CYChiwei Yan

Chiwei Yan

*This is an algorithmically generated author record based on publicly available information.

Current Organizations / Institutes

The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article

Previous Organizations / Institutes

The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years


Chiwei Yan has a total of 36 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:


Latest Publications

  • Open Access

    Pricing in Dynamic Matching Platforms with Strategic Agents

    by Tonghun Lee, Matthew Tsao, Chiwei Yan

    We study pricing in dynamic matching platforms, where matching opportunities evolve over time. This variation creates a natural role for match-dependent pricing. For example, in Yan, Yan, and Shen (2026), the price of a shared ride depends on whether the rider is matched with another rider. Such pricing, however, can incentivize agents to strategically delay requesting service in anticipation of more favorable prices. Despite the resulting complexity, we establish two positive results. The first concerns strategic robustness: prices optimized for myopic agents (who request service immediately) surprisingly never backfire under strategic behavior, yielding at least the optimal myopic profit. Remarkably, this robustness extends simultaneously to agent surplus, throughput, and match rate. The second concerns the optimality of a simple policy: offering a discount that clears the market immediately once two matchable agents are waiting to request achieves the optimal profit under strategic behavior. We complement these results with large-scale ridesharing simulations using Chicago data. Our numerical findings confirm that platforms need not regard strategic request delays as detrimental: such delays can increase both platform profit and rider welfare even when unaccounted for. These theoretical and empirical findings provide further support for the use of match-dependent pricing in dynamic matching platforms.

  • Dispatching and Pricing in Two-Sided Spatial Queues

    by Ang Xu, Chiwei Yan

    We study a dispatching and pricing problem in two-sided spatial queues with fixed supply, motivated by ride-hailing and robotaxi platforms. Idle drivers queue on one side, waiting to pick up riders, while riders queue on the other, waiting to be matched with available drivers. The platform seeks to maximize net profit, penalized by rider waiting penalties, by jointly optimizing state-dependent dispatching and pricing decisions. We formulate this problem as a Markov decision process with state-dependent service times that capture key features of spatial matching. We show that, under mild assumptions, the optimal dispatching policy admits a closed-form expression with a zigzag structure. This policy significantly improves the tractability of pricing optimization because of the resulting closed-form stationary distribution and a substantially reduced state space. Building on this insight, we propose an efficient and scalable dynamic programming heuristic to approximate the optimal zigzag policy in more general settings. Extensive numerical experiments with both the analytical model and ride-hailing simulations demonstrate that our algorithm is both near-optimal and highly scalable. Funding: This work was supported by a University of Washington–Amazon Science Hub Faculty Research Award. Supplemental Material: The online appendix is available at https://doi.org/10.1287/trsc.2025.0319 .


  • Case Article—Calyber: A Ridesharing Game

    by Yifan Shen, Chiwei Yan, Julia Yan

    This case introduces Calyber, a simulation-based game designed to provide a hands-on and engaging experience in developing real-time pricing and matching decisions for shared ride services, where multiple riders are pooled into a single vehicle. Students design and implement dynamic pricing and matching policies using a rich historical ridesharing data set, competing for top performance on a holdout test set. Through this case, students gain practical insight into stochastic dynamic decision making within a modern, relevant, and data-driven context. Results from previous class implementations provide strong evidence of enhanced learning and engagement. Funding: This work was supported by the National Science Foundation [Grant 2517861] and the Natural Sciences and Engineering Research Council of Canada [Grant RGPIN-2022-03524]. Supplemental Material: The Calyber Teaching Note and supplemental files are available at https://www.informs.org/Publications/Subscribe/Access-Restricted-Materials .

  • Matching Queues, Flexibility, and Incentives

    by Chiwei Yan, Francisco Castro, Peter Frazier, Hongyao Ma, Hamid Nazerzadeh

    Problem definition: In many matching markets, some agents are fully flexible, whereas others only accept a subset of jobs. For example, ride-sharing drivers can specify on the platform the destinations that they are willing to accept. Conventional wisdom suggests reserving flexible agents, but this can backfire; anticipating higher matching chances, agents may misreport as specialized, reducing overall matches. We ask how platforms can design simple matching policies that remain effective when agents act strategically. Methodology/results: We model job allocation as a bipartite matching queueing system and analyze equilibrium throughput performance under different policies when agents choose which queue to join. We show that flexibility reservation is optimal under full information but can perform poorly with private information, sometimes substantially worse than random assignment. To address this, we propose a new policy—flexibility reservation with fallback—that guarantees robust performance across settings without requiring precise knowledge of system parameters or agent utility functions. Managerial implications: Our results underscore the importance of accounting for strategic reporting in the design of matching policies; the proposed fallback policy both preserves flexibility and exploits latent flexibility when explicitly flexible agents are exhausted. Its simplicity and parameter-free nature also make it practical to implement in platforms such as ride-sharing and affordable housing allocation. Supplemental Material: The online appendix is available at https://doi.org/10.1287/msom.2024.0774 .


