation in Journal of Artificial Societies and Social Simulation
- Vol. 13 (3)
A Tag-Based Evolutionary Prisoner's Dilemma Game on Networks with Different Topologies
Researchers from many disciplines have been interested in the maintenance of cooperation in animal and human societies using the Prisoner's Dilemma game. Recent studies highlight the roles of cognitively simple agents in the evolution of cooperation who read tags to interact either discriminately or selectively with tolerably similar partners. In our study on a one-shot Prisoner's Dilemma game, artificial agents with tags and tolerance perceive dissimilarities to local neighbors to cooperate with in-group and otherwise defect. They imitate tags and learn tolerance from more successful neighbors. In terms of efficiency, society-wide cooperation can evolve even when the benefits of cooperation are relatively low. Meanwhile, tolerance however decreases as agents become homogenized. In terms of stability, parochial cooperators are gullible to the deviants - defectors displaying tolerably similar tags. We find that as the benefits of cooperation increase and the dimensions of tag space become larger, emergent societies can be more tolerant towards heterogeneous others. We also identify the effects of clustering and small-world-ness on the dynamics of tag-based parochial cooperation in spite of its fundamental vulnerability to those deviants regardless of network topology. We discuss the issue of tag mutability in search for alternative societies in which tag-based parochial cooperation is not only efficient but also robust.
- 1 January 2010
- Published by Journal of Artificial Societies and Social Simulation in Journal of Artificial Societies and Social Simulation
- Vol. 13 (3)
Open AccessA Tag-Based Evolutionary Prisoner's Dilemma Game on Networks with Different Topologies
Researchers from many disciplines have been interested in the maintenance of cooperation in animal and human societies using the Prisoner's Dilemma game. Recent studies highlight the roles of cognitively simple agents in the evolution of cooperation who read tags to interact either discriminately or selectively with tolerably similar partners. In our study on a one-shot Prisoner's Dilemma game, artificial agents with tags and tolerance perceive dissimilarities to local neighbors to cooperate with in-group and otherwise defect. They imitate tags and learn tolerance from more successful neighbors. In terms of efficiency, society-wide cooperation can evolve even when the benefits of cooperation are relatively low. Meanwhile, tolerance however decreases as agents become homogenized. In terms of stability, parochial cooperators are gullible to the deviants - defectors displaying tolerably similar tags. We find that as the benefits of cooperation increase and the dimensions of tag space become larger, emergent societies can be more tolerant towards heterogeneous others. We also identify the effects of clustering and small-world-ness on the dynamics of tag-based parochial cooperation in spite of its fundamental vulnerability to those deviants regardless of network topology. We discuss the issue of tag mutability in search for alternative societies in which tag-based parochial cooperation is not only efficient but also robust.