Martin Caminada
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Previous Organizations / Institutes
The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years
Martin Caminada has a total of 11 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Edmond Awad
The Media Lab, Institute for Data, Systems and Society, Massachusetts Institute of Technology , Cambridge , MA, USA
2 shared publications - Iyad Rahwan
Center for Humans and Machines, Max Planck Institute for Human Development, Berlin, Germany
2 shared publications - Bertram Ludäscher
University of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign
1 shared publication Chiaki Sakama
Wakayama University
1 shared publication- Claudia Schulz
Ubiquitous Knowledge Processing (UKP) Lab, TU Darmstadt, Darmstadt, Germany
1 shared publication - Gabriella Pigozzi
LAMSADE, Université Paris-Dauphine, PSL Research University, 75016 Paris, France.
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- 24 September 2025
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 395-410
Winning by Numbers: Connecting Strong Admissibility to Optimal Play in Argumentation
- 24 September 2025
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 395-410
Winning by Numbers: Connecting Strong Admissibility to Optimal Play in Argumentation
- 24 September 2025
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 424-436
Strong Admissibility and Infinite Argumentation Frameworks
- 24 September 2025
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 424-436
Strong Admissibility and Infinite Argumentation Frameworks
- Open Access
- 14 December 2017
- Published by AI Access Foundation in Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research
- Vol. 60, 779-825
On the Equivalence between Assumption-Based Argumentation and Logic Programming
Assumption-Based Argumentation (ABA) has been shown to subsume various other non-monotonic reasoning formalisms, among them normal logic programming (LP). We re-examine the relationship between ABA and LP and show that normal LP also subsumes (flat) ABA. More precisely, we specify a procedure that given a (flat) ABA framework yields an associated logic program with almost the same syntax whose semantics coincide with those of the ABA framework. That is, the 3-valued stable (respectively well-founded, regular, 2-valued stable, and ideal) models of the associated logic program coincide with the complete (respectively grounded, preferred, stable, and ideal) assumption labellings and extensions of the ABA framework. Moreover, we show how our results on the translation from ABA to LP can be reapplied for a reverse translation from LP to ABA, and observe that some of the existing results in the literature are in fact special cases of our work. Overall, we show that (flat) ABA frameworks can be seen as normal logic programs with a slightly different syntax. This implies that methods developed for one of these formalisms can be equivalently applied to the other by simply modifying the syntax.
- 14 December 2017
- Published by AI Access Foundation in Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research
- Vol. 60, 779-825
Open AccessOn the Equivalence between Assumption-Based Argumentation and Logic Programming
Assumption-Based Argumentation (ABA) has been shown to subsume various other non-monotonic reasoning formalisms, among them normal logic programming (LP). We re-examine the relationship between ABA and LP and show that normal LP also subsumes (flat) ABA. More precisely, we specify a procedure that given a (flat) ABA framework yields an associated logic program with almost the same syntax whose semantics coincide with those of the ABA framework. That is, the 3-valued stable (respectively well-founded, regular, 2-valued stable, and ideal) models of the associated logic program coincide with the complete (respectively grounded, preferred, stable, and ideal) assumption labellings and extensions of the ABA framework. Moreover, we show how our results on the translation from ABA to LP can be reapplied for a reverse translation from LP to ABA, and observe that some of the existing results in the literature are in fact special cases of our work. Overall, we show that (flat) ABA frameworks can be seen as normal logic programs with a slightly different syntax. This implies that methods developed for one of these formalisms can be equivalently applied to the other by simply modifying the syntax.
- Open Access
- 30 May 2017
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in Journal of Logic and Computation
- Vol. 27 (8) , 2581-2609
Pareto optimality and strategy-proofness in group argument evaluation
- 30 May 2017
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in Journal of Logic and Computation
- Vol. 27 (8) , 2581-2609
Open AccessPareto optimality and strategy-proofness in group argument evaluation
- Open Access
Experimental Assessment of Aggregation Principles in Argumentation-enabled Collective Intelligence
On the Web, there is always a need to aggregate opinions from the crowd (as in posts, social networks, forums, etc.). Different mechanisms have been implemented to capture these opinions such as "Like" in Facebook, "Favorite" in Twitter, thumbs-up/down, flagging, and so on. However, in more contested domains (e.g. Wikipedia, political discussion, and climate change discussion) these mechanisms are not sufficient since they only deal with each issue independently without considering the relationships between different claims. We can view a set of conflicting arguments as a graph in which the nodes represent arguments and the arcs between these nodes represent the defeat relation. A group of people can then collectively evaluate such graphs. To do this, the group must use a rule to aggregate their individual opinions about the entire argument graph. Here, we present the first experimental evaluation of different principles commonly employed by aggregation rules presented in the literature. We use randomized controlled experiments to investigate which principles people consider better at aggregating opinions under different conditions. Our analysis reveals a number of factors, not captured by traditional formal models, that play an important role in determining the efficacy of aggregation. These results help bring formal models of argumentation closer to real-world application.
Open AccessExperimental Assessment of Aggregation Principles in Argumentation-enabled Collective Intelligence
On the Web, there is always a need to aggregate opinions from the crowd (as in posts, social networks, forums, etc.). Different mechanisms have been implemented to capture these opinions such as "Like" in Facebook, "Favorite" in Twitter, thumbs-up/down, flagging, and so on. However, in more contested domains (e.g. Wikipedia, political discussion, and climate change discussion) these mechanisms are not sufficient since they only deal with each issue independently without considering the relationships between different claims. We can view a set of conflicting arguments as a graph in which the nodes represent arguments and the arcs between these nodes represent the defeat relation. A group of people can then collectively evaluate such graphs. To do this, the group must use a rule to aggregate their individual opinions about the entire argument graph. Here, we present the first experimental evaluation of different principles commonly employed by aggregation rules presented in the literature. We use randomized controlled experiments to investigate which principles people consider better at aggregating opinions under different conditions. Our analysis reveals a number of factors, not captured by traditional formal models, that play an important role in determining the efficacy of aggregation. These results help bring formal models of argumentation closer to real-world application.