Shaorong Sun
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Research Subjects
Research Interests
Shaorong Sun has a total of 9 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
Na Sun
University of Shanghai for Science and Technology
10 shared publications- Faluk Shair
Business School, University of Shanghai for Science and Technology, Shanghai, China
1 shared publication - Hafiz Waqas Kamran
Department of Business Administration, IQRA University, Karachi, Pakistan
1 shared publication - Lei Hang
Department of Fintech, Shanghai Normal University Tianhua College, Shanghai 201815, China
1 shared publication - Muhammad Atif Nawaz
Department of Economics, The Islamia University of Bahawalpur, Bahawalpur, Pakistan
1 shared publication - Muhammed Sajjad Hussain
Superior University Lahore, Lahore, Pakistan
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 21 April 2022
- Published by MDPI AG in Algorithms
- Vol. 15 (5) , 137
Behavioral Game Theory Model in Pollution Control with Additional Supervision
The work is devoted to the study of the impact of external control on the strategies of pollutant discharge enterprises and government regulators in the field of environmental protection. The authors construct a model of the relationship between these entities. It is an evolutionary game in which the players are entities that generate pollutants and the government departments that implement pollution supervision. The choice of strategies of both of these entities and the evolutionary stability of the system controlled by different regulatory efforts, i.e., a third party, are analyzed. The authors then verify the evolutionary paths and evolutionary results of the model under different conditions using simulation analysis based on this model. The conducted research shows that the weak power of third-party supervision is not enough to promote the evolution of the behavioral decisions of the government and enterprises. An appropriate increase in the power of third-party supervision will change the choice of the government and enterprises strategies in the short term; however, due to the mutual influence of the strategies between both sides of the game, in this situation, the evolutionary system does not pursue a stable state. The strong power of third-party supervision will push enterprises to choose a pollution control strategy, change the intensity of government supervision, and replace government supervision to a certain extent. It is an interesting example of modeling the relationship of this system on the basis of evolutionary game theory. The findings can be regarded as a theoretical reference for environmental pollution control of enterprises.
- 21 April 2022
- Published by MDPI AG in Algorithms
- Vol. 15 (5) , 137
Open AccessBehavioral Game Theory Model in Pollution Control with Additional Supervision
The work is devoted to the study of the impact of external control on the strategies of pollutant discharge enterprises and government regulators in the field of environmental protection. The authors construct a model of the relationship between these entities. It is an evolutionary game in which the players are entities that generate pollutants and the government departments that implement pollution supervision. The choice of strategies of both of these entities and the evolutionary stability of the system controlled by different regulatory efforts, i.e., a third party, are analyzed. The authors then verify the evolutionary paths and evolutionary results of the model under different conditions using simulation analysis based on this model. The conducted research shows that the weak power of third-party supervision is not enough to promote the evolution of the behavioral decisions of the government and enterprises. An appropriate increase in the power of third-party supervision will change the choice of the government and enterprises strategies in the short term; however, due to the mutual influence of the strategies between both sides of the game, in this situation, the evolutionary system does not pursue a stable state. The strong power of third-party supervision will push enterprises to choose a pollution control strategy, change the intensity of government supervision, and replace government supervision to a certain extent. It is an interesting example of modeling the relationship of this system on the basis of evolutionary game theory. The findings can be regarded as a theoretical reference for environmental pollution control of enterprises.
- 6 January 2021
- Published by Springer Nature in Environmental Science and Pollution Research
- Vol. 28 (16) , 20822-20838
Assessing the efficiency and total factor productivity growth of the banking industry: do environmental concerns matters?
This paper investigates the efficiency and total factor productivity (TFP) growth of the Pakistani banking industry and determines the impact of risk and competition on the efficiency and TFP growth. The data envelopment analysis (DEA)–based Malmquist productivity index is used to measure efficiency and TFP growth of the Pakistani banking industry. The generalized method of moments (GMM) model is applied to observe the impact of risk and competition on efficiency and TFP growth. The motivation behind the use of GMM model is its ability to overcome unobserved heterogeneity, autocorrelation, and endogeneity issues. The results of the study show that the credit and liquidity risks have positive while insolvency risk has negative effect on the efficiency and TFP growth. The competition leads to improve technological efficiency but declines the technical efficiency growth. Among other explanatory variables, operational cost management, banking sector development, GDP growth rate, and infrastructure development show significant relationships with various efficiencies and TFP growth. The banks also facilitate for the purchase of carbon-intensive products in order to reduce carbon emissions. Strong banking development successfully allocate their financial resources for the development of energy-efficient technology while banking sector development is found to be negatively related with environmental sustainability. The strong banking sector possesses a significant negative influence on carbon reduction and environmental degradation.
- 6 January 2021
- Published by Springer Nature in Environmental Science and Pollution Research
- Vol. 28 (16) , 20822-20838
Assessing the efficiency and total factor productivity growth of the banking industry: do environmental concerns matters?
This paper investigates the efficiency and total factor productivity (TFP) growth of the Pakistani banking industry and determines the impact of risk and competition on the efficiency and TFP growth. The data envelopment analysis (DEA)–based Malmquist productivity index is used to measure efficiency and TFP growth of the Pakistani banking industry. The generalized method of moments (GMM) model is applied to observe the impact of risk and competition on efficiency and TFP growth. The motivation behind the use of GMM model is its ability to overcome unobserved heterogeneity, autocorrelation, and endogeneity issues. The results of the study show that the credit and liquidity risks have positive while insolvency risk has negative effect on the efficiency and TFP growth. The competition leads to improve technological efficiency but declines the technical efficiency growth. Among other explanatory variables, operational cost management, banking sector development, GDP growth rate, and infrastructure development show significant relationships with various efficiencies and TFP growth. The banks also facilitate for the purchase of carbon-intensive products in order to reduce carbon emissions. Strong banking development successfully allocate their financial resources for the development of energy-efficient technology while banking sector development is found to be negatively related with environmental sustainability. The strong banking sector possesses a significant negative influence on carbon reduction and environmental degradation.
- 28 August 2018
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 115-128
Evolution and Stability
- 28 August 2018
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 37-51
Free Ride, Adverse Selection, Moral Hazard and Separating Equilibrium
- 28 August 2018
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 37-51
Free Ride, Adverse Selection, Moral Hazard and Separating Equilibrium
- 28 August 2018
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 93-101
Coalitions—Disintegration and Stability
- 28 August 2018
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 69-84
Coalitional Games
- 28 August 2018
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 53-62
First-Move Advantage and Second-Move Advantage