  • Pricing Shared Rides

    by Chiwei Yan, Julia Yan, Yifan Shen

    Pricing Based on Matching Outcomes Improves Shared Rides Operations Shared rides aspire to mitigate congestion and promote more sustainable urban transportation, but many platforms struggle to maintain a healthy and profitable shared rides product. Why have shared rides struggled, and how can platforms design a successful product? In “Pricing Shared Rides,” Chiwei Yan, Julia Yan, and Yifan Shen discuss the drawbacks of platforms’ existing pricing policies and show that a common approach to pricing suppresses demand and may even drive the platform out of the market. They then propose adjusting the price according to the extent she is matched with another rider—which proves to benefit both platform and riders alike in increased profitability and reduced payments. These benefits are especially pronounced in regimes with high cost and low demand, expanding shared rides access to areas where they have historically been most challenging to sustain.


  • Restricting entries to all-pay contests

    by Fupeng Sun, Yanwei Sun, Chiwei Yan, Li Jin

  • A Locational Demand Model for Bike-Sharing

    by Ang Xu, Chiwei Yan, Chong Yang Goh, Patrick Jaillet

    Problem definition: Micromobility systems (bike-sharing or scooter-sharing) have been widely adopted across the globe as a sustainable mode of urban transportation. To efficiently plan, operate, and monitor such systems, it is crucial to understand the underlying rider demand—where riders come from and the rates of arrivals into the service area. They serve as key inputs for downstream decisions, including capacity planning, location optimization, and rebalancing. Estimating rider demand is nontrivial as most systems only keep track of trip data, which are a biased representation of the underlying demand. Methodology/results: We develop a locational demand model to estimate rider demand only using trip and vehicle status data. We establish conditions under which our model is identifiable. In addition, we devise an expectation-maximization (EM) algorithm for efficient estimation with closed-form updates on location weights. To scale the estimation procedures, this EM algorithm is complemented with a location-discovery procedure that gradually adds new locations in the service region with large improvements to the likelihood. Experiments using both synthetic data and real data from a dockless bike-sharing system in the Seattle area demonstrate the accuracy and scalability of the model and its estimation algorithm. Managerial implications: Our theoretical results shed light on the quality of the estimates and guide the practical usage of this locational demand model. The model and its estimation algorithm equip municipal agencies and fleet operators with tools to effectively monitor service levels using daily operational data and assess demand shifts because of capacity changes at specific locations. Funding: This work was supported by The Pacific Northwest Transportation Consortium (PacTrans) [Grant 69A3551747110]. Supplemental Material: The online appendix is available at https://doi.org/10.1287/msom.2023.0306 .


  • Open Access

    On-Off Systems with Strategic Customers

    by Yanwei Sun, Zhe Liu, Chiwei Yan

    Motivated by applications such as urban traffic control and make-to-order systems, we study a fluid model of a single-server, on-off system that can accommodate multiple queues. The server visits each queue in order: when a queue is served, it is "on", and when the server is serving another queue or transitioning between queues, it is "off". Customers arrive over time, observe the state of the system, and decide whether to join. We consider two regimes for the formation of the on and off durations. In the exogenous setting, each queue's on and off durations are predetermined. We explicitly characterize the equilibrium outcome in closed form and give a compact linear program to compute the optimal on-off durations that maximizes total reward collected from serving customers. In the endogenous setting, the durations depend on customers' joining decisions under an exhaustive service policy where the server never leaves a non-empty queue. We show that an optimal policy in this case extends service beyond the first clearance for at most one queue. Using this property, we introduce a closed-form procedure that computes an optimal policy in no more than 2n steps for a system with n queues.

  • Open Access

    Restricting Entries to All-Pay Contests

    by Fupeng Sun, Yanwei Sun, Chiwei Yan, Li Jin

    We study an all-pay contest where players with low abilities are filtered prior to the round of competing for prizes. These are often practiced due to limited resources or to enhance the competitiveness of the contest. We consider a setting where the designer admits a certain number of top players into the contest. The players admitted into the contest update their beliefs about their opponents based on the signal that their abilities are among the top. We find that their posterior beliefs, even with IID priors, are correlated and depend on players' private abilities, representing a unique feature of this game. We explicitly characterize the symmetric and unique Bayesian equilibrium strategy and compare it with a contest that admits all players. We also discuss a two-stage extension where players with top first-stage efforts can proceed to the second stage competing for prizes. A full version of this paper can be found at https://arxiv.org/pdf/2205.08104.